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ABSTRACT 
 
The thrust of this study is to provide a critical reading of the configuration of 
borders through the discourse of one of the main institutions of the European Union 
(EU), the European Commission. My starting point is the observation of multiplication 
and transformation of EU and European borders as a result of the process of integration. 
This implies simultaneous processes of de-bordering, border construction and 
reconstruction. Despite that the overwhelming majority of current research tends to 
focus on one aspect of these trends at the expense of the others. My premise is that as a 
supranational institution, the European Commission is ideally placed to provide an 
empirical illustration of how these processes occurs. It has a vested interest and an 
ability to promote further integration and therefore, ambiguous border configurations in 
its discourse highlight current limitations to border transcendence that instead lead to 
multiplication and transformation of EU and European borders.  
The research provides a comprehensive examination of the different types of 
borders configured by the discourse of the European Commission, thus allowing 
analysis of how exactly these are articulated. It looks into a number of EU policy areas, 
border controls, free movement of people, social policy and the European 
Neighbourhood Policy and, employing the strategy of double reading, examines various 
Commission documents in the period after the adoption of the Single European Act. 
The main body of the thesis starts with a theoretical framework, which outlines the most 
important concepts used in the research, which inform the analysis in the subsequent 
empirical chapters. 
The major finding of the study is that in each of the policy areas examined, there 
are ambiguous configurations of borders. At the surface, the Commission discourse 
tends to focus on formulations that imply decreased importance of borders. A critical 
engagement with the articulations, however, reveals simultaneous construction and 
reconstruction of EU external and internal borders. This exposes the inherent limitations 
to border transcendence and allows interrogating how the ambiguous border 
configurations are articulated. Thus, the major contribution of the research to the 
relevant academic fields is to provide a rich empirical account of the different ways in 
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which EU and European borders are configured in Commission discourse and to 
analyse the Commission contribution to this process.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
BORDERS, INTEGRATION AND THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION 
 
 
Out of the ruins of the Second World War a unique international organisation 
was created in Europe, the European Community (EC), which in 1990 was incorporated 
in the European Union (EU). What set the EC apart from other international 
organisations was the existence of supranational institutions that in principle
1
 in certain 
cases can propose or implement legally binding decisions even without the consent of 
all the member states. One such institution is the European Commission, which over the 
years has contributed to pushing forward the process of European integration. For 
example, over the issue of migration that traditionally has caused a lot of controversy, 
the Commission position has been: “Let us try to use a new expression: EU mobility.”2 
This cross-border mobility means that with the lifting of most internal border controls, 
EU citizens can move as freely within the EU as they can in their own country.
3
 The 
Commission stance clearly rejects the fear of being “swamped by foreigners”4 because: 
“The Union‟s long experience with free movement shows that it does not lead to mass 
migration.”5 
This Commission position concurs with the aims of the Preamble of the Treaty 
of Rome, which declared that the signing parties are: “Determined to lay the 
foundations of an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, Resolved to ensure 
the economic and social progress of their countries by common action to eliminate the 
                                               
1 Although de jure this settlement has existed since the Treaty of Rome, as a result of the Luxembourg 
compromise, de facto it was not really used until the Single European Act in the 1980s. 
2 Franco Frattini, Enhanced Mobility, Vigorous Integration Strategy and Zero Tolerance to Illegal 
Employment: a Dynamic Approach to European Immigration Policies, SPEECH/07/526, 13.09.2007, p. 2 
(emphasis in the original) 
3 http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/top_layer/index_15_en.htm, accessed on 30.06.2009 
4 Hans van den Broek, Switzerland and the European Union, SPEECH/96/132, 24.05.1996, p. 3. 
Importantly in the speech he refers to other citizens of the EEA. Despite the decades of integration, free 
movement of workers in the EU can still cause significant debates, as the protests in the UK in the 
beginning of 2009 clearly showed.  
5 Ibid. 
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barriers which divide Europe”.6 Therefore, from the outset the Founders of the 
integration process in Europe realised that there is a very important and strong link 
between integration and borders. If the envisaged “ever closer union” was to be 
achieved, this would require an alteration in the ways for regulating who is to be 
allowed in or kept out, and how; the functions performed by borders. The existing 
divides between the member states have to be replaced with the emergence of a 
common area. Thus, the example of “EU mobility” can be read as the Commission 
promoting the opening-up of borders inside the EC/EU, which in turn helps to achieve 
the goals of European integration. Such an understanding is in tune with one of the most 
prominent theories of integration, Neo-functionalism, which has long regarded the 
Commission as the “motor of the integration process”.7 Furthermore, it concurs with 
conventional accounts that see the integration process as transcending political, social or 
economic borders. However, such accounts hold true only when the attention is on the 
developments inside the European Union, thus leading to decreased significance of 
internal Union borders. As the discussion in section 2.2.1. illustrates, commentators 
have on many occasions pointed out that the process of integration in Europe has led to 
the emergence of a new border at the external edges of the Union. Thus, the integration 
process is an ambiguous one that overcomes but also constructs new borders.
8  
The construction of borders under integration can be illustrated by pointing out 
that when immigration from outside the EU is concerned, the Commission has declared 
much more limited objectives in relation to migration issues: “I therefore clearly and 
publicly emphasise that this proposal does not allow one single entry to one single 
immigrant into the labour markets of the European Union. The Commission is clearly 
not creating a subjective right to immigration. It is simply aiming at harmonising the 
procedure for admission.”9 These more modest goals mean that in distinction to the 
complete opening-up of borders supported in the previous example, in this case, the 
                                               
6 Preamble, Treaty of Rome, available at 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/TRAITES_1957_CEE.pdf, 
accessed on 16.02.2009 (emphasis added) 
7 See for example Chris Shore, Building Europe – the Cultural Politics of European Identity (London: 
Routledge, 2000), p. 3 
8 Thomas Diez, „The Paradoxes of Europe‟s Borders‟, Comparative European Politics, 4: 2/3 (2006), pp. 
235 - 252 
9 Antonio Vitorino, Asylum is a Right, Economic Migration is an Opportunity, SPEECH/03/71, 
11.02.2003, p. 2. Importantly, in distinction to the example on mobility, which refers to EU citizens, the 
proposal cited in this quotation refers to non-EU citizens.  
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result will be more selective. Thus, in this second case the Commission in effect 
promotes the construction and reconstruction of borders. 
Therefore, taken together, these examples show ambiguous and dynamic ways 
in which the articulations of the European Commission configure borders. Despite that, 
as this study demonstrates, in the overwhelming majority of cases the explicit 
enunciations of the Commission pertain to the transcendence of borders. Therefore, in 
order to uncover the trends to construction and reconstruction of borders it is necessary 
to engage critically with Commission discourse. This will allow me not only to 
demonstrate the ambiguous ways in which the Commission configures borders but also 
to examine how exactly these are articulated. This last point is crucial. Although, as the 
literature review in the next chapter shows, there has been an acknowledgement of the 
ambiguous relationship between borders and integration, at present there is still 
insufficient empirical examination of the way in which this has happened. The present 
study seeks to contribute in addressing this lacuna in the current academic research.     
My goal is twofold. On the one hand the critical examination of Commission 
discourse enables me to point out how despite the prevalent rhetoric of the Commission 
of border transcendence, the construction and reconstruction of borders, identified by 
numerous commentators, has come about. On the other hand, I want to interrogate the 
exact ways in which borders are configured (i.e. explicitly or implicitly; through 
erecting/ removing physical or identity borders) and the Commission‟s contribution to 
the process. 
Such a critical engagement with the bordering practices of the Commission is of 
paramount importance if we are to get a more accurate and comprehensive 
understanding of the ways in which the Commission promotion of integration 
configures borders. Therefore, this research contributes to the empirical and theoretical 
debates in border and integration studies in several major ways. Firstly, it contributes 
towards overcoming more simplistic accounts that tend to focus on one side of this 
interrelation. Very often, as the review of the academic debates in Chapter Two will 
reveal, scholars tend to concentrate either on the de-bordering or on the border-
constructing outcomes of integration, thus down-playing the other one. My project, 
through the concrete case studies included, demonstrates that these two tendencies are 
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simultaneous and are inextricably linked. Such an understanding is crucial for a more 
realistic account of the link between borders and integration.  
Secondly, the findings of the study provide insights into the role played by the 
Commission in the process of border reconstruction. Thus, it is related to one of the 
primary theoretical debates within Integration Studies – the debate between more 
Intergovernmentalist accounts and Neo-functionalist accounts. The findings highlight 
the grounds on which Commission documents justify the need for further integration, 
thus contributing to decreased importance of internal EU borders. Also, the border 
construction and reconstruction trends demonstrate some of the important limitations 
the Commission faces in fulfilling in practice the drive towards decreasing the salience 
of internal borders in the EU. Furthermore, these trends enable analysis of the factors 
leading to and the specific ways in which external EU borders are configured in 
Commission discourse. These border alterations lead to reconfiguration of European 
borders as well due to the EU being a regional organisation. Thirdly, the detailed 
examination of Commission documents will allow me to analyse the ways in which 
various kinds of borders are articulated, thus demonstrating any differences and 
similarities across the policy areas examined.     
Given the complexity of both the integration project and the question of borders, 
this study specifies a more concrete time frame and issue areas on which it will focus. 
Such delineation maps out the scope of the research. Although in the section on the 
methodology of the research in the next chapter I explain in greater detail the reasons 
behind the choice of each of the above, below I briefly outline the period and the policy 
areas that are considered in this inquiry. 
In this thesis I concentrate on examining the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP), border controls, free movement of people, and social policy. There are two main 
reasons for this selection. The first of them is related to borders. Although, as the 
Literature Review in the next chapter will reveal, there is a growing number of studies 
dealing with EU borders, they nevertheless tend to focus in their overwhelming majority 
on several main issues such as Schengen, migration, or the EU‟s relations with its 
neighbours. These are all areas that traditionally have been concerned with regulating 
the relationship of an entity with the outside world and have thus conventionally been 
associated with borders. Hence, it is no surprise that studies devoted to EU borders are 
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often related to the EU‟s external limits. Yet, there are other areas in which Commission 
documents configure borders that are not usually in the limelight. These can be 
exemplified by the undertakings in a number of areas related to the completion of the 
internal market, such as social policy, the free movement of workers, or monetary 
union. All these are more closely related to the enterprise of economic integration than 
to “high politics” and therefore are not usually associated with borders. If they are, the 
focus tends to be on the trend towards decreasing the salience of internal EU borders as 
a result of the integration process. Thus, as far as Union borders are concerned, there are 
two types of policy areas – one explicitly related to borders and another much less so. 
Therefore, I look into two policies that are clearly related to borders (ENP and border 
controls) and two policies that are not usually directly associated with borders (free 
movement of people and social policy). Engagement with the former type of policies is 
necessary due to its salience when dealing with borders, while with the latter because it 
will provide important new insights.  
The second reason for selecting these case studies is related to the Commission. 
Given the complex governing structure of the EU, the Commission has different powers 
and responsibilities depending on the issue area.
10
 The policies listed above are from 
different pillars, which will allow seeing how (if at all) this has had an impact on the 
ways in which Commission documents configure borders. Furthermore, Schengen was 
moved from the third to the first pillar with the Treaty of Amsterdam. This will make it 
possible to analyse if the transfer has had any impact on the configuration of borders in 
Commission documents.  
The policy areas examined, however, are diverse in another way as well – they 
all have been initiated at different points in time. For example, the issues related to the 
free movement of workers and social policy have their origins in the Treaty of Rome 
that was signed in 1957. Border controls are more closely related to the cooperation of 
Interior Ministries that was launched by the Schengen Agreement, signed in 1985, 
which initially started outside of the framework of the EC. The ENP was only 
established in the wake of the Eastern Enlargement in 2003. This inevitably poses the 
                                               
10 There are three pillars in the governing structure of the EU. The powers and responsibilities of the 
Commission are greatest in the first one, where the cooperation is supranational and it has the sole power 
of legislative initiative. In the other two pillars, cooperation is still intergovernmental and the 
Commission shares its legislative initiative rights with the Council of Ministers. 
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question of what is the time frame of the research? Given the number of policy areas to 
be examined, it is not possible to examine each of them from the time they were 
initiated. Therefore, the way the time frame was decided upon needs to be spelled out. I 
have focused my study of Commission documents on examination of those issued in the 
period after 1987 when the Single European Act (SEA) came into force. The reason for 
this is that this Treaty explicitly aimed at “progressively establishing the internal market 
… “11, where the internal market is defined as: “… an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured …”12. The 
SEA is widely regarded as a manifestation of the revival of integration efforts after a 
long period of stagnation in 1970s. This definition of the internal market shows it 
clearly aims at diminishing the significance of internal borders, and thus, provides a 
fertile ground for critical engagement with the integration-borders nexus.   
Chapter Two will now develop the theoretical framework that will allow 
examining how Commission documents configure borders in the next four chapters. To 
that end Chapter Two provides an overview of the relevant academic debates, focusing 
more specifically on the existing studies on EU borders, on briefly reviewing the major 
theoretical approaches to studying borders and on outlining the different positions on 
the Commission‟s role in the process of integration. The aim of these reviews is to 
present the main developments in the relevant fields and to identify the problems and 
shortcomings in each of them, which this research addresses. The second section 
develops the theoretical framework of the research. I present my account of the 
Commission‟s role in the process of integration and reconfiguration of borders, 
elaborate on my understanding of how borders are created and classify them. This 
clarifies my understanding of the main terms of the study and the ways they interrelate 
with each other. The third section presents in detail the methodology of this study – it 
introduces the double reading technique, the type of Commission documents that are 
studied and the ways in which the documents were interrogated. 
Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six form the empirical part of the investigation 
by looking at exactly how Commission documents in the various policy areas configure 
                                               
11  Article 13 of the Single European Act, available at 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/SEA/Single%20European%20Act.p
df, accessed on 22.10.2007 
12 Ibid. 
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borders. Chapter Three is devoted to the configuration of borders in the area of border 
controls. Chapter Four deals with the area of free movement of people. These two 
chapters are instances of Commission documents either striving to open up internal EU 
borders or being more explicit about the ways in which they configure borders. In that 
respect, although they are still ambiguous to some extent, they are examples of more 
straightforward or positive configuration of borders in the documents of the 
Commission. Chapter Five critically examines Commission documents on social policy 
and Chapter Six engages with Commission documents on the ENP. In comparison to 
the first two empirical chapters these two chapters are instances of much more 
ambiguous configuration of borders by Commission documents. They provide examples 
of these documents not only opening up spaces but also of actively closing spaces. 
Thus, in these two areas the tendencies towards the construction and reconstruction of 
borders by Commission documents are more pronounced. Importantly, these latter 
tendencies are not always explicit and can only be unveiled through a reading of 
Commission documents that relates them with other documents in the same or a 
different policy area that reveal the inherent contradictions between them and by 
analising the silences within the discourses. 
The thesis finishes with a Conclusion Chapter, which summarises the findings 
of the study. It highlights that although the articulations of the Commission in all the 
policy areas emphasise the existence of a common area in the EU, a critical examination 
of the discourses also reveals enunciations that contribute to construction and 
reconstruction of borders. Despite this underlying common trend, across the policy 
areas there are variations along two major lines. Firstly, different types of borders are 
configured in different fields. For example, while social policy discourse configures 
primarily identity borders, border controls one deals overwhelmingly with territorial 
borders. Secondly, the particular contribution of the Commission to the configuration of 
borders has been different. The Commission has been successful in promoting its more 
inclusive vision towards highly qualified Third Country Nationals in the Blue Card 
initiative. This was not the case in the field of long-term visas, however, where 
Commission articulations merely reproduce already existing settlements.  I also argue 
that although Neo-functionalist accounts can be seen as providing a ground for 
anticipating Commission‟s favourable disposition to the construction of EU‟s external 
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borders, they do not present an in-depth narrative of how exactly this comes about. This 
is a serious shortcoming given that the analysis in the empirical chapters shows that in 
all the policy areas Commission articulations contribute to the construction of the 
external Union borders.  
 19 
CHAPTER TWO 
 
BORDER CONFIGURATIONS – A THEORETICAL AND 
METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK 
  
  
2.1. Introduction  
As I have shown in Chapter One, Commission articulations on controversial 
political issues display ambiguous configurations of borders. This is in tune with the 
argument of many EU observers that European integration has led to the construction 
and reconstruction of borders. One of the most important examples of that is the 
emergence of the EU‟s external borders. Despite this observation, at present there is a 
lack of an in-depth examination into the particular ways in which EU borders are 
constructed and reconstructed in Commission discourse, which has had a central role in 
furthering integration and hence, border transformations. The present study seeks to 
rectify that. Such an engagement will not only provide a much more comprehensive 
understanding of the ways in which the Commission configures borders but will also 
allow analysis of the specific ways in which various borders are enunciated. In order to 
be able to successfully engage with these issues, however, I have to first address core 
conceptual questions, which is the aim of this chapter, thus laying down the foundations 
of the empirical part of the study. 
 This chapter is divided into three main sections. The first one reviews the 
current academic debates on the effects of integration on EU borders, the main 
approaches to studying borders and the different accounts of the role played by the 
Commission in the process of integration. My aim is twofold. On the one hand I want to 
present the major debates and findings of these studies and on the other to identify 
issues they do not address exhaustively. Building on these reviews, in the second part I 
develop my theoretical framework. I present my accounts of what borders are, why and 
how the Commission can influence the construction of EU borders and analyse the 
different possible border configurations by the Commission. This clarifies my position, 
situates it within the wider academic debates and presents the main lines that structure 
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the analysis in the following chapters. The third section deals with the methodological 
issues of the research. It explains how the data was selected and collected and how I 
analysed it.  
 
 
2.2. Academic Debates on EU Borders and the Commission 
There are three main brands of academic literature that are pertinent to this 
research, which I review in this section. These are the debates on the role played by the 
Commission in the process of integration in the EU, the different approaches to border 
studies in Political Science and the investigations into the impact on borders of the 
integration process in the EU. 
 
2.2.1. Studies on EU borders  
There are several main ways in which the EU borders have inspired the research 
of scholars. The first brand is concerned with the multiplication of spaces in Europe. 
For example Bialasiewicz, Elden and Pinter
1
, Balibar
2
, Diez
3
, Rumford and Delanty
4
 all 
point to some of the major changes that have led to significant shifts in the organisation 
of space in Europe and the EU. In a nutshell these are a result of the process of 
European integration that has led to a redefinition of the relationship between inside (the 
specific country) and the outside (the arena of international relations) through the 
transfer of sovereignty from the central state governments upwards towards the 
institutions of the EU and downwards towards local authorities. The occurrence of such 
changes is important as a point of departure for my research because the process of the 
multiplication of spaces logically goes hand in hand with the multiplication of borders, 
which happens in two main ways. Firstly, the multiplicity of spaces entails a variety of 
borders (on the same principle on which the increasing number of sovereign states has 
                                               
1 Luiza Bialasiewicz, Stuart Elden, Joe Pinter, „Constitution of EU Territory‟, Comparative European 
Politics, 3: 3 (2005), pp. 333-363  
2 Etienne Balibar, „The Borders of Europe‟ in Pheng Cheah, Bruce Robinson (eds), Cosmopolitics. 
Thinking and Feeling Beyond the Nation (Minneapolis: University of Minnestota Press, 1998), pp. 216-
229 
3 Thomas Diez, „The Paradoxes of Europe‟s Borders‟, Comparative European Politics, 4: 2/3 (2006), pp. 
235-252 
4 Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005); Chris Rumford, „Theorizing Borders‟, European Journal of 
Social Theory, 9: 2 (2006), pp. 155-169 
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resulted in an increase of the number of borders). This is a quantitative multiplication of 
borders. Secondly, the multiplication of spaces leads to multiple borders in a qualitative 
aspect, which means that in some particular cases the way borders operate has 
substantially altered in comparison to the way traditional nation-state borders work. 
Examples of qualitative changes in borders are boundaries emerging as a result of 
regionalisation and multilevel governance. The qualitative multiplication of borders: 
“… requires new ways of thinking about the spatiality of politics”5 and about the 
specific nature and functions of contemporary EU borders.  
 The literature that explores the issues related to the qualitative multiplication of 
borders is the second brand of studies on EU borders. They are important to this 
research because they provide different ways of thinking about how EU borders have 
changed in comparison to traditional Westphalian state borders. This brand of studies 
tackles the question of how the emerging EU order is best conceived of – as 
Westphalian, medieval, etc. These studies rest on the argument made by Albert, 
Jacobson and Lapid that borders and orders are intimately related and therefore should 
be studied in connection to each other.
6
 According to Albert et. al.: “… acts of 
bordering (i. e. the inscription, crossing, removal, transformation, multiplication and/or 
diversification of borders) invariably carry momentous ramifications for political 
ordering at all levels of analysis.”7 In a similar vein Kratochwil has argued that: 
“Changes in the function of boundaries throughout history help to illuminate differences 
in the nature and patterns of interaction of different domestic and international 
systems.”8 The main contribution of this brand of studies to my research is twofold. 
Firstly, some of these studies elaborate on the kind of political entity the Union is. 
Secondly, they outline different categories of borders in various orders and from that 
perspective analyse EU borders. 
                                               
5 Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005), p. 120 
6 Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders – Rethinking 
International Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001) 
7 Yosef Lapid, „Introduction: Identity, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New 
Direction‟ in Mathias Albert, David Jacobson, Yosef Lapid (eds), Identities, Borders, Orders – 
Rethinking International Relations Theory (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), pp. 1- 20, 
p. 7  
8 Friedrich Kratochwil, „Of Systems, Boundaries, and Territoriality: An Inquiry into the Formation of the 
State System‟, World Politics, 39: 1 (1986), pp. 27-52, p. 27 
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Two of the important contributions that illustrate the debates on the definition of 
the EC/EU as a political entity are the studies by Caporaso, examining the institutional 
structure of the Union in light of three stylised forms of state (Westphalian, regulatory 
and post-modern),
9
 and Schmitter‟s concluding chapter in “Governance in the European 
Union” 10, which presents four scenarios as an outcome of the formation of the EU 
polity, namely Stato/ Federatio, Confederatio, Consortio, and Condominio. According 
to Schmitter the emergent institutional structure of the EU is novel because it: “… 
opens the way for the institutionalization of diversity – for a multitude of relatively 
independent European arrangements with distinct statutes, functions, resources and 
memberships, not coordinated by a single central organization and operating under 
different decision rules.”11 In a similar vein the three types of states examined by 
Caporaso are chosen because each of them captures some of the important features of 
the EU and therefore, is a partially accurate representation of it.
12
  
A very important conclusion that can be drawn from the findings of studies 
similar to Caporaso‟s and Schmitter‟s is that the traditional, also referred to as 
Westphalian, way of organising political life is not providing an adequate representation 
of the manner in which relations are organised in the EU.
13
 This has been put most 
                                               
9 James Caporaso, „The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 1 (1996), pp. 29-52 
10 Philippe Schmitter, „Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts‟ in Gary 
Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe Schmitter, Wolfgang Streeck, Governance in the European Union 
(London: Sage, 1998), pp. 121-150, especially pp. 135-136 
11 Ibid., p. 127 
12 James Caporaso, „The European Union and Forms of State: Westphalian, Regulatory or Post-Modern?‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 1 (1996), pp. 29-52, p. 34 
13 The following studies are particularly relevant for outlining some of the underlying features of the 
Westphalian order: Ron Johnston, „„Out of the „Moribund Backwater‟: Territory and Territoriality in 
Political Geography‟, Political Geography, 20: 6 (2001), pp. 677-693; Peter Taylor, „The State as 
Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System‟, Progress in Human Geography, 18: 2 (1994), pp. 
151-162; James Caporaso, „Changes in the Westphalian Order: Territory, Public Authority, and 
Sovereignty‟, International Studies Review, 2: 2 (2000), p. 1-28; Stephen Krasner, „Westphalia and All 
That‟ in Judith Goldstein, Robert Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy (London: Cornell University 
Press, 1993), pp. 235-264; Stephen Krasner, „Rethinking the Sovereign State Model‟, Review of 
International Studies, 27: 5 (2001), pp. 17-42; Alexander Murphy, „The Sovereign State as Political-
Territorial Idea: Historical and Contemporary Considerations‟ in Thomas Biersteker, Cynthia Weber 
(eds), State Sovereignty as Social Construct (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 81-120; 
John Gerard Ruggie, „Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Towards a Neorealist 
Syntheses‟, World Politics, 35: 2 (1983), pp. 261-285; Emmanuel Brunet-Jailly, „Theorizing Borders: an 
Interdisciplinary Perspective‟, Geopolitics, 10: 4 (2005), pp. 633-649; R. B. J. Walker, Inside/ Outside: 
International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Tuomas 
Forseberg, „The Ground Without Foundation? Territory as a Social Construct‟, Geopolitics, 8: 2 (2003), 
pp. 7-24; A. Kemp, U. Ben-Eliezer, „Dramatizing Sovereignty: the Construction of Territorial Dispute in 
the Israeli-Egyptian Border at Taba‟, Political Geography, 19: 3 (2000), pp. 315-344; Daniel Philpott, 
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succinctly by Ruggie in his famous article “Territoriality and Beyond”. According to 
him, the EC/EU may be the first “„multiperspectival polity‟ to emerge since the advent 
of the modern era.”14 This is a result of the fact that: “… it is increasingly difficult to 
visualise the conduct of international politics among community members, and to a 
considerable measure even domestic politics, as though it took place from a starting 
point [at the time] of twelve separate, single, fixed viewpoints.”15 Thus, the EU is 
compared instead to a medieval order in which a: “patchwork of overlapping and 
incomplete rights of government” existed.16 What is of paramount importance for this 
research from the findings of the studies devoted to the fundamental features of the 
Westphalian order and the possible transformations in it we are witnessing today, is the 
fact that these two orders configure borders differently. 
For the purposes of my analysis I have summarised these configurations as the 
construction of borders (characteristic of the Westphalian order, which is focused on the 
control of the central authority over a particular piece of land through delineating the 
limits of its reach) and the decreased significance of borders (characteristic of the 
Medieval and the post-modern orders, which are characterised by an overlap of 
authorities that blurs the distinction between inside and outside).
17
 Thus, for me one 
criterion for classifying different configurations of borders most generally refers to the 
                                                                                                                                         
„Westphalia, Authority, and International Society‟, Political Studies, 67: 3 (1999), pp. 566-589. Some of 
the studies highlighting the main features of the contemporary world or of the EU that contribute to the 
erosion of the Westphalian model are: Christopher Rudolph, „Sovereignty and Territorial Borders in a 
Global Age‟, International Studies Review, 7: 7 (2005), pp. 1-20; James Anderson, Chris Brook, Allan 
Cochrane, A Global World? (Oxford: Open University Press, 1995); Alan James, „The Practice of 
Sovereign Statehood in Contemporary International Society‟, Political Studies, 47: 3 (1999), pp. 457-473; 
William Wallace, „Europe after the Cold War: Interstate Order or Post-Sovereign Regional System?‟, 
Review of International Studies, 25: 5 (1999), pp. 201-223; William Wallace, „The Sharing of 
Sovereignty: the European Paradox‟, Political Studies, 47: 3 (1999), pp. 503-521.  
14
 John Gerard Ruggie, „Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations‟, 
International Organization, 47: 1 (1993), pp. 139-174, p. 172  
15 Ibid. 
16 Joseph S. Strayer and Dana C. Munro, cited in Ibid, p. 149 
17 In the literature this different configuration of borders is also often referred to as hard and soft borders. 
For definition and different usages of the terms hard and soft borders see Jan Zielonka, „How New 
Enlarged Borders will Reshape the European Union‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 3 (2001), 
pp. 507-536, p. 509; Jan Zielonka, Europe as an Empire – the Nature of the Enlarged European Union 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); Jan Zielonka (ed.), Europe Unbound – Enlarging and 
Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union (London: Routledge, 2002); John Gerard Ruggie, 
„Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations‟, International 
Organization, 47: 1 (1993), pp. 139-174; Heather Grabbe, „The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending 
Schengen Eastwards‟, International Affairs, 76: 3 (2000), pp. 519-536, p. 527; Klaus Eder, „Europe‟s 
Borders: the Narrative Construction of the Boundaries of Europe‟, European Journal of Social Theory, 9: 
2 (2006), pp. 255-271, p. 256 (however, his distinction between hard and soft borders is on the ground of 
their legal formalisation, not on the relative easiness for their crossing)  
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relative ease of crossing the border and to its salience. Therefore, when borders are 
constructed, it becomes more difficult to penetrate them, while on the contrary when 
borders‟ significance diminishes it becomes easier to penetrate them.18  
Another way for classifying borders is the distinction by Geddes between 
territorial, organisational (functional) and conceptual borders. He defines territorial 
borders as the sites (sea, land, air) of entry at which the sovereign powers of the state to 
exclude are exercised. This territorial border is a particular instance of a more general 
type of borders that Cuttutta terms material borders. According to him, they: “… can be 
marked and physically reproduced on the earth surface”.19 The second type of borders 
identified by Geddes is organisational (functional), which are the sites where conditions 
for the membership into the labour market, the welfare state and the national citizenship 
are specified. The third type, conceptual borders, encompasses a set of concerns 
centered on notions of belonging and identity to various communities (trans-national, 
national or sub-national).
20
 Cuttitta refers to this last type of borders as non-material 
ones that manifest differences between various kinds of non-material entities, such as 
dividing lines between ethnic and linguistic groups, cultures or classes.
21
 These 
distinctions are important because as will be demonstrated below, the debates on EU 
borders evolve around issues closely related to these basic types of borders.  
If one tries to classify EU borders along the distinction of border construction or 
diminished significance of borders, it is most likely that one will find it highly 
problematical, if not impossible to pigeon-hole them straightforwardly as either of the 
two categories. While the Union does indeed display some of the features characteristic 
of a post-modern/ or Medieval order, as the studies of Caporaso and Schmitter, referred 
to above, have indicated, it does at the same time possess some of the features of the 
traditional Westphalian order.  
A study that has captured this duality well is Smith‟s investigation into the 
interrelationship between the politics of inclusion and exclusion in the EU and the 
                                               
18  no desab si noitaitnereffid sihT Heather Grabbe, „The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen 
Eastwards‟, International Affairs, 76: 3 (2000), pp. 519-536, p. 527  
19 Paolo Cuttitta „Points and Lines: a Topography of Borders in the Global Space‟, Ephemera, 6: 1 
(2006), pp. 27-39, p. 29 
20 Geddes‟ classification and definitions of borders is from Andrew Geddes, „Europe‟s Border 
Relationships and International Migration Relations‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 43: 4 (2005), 
pp. 787-806, pp. 789-790 
21 Paolo Cuttitta, „Points and Lines: a Topography of Borders in the Global Space‟, Ephemera, 6: 1 
(2006), pp. 27-39, p. 29 
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changing European order.
22
 What is of particular importance is the fact that this article 
demonstrates how these two tendencies occur simultaneously as a result of the different 
policies adopted on various levels in the Union. Despite this, a closer look into the 
studies devoted to the contemporary EU borders reveals that they in general concentrate 
on either the dynamics of inclusion, which is consistent with the advent of a post-
modern order and decreasing importance of borders, or the dynamics of exclusion that 
are in synch with the more traditional Westphalian order and its border construction. 
Below I discuss the major studies related to both trends – decreasing significance of 
borders and construction of territorial and identity EU borders (see also Table 2.1). 
This one-sidedness of the conceptualisation of EU borders is most evident in the 
ways a number of studies have argued in favour of the construction/ diminished salience 
of borders that is currently taking place at the external edges of the EU. If during the 
first decades of European integration the decreasing visibility of borders was directed 
primarily towards the inside (in the EC itself with the adoption and implementation of 
the various common policies) at the end of the twentieth century the question of how 
does or should the EU interact with the rest of the world gained ever increasing 
importance. Thus, recent debates on borders in EU Studies have been concerned 
predominantly with this issue as the studies reviewed below show.  
One of the prominent contributions to the debate is an article by Christiansen, 
Petito and Tonra that coined the idea that the borders of the EU are “fuzzy”. According 
to them, this is a result of the EU's policy of exporting its policies beyond its member 
states, such as the gradual extension of its Single Market Programme to Central and 
Eastern Europe. Hence, the article argues that in the current circumstances there is value 
in moving away from the inside/ outside dichotomy and studying the relations of the EU 
with its neighbours through the category of “near abroad”. Thus, the article maintains 
that the boundaries of the polity are not clearly defined.
23
 Denalty and Rumford's
24
 and 
Lavenex's
25
 studies on the ENP contribute to the same debate. According to the former 
                                               
22 Michael Smith, „The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 34: 1 (1996), pp. 5-28 
23 Thomas Christiansen, Fabio Petito, Ben Tonra, „Fuzzy Politics around Fuzzy Borders: the European 
Union's 'Near Abroad‟‟, Cooperation and Conflict, 35: 4 (2000), pp. 389-415  
24 Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005)  
25 Sandra Lavenex, „EU External Governance in 'Wider Europe‟‟, Journal of European Public Policy, 11: 
4 (2004), pp. 680-700  
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study this policy represents a blurring of the EU's external border.
26
 The concept 
through which the authors propose to think about the European territory is borderlands. 
For them this term captures the changed nature of the EU‟s borders, which must be seen 
less in territorial terms as firmly delineated and fixed and more in terms of new spaces. 
Thus, borderlands contain core and periphery, members and non-members, global and 
local, networks and discontinuities.
27
 Lavenex views the EU's neighbourhood policies 
as: "... a form of external governance which consists in the (selective) extension of the 
EU's norms, rules and policies, i.e. its legal boundary, while precluding the opening of 
its institutional boundary, i.e. membership."
28
 All these studies present analysis of a 
particular phenomenon – the fact that the EU is gradually expanding its governance 
beyond the circle of its member states, which creates ambiguity about the various Union 
borders. 
Another important area of research, which provides information about the 
decreasing salience of the external EU borders are the contributions concerned with 
different aspects of Europeaness and European identity in the context of Eastern 
Enlargement. Typically these studies explore the issue of what constitutes “European 
values”29 and which of the former Communist countries can be regarded as conforming 
to them. For example, Mungiu-Pippidi states that: "The borders of Europe might then be 
traced on the basis of such "values"”30 and that the eastern border of the EU (prior to the 
May 2004 enlargement) “… is not a separator between two identities- the European 
identity is actually stronger east of the line.”31 In a similar vein, a study by Pavlovaite 
explores the dominant discourse on “Europe” in Lithuania from the standpoint that in 
post-Cold War Lithuania the preoccupation with belonging to Europe is mainly 
expressed through a desire to become a member of the EU.
32
 This discourse was typical 
for the other post-Communists countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007 and 
                                               
26 Gerard Delanty, Chris Rumford, Rethinking Europe. Social Theory and the Implications of 
Europeanization (London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 126-127 
27 Ibid., pp. 133-134  
28 Sandra Lavenex, „EU External Governance in 'Wider Europe‟‟, Journal of European Public Policy, 11: 
4 (2004), pp. 680-700, p. 694  
29 An example of a study focused on outlining European values is Ulrich Beck, „Understanding the Real 
Europe‟, Dissent, Summer, 2003, pp. 32-38 
30 Alina Mungiu-Pippidi, „Beyond the New Borders‟, Journal of Democracy, 15: 1 (2004), pp. 48-62, p. 
54  
31 Ibid., p. 49  
32 Inga Pavlovaite, „Being European by Joining Europe: Accession and Identity Politics in Lithuania‟, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 16: 2 (2003), pp. 239-255, p. 239  
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indeed one of the most contentious issues in Turkey‟s membership application is its 
genuine adherence to European values. Such studies can be regarded as contributing 
towards the decreased importance of identity borders between the EU and its neighbours 
because they demonstrate the shared values across formal boundaries, which potentially 
can lead to blurring the distinction between the EU‟s inside and outside.33 
In distinction to this position, the second type of arguments in studies on the 
borders of the EU focuses on various aspects of the emergence of new dividing lines. 
Probably the area where this is most apparent are the various policies related to the 
implementation of the Schengen provisions. As Grabbe states: “The idea behind 
softening borders in the Schnegen zone is that internal frontiers become soft, while 
external ones are hard, effectively creating a larger zone of free movement, but one with 
sharper edges … so entry to the area is strictly controlled.”34 As a result, there is a 
growing body of literature, whose main contribution in respect to my research is in 
providing an account of which elements of the Schengen-related policies lead to the 
construction of EU‟s borders. Some of this research is focused on the measures for and 
the effects of the increased control of the external borders of the EU and the ways the 
EU is consolidating its policies in areas such as immigration and asylum, the fight 
against organised crime and international terrorism, or other measures aimed at 
promoting the establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice on the territory 
of the EU. For example Wouters and Naert,
35
 as well as Monar
36
 concentrate on the 
                                               
33 Indeed such an outcome is the ultimate goal of the ENP. Therefore, although most of the countries on 
which this type of studies would have been focused are at present already members of the EU, discourses 
related to the adherence to the European values by diminishing the differences between various groups of 
people can lead to easier crossing of borders. At the same time, however, it should be noted that because 
as I argue, the decreased salience of borders always occurs simultaneously with the erections of borders 
elsewhere, the studies on Europeaness and European identity are dependent on the articulation of an 
“Other”. In the case of the former Communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe very often this 
“Other” has been Russia. In that respect this brand of studies can also be regarded as erecting borders 
(between the former Communist countries and Russia). Nevertheless, as far as the ways in which these 
studies configure the external borders of the EU is concerned, they promote the view that there is not a 
significant difference of the value systems of the countries from the two sides of the EU external borders. 
Therefore, I have classified these studies as contributing towards the diminished visibility of identity 
borders between the EU and it‟s immediate neighbours.   
34 Heather Grabbe, „The Sharp Edges of Europe: Extending Schengen Eastwards‟, International Affairs, 
76: 3 (2000), pp. 519-536, p. 527. A similar conclusion on the effects of the integration in the areas of 
Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) is reached by Jörg Monar in „Justice and Home Affairs in a Wider 
Europe: the Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion‟, ESRC „One Europe or Several?‟ Program, Working 
Paper 07/00, available at http://www.one-europe.ac.uk/pdf/monarW7.PDF, accessed on 3.11.2007 
35   Jan Wouters, Frederik Naert, „The European Union and “September 11”‟, available at 
http://www.law.kulauven.ac.be/lir/eng/wp/WP40ed2e.pdf, accessed on 20.09.2004 
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legal provisions adopted by the European Union in various aspects of Justice and Home 
Affairs (JHA). Another area on which the studies of territorial borders of the EU are 
focused is the Eastern Enlargement of the Union and the migration of the labour force.
37
 
Kostakoupolou has examined the effects of communitarisation of the JHA pillar. Her 
conclusion is that it gives the member states the opportunity to reinforce the restrictive 
and law-enforcement approaches towards migration as well as allowing them to impose 
their security agenda beyond the limits of the EU.
38
 In a similar vein Huysmans states 
that: “The Third Pillar on Justice and Home Affairs, the Schengen Agreements, and the 
Dublin Convention most vividly indicate that the European integration process is 
implicated in the development of a restrictive migration policy and the social 
construction of migration into a security question.”39 These are crucial findings that 
point to the construction of new external borders as a result of European integration. 
The securitisation of particular issues on the EU‟s agenda is also related to 
questions of the construction of identity borders. This is a result of the fact that: “… 
identity politics play a crucial role in both defining the boundaries of any community, 
and in providing the community with an inner sense of cohesion.”40 Ultimately these are 
achieved through a process of differentiation, which is pertinent especially to those that 
are “liminal” to the community because it helps to generate abstract principles upon 
which the community or polity is based.
41
 Such a process is also referred to as 
“Othering”. It leads to the emergence of borders because if someone is identified as “the 
Other” cooperating with and trusting him/ her becomes much more problematic and 
difficult to achieve. Some studies have examined various aspects of this process in 
European politics. For example, Neumann
42
 has explored how the Eastern “Other” has 
                                                                                                                                         
36 Jörg Monar, „Justice and Home Affairs‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 1: 42 (2004), pp. 117-
133 
37  See for example Margit Kraus, Robert Schwager, „EU Enlargement and Immigration‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 2: 41 (2003), pp.165-181. The issues of migration and the impact of the Eastern 
Enlargement on the European Social Model will be examined in greater detail in Chapters Four and Five.  
38 Theodora Kostakoupolou, „The „Protective Union‟: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and 
Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38: 3 (2000), pp. 497-518   
39 Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and the Securitization of Migration‟, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38: 5 (2000), pp. 751-777, p. 751 
40 Cited in Jacinta O'Hagan, Conceptualizing the West in International Relations – from Spengler to Said 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), p. 40  
41 Ibid., pp. 47-50  
42 Iver Neumann, Uses of the Other – "the East" in European Identity Formation (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 1999) 
 29 
been used in the European identity formation; Sztompka
43
 has investigated the shifting 
identities and boundaries in the New Europe, while Bilgin
44
 and Pace
45
 have been 
concerned with the identity dimensions of different aspects of the policies of the EU 
towards its Southern neighbours in the Mediterranean. 
 
Table 2.1: Major studies related to the construction/ diminished significance of 
territorial and identity borders of the EU 
Configuration of 
Borders/ Type of border 
Territorial Identity 
Construction of 
Borders 
Wouters and Naert; 
Monar; Kostakoupolou; 
Huysmans 
Neumann; 
Sztompka; Bilgin; Pace 
Diminished 
Significance of Borders 
Christiansen, Petito 
and Tonra; Delanty and 
Rumford; Lavenex 
Mungiu-Pippidi; 
Pavlovaite 
 
Thus, the existing research on EU borders shows that as a result of the process 
of integration, member states‟ borders have been transformed in a variety of important 
ways. Furthermore, the literature on this issue provides useful ways of conceptualising 
borders that will inform the analysis in the following chapters. Two of the most 
important of the current transformations are the decreased salience of internal EU 
borders and the emergence of the Union‟s external borders. These trends, however, pose 
a new set of theoretical questions, which are paramount to this study: firstly, what is the 
nature of the “internal EU borders” and their relationship to the national borders of the 
member states. Secondly, the question of national borders becoming EU borders.  
In recent years a number of studies have contributed to the issue of the emerging 
EU external borders, thus elucidating the issue of national borders becoming EU 
                                               
43 Piotr Sztompka, From East Europeans to Europeans: Shifting Identities and Boundaries in the New 
Europe, available at http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&lr=&q=cache:n3S5oj-
5X48J:www.nias.knaw.nl/Ortelius2004.pdf+from+East+Euroepans+to+Europeans+%2B+Sztompka, 
accessed 13.02.2006 
44 Pinar Bilgin, „A Return to „Civilisational Geopolitics‟ in the Mediterranean? Changing Geopolitical 
Images of the European Union and Turkey in the Post-Cold War Era‟, Geopolitics, 9: 2 (2004), pp. 296-
291  
45 Michelle Pace, „The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Common Mediterranean Strategy? 
European Union Policy from a Discursive Perspective‟, Geopolitics, 9: 2 (2004), pp. 292-309 
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borders. Most generally, as Vaughan-Williams summarises, the external EU borders 
have emerged as a result of the “„Europeanisation‟ of member states‟ borders since 
1985.”46 Thus, the Community law defines the external EU borders as: “the Member 
States’ land borders, including river and lake borders, sea borders and their airports, 
river ports, sea ports and lake ports, provided that they are not internal borders.”47 
Several significant features characterise this process. Firstly, while some of the 
traditional Westphalian functions, such as economic and military maybe declining, the 
external EU borders are becoming ever more important in the policing of the so-called 
clandestine international actors.
48
 Secondly, as Axford
49
 and Carrera
50
 argue, although 
many of the current threats to border security the EU faces are non-traditional, the bulk 
of the responses are traditional due to the predominance of measures premised on 
strengthening of the principle of territoriality.
51
 Thirdly (and most importantly with 
respect to the relationship between national and EU borders), the current design of 
cooperation at EU level is based on the national predominance of the member states.
52
 
This is in concurrence with the above definition of the external EU borders and can be 
exemplified with the recent decisions on the way FRONTEX functions.
53
 The empirical 
chapters of this study conform to these arguments and provide evidence of how these 
features of the external EU borders have been articulated in the discourses of the 
European Commission in various policy areas. 
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47 Cited in Sergio Carrera, „The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the Challenges of 
Irregular Migration in the Canary Islands‟, CEPS Working Document, no. 261, March (2007), p. 5 
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Politics, 4: 2/3 (2006), pp. 141-159, p. 142 
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 Barrie Axford, „The Dialectic of Borders and Networks in Europe: Reviewing „Topographical 
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European Politics, 4: 2/3 (2006), pp. 141-159.    
52 This point is made by Sergio Carrera, „The EU Border Management Strategy: FRONTEX and the 
Challenges of Irregular Migration in the Canary Islands‟, CEPS Working Document, no. 261, March 
(2007), p. 9 and by Julien Jeandesboz, „Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU Borders. The Future 
Development of FRONTEX and EUROSUR‟, Challenge: Liberty and Security, Research Paper no. 11, 
August (2008), p. 3.  
53 A good summary of the prerogatives and functioning of FRONTEX can be found in Helene Jorry, 
„Construction of a European Institutional Model for Managing Operational Cooperation at the EU‟s 
External Borders: is the FRONTEX a Decisive Step Forward?‟, Challenge: Liberty and Security, 
Research Paper no. 6, March (2007)  
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  Another set of theoretical border-related issues, triggered by the process of 
integration concerns the internal EU borders. As Delanty argues, internal Union borders 
are a result of an overlap between old borders and new (often) less visible ones.
54
 In that 
respect one type of internal EU borders are the old lines demarcating the divisions 
between the member states of the EU. Today these borders are often seen as having 
declining importance. This is because they are: “now mostly devoid of military 
significance, and have also lost their function as trading zones…”.55 Although this 
implies decreasing significance of national borders inside the EU and therefore, a 
relatively simple relationship between national and internal EU borders, this in fact is 
not the case. This is so because as Diez argues a basic paradox of European integration 
is that the decreasing importance of borders inside the European Union is based on the 
recognition of the national borders of the member states. He refers to this as subversion. 
Thus, it was possible to progress with European integration only because it implicitly 
recognised the borders of the member states,
56
 hence guaranteeing their continued 
existence and significance. This logic has endured and has led in some cases, as the 
analysis in the empirical chapters show, to the reconstruction of borders inside the EU. 
Another type of internal EU borders are new divisions emerging in the Union 
that exist beyond the national borders of the member states. In distinction to the above 
internal borders that can be seen as an expression of the intergovernmental thinking in 
the integration process, these new internal divisions are a result of the normative 
adherence to the idea of an integrated Europe. According to Blatter, this has inspired the 
efforts towards the creation of cross-border regions in the EU,
57
 which is embodied in 
the INTERREG programmes. Another example of internal borders existing beyond the 
national borders of the member states are the new identities emerging as a result of 
integration efforts. The current study provides several examples of the articulation of 
this kind of internal borders in the Commission discourses, such as the distinction 
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between EU nationals and TCNs or the juxtaposition of the supporters and objectors of 
the social dimension of the internal market.                
Therefore, the existing literature on EU borders gives a comprehensive 
theoretical and empirical account of the main transformations of borders that occur as a 
result of the process of integration. The major shortcoming of the current studies is that 
they tend to end up in providing limited and one-sided account of the relationship 
between borders and integration. This is a grave problem because it prohibits a 
comprehensive account of the current developments and instead presents a distorted 
picture. My claim that integration leads simultaneously to the decreasing importance of 
borders and to the construction of borders means that one of the central concerns of the 
research is to capture the parallel occurrence of these two processes. This will contribute 
to the current debates in two main ways. Firstly, it will provide a much more 
comprehensive coverage of the developments on EU borders through highlighting the 
simultaneous tendencies towards decreasing the salience of borders and the construction 
of borders for different types of borders. By doing this, secondly, it will present a much 
more realistic account of the processes that are currently taking place. This ambition, 
however, necessitates the development of a way for studying borders. The first step in 
this journey is to become familiar with the contemporary debates on this matter, which 
are presented in the next section. 
 
2.2.2. Theoretical approaches to the study of borders 
The aim of the discussion in this section is to provide the background on which I 
will develop a theoretical framework for the examination of the construction of EU 
borders. In order to do this, I present the main ways in which Border Studies have 
conceptualised borders and I link the assumptions of these conceptualisations with the 
broader meta-theoretical debates that have inspired them. 
The developments in Border Studies have been influenced by and have followed 
the general developments in social scientific research. In the last decades it has seen a 
renewed interest and engagement with ontological and epistemological issues. 
Simplifying a complex debate, most generally research on social issues can be classified 
as positivist and constructivist. The tenets of positivism are the view of the unity of 
science, and therefore the belief that the methodologies of the natural sciences should be 
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adopted to explain the social world (naturalism); the belief that there is a sharp 
distinction between facts and values and that facts are theory neutral (objectivism); the 
conviction that there are regularities in the social world and therefore, deductive and 
inductive forms of inquiry are relevant in order to develop law-like explanations; the 
validation of social scientific inquiries through either validation or falsification 
(empiricist epistemology).
58
 This approach argues that the world exists independently of 
our knowledge of it. Constructivism “… builds on relativist philosophy of science and 
interpretivist sociology of knowledge.”59 Contrary to positivism, for the proponents of 
this approach there is no direct access to the real world because our knowledge of it 
depends on understandings that are socially constructed. Therefore, in order to learn 
about the social world it is crucial to interpret the meanings of social phenomena.
60
   
Following these major trends in social scientific research, prior to the 1980s, 
borders were seen as a given reality. They were above all concrete empirical 
phenomena,
61
 which is why they were defined as a spatial fact that has a sociological 
impact.
62
 For example Prescott‟s influential study on boundaries and frontiers sets out to 
examine the specific aspects of frontiers and boundaries. As far as boundaries are 
concerned, he is interested in the evolution of international land and maritime 
boundaries, the disputes associated with them, the internal state borders and boundaries‟ 
general effects on the landscape.
63
 In a similar way the contributors to the “The 
Geography of Border Landscapes” inquire into the varying impact of political decision-
making and ideological differences on the environment at border locations.
64
 Other 
studies have concentrated on different issues, such as examining the link between 
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electoral behaviour and borderland ethnic minority patters
65
 and tracing the effects of 
border alterations on the borderland and its inhabitants.
66
 Thus, these studies see borders 
as a fact that is given independently of human actions and examine them utilising 
various tools modeled after the instruments of enquiry of natural sciences.  
However, by the end of the twentieth century, this conceptualisation of borders 
was increasingly criticised due to its inability to provide a satisfactory account of 
various important events, such as why in some cases even small changes in state 
territory and its borders provoke deep emotional reactions and can lead to territorial 
conflict, while in other cases new borders are not disputed; why sometimes border areas 
that have been peaceful for a long time can suddenly be transformed into the foci of 
conflict and provoke even bloodshed; or why governments and public opinion are very 
often painfully sensitive towards many questions concerning political boundaries. These 
criticisms provoked new ways of thinking about borders that helped overcoming some 
of the problems the traditional approaches were facing.
67
   
In doing this, since the late 1980s Border Studies have increasingly utilised 
constructivist understandings and have started to focus on the border‟s massive 
visibility in the shaping and controlling of the lives of people and their huge importance 
for the questions of war and peace.
68
 In distinction to the traditional methods of border 
studies, these inquiries are based on the presumption that borders as delimiters of 
sovereignty are constructed and reconstructed in a search for control, linked to the 
nature of political power.
69
 Thus, these approaches point to the fact that there is a whole 
social dimension attached to boundary delineation.
70
 Therefore, this type of studies 
predominantly critically investigates borders as differentiators of socially constructed 
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mindscapes and meaning.
71
 The major tools used by the scholars in this approach are 
the examination of discursive practices, deconstruction and the use of critical theory.
72
 
The contribution they make is to underline the ways in which studying and modeling 
international politics are also acts of international politics.
73
 Examples of this type of 
border research are the works of Paasi
74
 and Newman,
75
 as well as most of the studies 
reviewed in the previous section. All of these studies provide both theoretical and 
empirical examples of how these approaches conceptualise borders.  
Thus, this discussion shows that there are different approaches to studying 
borders. These are a result of the ontological assumptions made as well as the different 
epistemological and methodological tools used for conducting the research. As this 
review of the various types of Border Studies has shown, the different opinions on these 
matters have had enormous impact on Border Studies because they have led to the 
emergence of diverse (sometimes opposing) ways for conceptualising borders. By 
bringing to the fore these issues of contention and allowing various ways for tackling 
them, these debates have helped to outline the different characteristics and effects that 
borders have. Some of the most contentious issues, which emerged out of the positivist 
– constructivist debates on the study of borders, are questions such as what are borders a 
result of, which are the most appropriate tools for their examination and where should 
one look when studying them? Each of these issues should implicitly, if not explicitly, 
be addressed when conducting border-related research. If all the studies reviewed have 
addressed these problems in one way or another, these points have to be raised for the 
present inquiry as well. This is the topic of the following parts of the chapter but before 
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addressing these matters, I turn my attention to presenting the last major academic 
debate relevant to this study. 
 
2.2.3. Debates on the role of the European Commission in the EU integration 
process  
The aim of this section is to work out which would be the most appropriate 
focus for a project that wants to investigate the way construction and reconstruction of 
EU borders has occurred. As the discussion so far has shown, one of the most important 
factors contributing to the transformation of borders that we are witnessing today is the 
emergence of integration efforts embodied in an unique organisation, the EU. Therefore, 
in deciding where to focus the study, my premise has been that its findings will be most 
pertinent if I concentrate on an institution that by its characteristics is distinctive from 
other international institutions and is bound to promote integration, thus ensuring the 
continued existence of border constructing and reconstructing conditions. Such an 
organisation will successfully highlight the unique features of the ambiguous 
configurations of borders under integration. To achieve this goal, I have to engage with 
the existing literature on the process of integration in the EU. In order to identify the 
appropriate object at which to focus the study, I have to draw on research that examines 
the institutional structure of the Union. Then I outline the major studies on the European 
Commission. This enables me to present the differing views on the role of the 
Commission in furthering integration and building on that to explain why I argue that 
the Commission can influence the integration process and the nature and scope of its 
input in EU border transformations.  
Simultaneously with the practical efforts towards unification in Western Europe 
in the 1950s the academic field focused on examining the integration process started to 
develop. Out of the existing research on this issue, the area that is of particular concern 
for me consists of the studies that examine the institutional structure of the EU. The 
contributions of scholars, such as Weidenfeld
 
and Wessels,
76
 El-Agraa,
77
 Pinder,
78
 
                                               
76 Werner Weidenfeld, Wolfgang Wessels, Europe From A to Z (Luxembourg: Office for Official 
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McCormick,
79
 Dinan,
80
 Peterson and Shackleton,
81
 Nugent,
82
 and Hix
83
 have provided a 
thorough examination of the institutional structure of the EU. A common line that 
emerges out of this type of studies is that the major institutions of the Union can be 
broadly divided into two main categories. Firstly, some bodies, such as the Council of 
Ministers and the European Council, are conventional and represent above all the 
interests of the individual member states. Furthermore, the way in which they take their 
decisions does not differ in any substantial way from traditional methods of negotiations 
in international relations. Hence, the way in which these institutions operate retains by 
and large the Westphalian dynamic under which the main building block is the nation-
state. Furthermore, for at least some schools of thought such as intergovernmentalists, 
the nation-state continues to be the ultimate authority because even when decisions that 
pull its sovereignty are taken, the nation-state explicitly agrees to that. Thus, in theory, 
nothing outside the legitimate government of the country in question is able to impose 
on it legally binding decisions. Following the way in which such institutions reach 
decisions, this kind of EU bodies are referred to as intergovernmental. 
The second type of institutions, which are embodied by the European 
Parliament, the European Commission and the ECJ, are a novel and unique category of 
organisations. They represent a departure from the supremacy of the nation-state in 
international relations. They are vested with powers and competences that allow them 
under specific procedures and in particular areas, to adopt measures that are legally 
binding for all the countries that are members of an international organisation even if 
some of these countries did not agree to these measures. These institutions are called 
supranational institutions. To date, the EU is the international organisation in which 
supranational institutions are most advanced. This is the most important reason, why the 
Union is regarded as the most developed instance of regional integration in the world.
84
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The supranational institutions of the EU, in distinction to the intergovernmental 
ones, ostensibly act in the interest of the whole Community. This is well exemplified by 
the traditional perception of the European Commission as impartial and neutral.
85
 
According to the Treaty of Rome, the Commission has to act: “in the general interest of 
the Community”86 and to be “completely independent in the performance of their 
duties”.87 Importantly, the supranational institutions, such as the Commission, are 
charged with acting in the interests of the Union as a whole in opposition to 
intergovernmental institutions protecting the interests of individual member states. This 
“division of labour” between the various institutions of the EU is a result of the careful 
balance between ensuring the achievement of the aims of integration and the protection 
of the autonomy of the member states. The latter is a necessary prerequisite that makes 
integration possible in the first place. The need to have such a “division of labour” put 
in place, points to the difficulties in achieving agreed upon targets that any integration 
effort is likely to face. The responsibilities of each type of EU institutions mean that 
when differences occur, it is going to be the supranational ones that in protecting the 
interests of the Union as a whole can be expected to argue in favour of integration, thus 
also maintaining the existence of crucial conditions that lead to transformation of 
borders. Thus, the first reason why one can expect supranational institutions, such as the 
Commission, to promote integration is because of their legal duties under the Treaties of 
the EC/EU.  
 Therefore, under conditions of integration, conflicts do not disappear altogether 
but are resolved in a different way. This issue is explored in greater depth in an early 
contribution by Haas. He looks into different ways of resolving conflicts and relates 
them to different levels of integration. His argument is that when integration is more 
advanced, there is greater possibility to find a solution different from traditional 
diplomacy‟s “lowest common denominator”. According to him, such an outcome is 
possible when an international body that performs mediatory services to the states 
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involved exists.
88
 As Haas points out, these more advanced types of conflict resolution 
usually imply the expansion of the mandate of the supranational agency.
89
 It is precisely 
this link, pointed out by scholars such as Haas, between resolution of disagreements 
through further integration and the expansion of the mandate of the supranational 
institutions that constitute a plausible explanation why one can expect supranational 
institutions to be in support of more integration. Importantly, this predisposition of 
supranational institutions to promoting integration is acknowledged and accepted even 
by intergovernmentalist scholars.
90
 Supranational institutions promote integration 
because such a development is expected to lead to further expansion of their own 
powers and competences, which is the ultimate goal of every political interaction. Thus, 
the second reason to expect that the Commission will be promoting further integration 
and with this decreasing the significance of internal borders, is its self-interest. It is 
these two reasons that make supranational institutions act in favour of further 
integration. Hence, I focus my research on the European Commission.  
Neo-functionalism has over the years developed an explicit account of how 
exactly the Commission advocates more integration. This is captured by the notion of 
“cultivated spillover”. It is one of the three types of spillover identified by Neo-
functionalist literature.
91
 It provides: “a specific theory of how once created, 
supranational institutions act as strategic advocates on behalf of functional linkage and 
deeper/ wider integration.”92 In some academic literature, such as the one dealing with 
public policy, such advocates are labelled “policy entrepreneurs”.93 According to Burns: 
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“Entrepreneurs aim to induce authoritative political decisions that would not otherwise 
occur.”94 This comes about as a result of the policy entrepreneurs promoting policy 
proposals and ideas. Some of the important reasons outlined by Kingdon as to why 
entrepreneurs are willing to invest a wide range of resources (time, money, or 
reputation,) into this advocacy are personal interests and promotion of their values.
95
  
As we have seen above there are strong reasons to expect the European 
Commission to try to promote further integration. As a result, it will be promoting a 
particular type of policy proposals and values, which as far as the topic of this study is 
concerned means that it can be expected to argue in favour of creating a common area in 
the EU. This is why in Integration Studies the Commission is often referred to as 
supranational entrepreneur.
96
 In this study the Commission actions regarding the Blue 
Card initiative are the best example of it performing entrepreneurial activities that 
promote further integration. As the discussion in section 2.4.1. and the empirical 
findings in Chapters Three and Five show, functional spillover has also been an 
important tool used by the Commission in its attempts to promote further integration. 
As the empirical chapters will demonstrate in detail, when this strategy is employed, at 
discursive level there are articulations that link the achievement of the goals of the 
internal market with the development of integration in other policy fields (such as 
border controls or social policy).
97
 
However, the ability of the Commission to successfully exercise independent 
entrepreneurial leadership is one of the major issues of disagreement between Neo-
functionalism and its main theoretical rival Intergovernmentalism. On this matter, some 
have argued against the position of Neo-functionalists and have maintained that: 
“supranational organizations such as the European Commission exert little or no causal 
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influence.”98 Some of the most important contributions supporting this position have 
come from Moravcsik
99
 and Pollack.
100
 Ultimately, this is a debate that goes back to the 
ontological positions of what integration is.
101
 In my view, the focus of 
Intergovernmentalist accounts on grand Treaty bargains is too limited an understanding 
of integration. As such, this position is in danger of not paying attention to other 
important developments that are indispensable parts of integration.
102
 One of the main 
weaknesses of Intergovernmentalism is that because it regards interests (national 
interests) as externally given, it cannot provide a satisfactory account of how agenda 
was set and the decision-making situations were framed.
103
 Therefore, the Neo-
functionalist understanding of integration as a process better captures such 
developments. This conception emphasises the importance of day-to-day inputs in 
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integration, which: “stress that the enmeshment of member states in the larger 
framework of integration changes their identities, limits their institutional choices 
through path-dependencies, and accordingly strongly influences their interest 
formation”.104 In such an understanding, the Commission does not only (as explained 
above) have a good reason to promote further integration but is also well placed to do 
so. In the next section, I elaborate on exactly how the Commission can promote its 
preferred option, thus contributing to the transformation of EU borders.  
This Neo-functionalist argument provides a compelling case in favour of the 
expectation that the Commission will favour and is able to promote decreased salience 
of internal EU borders. Nevertheless, from the point of view of border configurations it 
has a serious flaw. Due to Neo-functionalism‟s concern with explaining integration, this 
theory is understandably focused on providing an account of the internal developments 
in the EU. Thus, the major findings of Neo-functionalism are related to elucidating 
transformations of internal EU borders. The theory, however, gives much less detail on 
the developments at the external EU borders. Indeed, it anticipates the emergence of 
dividing lines at the outer edges of the Union but does not contain more in-depth 
analysis on the issue. I elaborate on that matter in section 2.3.2.       
Despite their disagreements on issues, such as the definition of integration and 
the ability of the Commission to exert independent influence, the studies referred to 
above share an important commonality. As I pointed out, they agree that the 
institutional structure of the EU prompts the Commission to try to increase its own 
powers. This will lead it to support further integration and decreased significance of 
internal borders. This, however, brings to the fore the issue of the study‟s understanding 
of borders.  
   
 
2.3. Towards a Theoretical Framework of the Study 
In this section I aim to develop the theoretical framework that will enable me to 
demonstrate the inherent ambiguity in the way in which Commission discourse 
configures EU borders and as a result of that also transforms European borders. This 
will inform the empirical parts of the study. Achieving this requires me to advance my 
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positions on the academic debates reviewed above and my understandings of some 
terms and issues core to this study, such as borders, or discourse. Therefore, in this 
section, I spell out my stance on the core debates on borders and the European 
Commission presented above. I elaborate on how I perceive borders, analyse how the 
Commission influences border constructions and building on these, work out the 
different ways in which the Commission can configure various borders under 
integration. 
 
2.3.1. What are borders? 
This study sees borders not as an independent reality existing beyond people‟s 
knowledge of it but as socially constructed phenomenon. As the discussion in the 
Literature Review section has shown, one of the fundamental disagreements between 
the two major camps in Social Sciences is over the existence of an independent reality 
beyond our knowledge. On this issue, constructivists argue that reality as such is created 
through the social interaction of everyone involved. Berger and Luckman were among 
the first to explain this process. According to them, the interactions between agents and/ 
or structures lead to gradual habitualisation of human activity. The reason for this is the 
fact that the overwhelming majority of the different activities have to be performed 
more than once and in fact very often occur on a regular basis. Recurrent activities are 
habitualised because this allows their performance with making fewer efforts and with 
spending less time. However, a society will not be able to function effectively if each 
individual has a unique habitualisation of his/ her activity. Therefore, in order to enable 
the faster performance of routine actions, it is necessary for actors to reciprocally 
habitualise certain types of actions. This is what leads to the establishment of social 
practices. The latter are habitualised activities that have been accepted as the way for 
performing certain tasks in a particular group. Over time this acceptance of the social 
practices leads to their institutionalisation because this becomes the uniform and 
unchanging (or difficult to change) way for performing certain actions.
105
 This 
acceptance can also be called “normalisation”. It is when a social practice has been 
successfully normalised that it starts to be taken as an objective reality. Thus, what 
positivists regard unquestioningly as a reality, has a very important history according to 
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constructivists. This history is related to the question of discursive struggles, which I 
look into below. 
Importantly, as Berger and Luckman underline, the institutions created during 
the process of habitualisation, are objectively given to the individual in the sense that 
they exist over and beyond him/ her, they appear as given, difficult to change, and self-
evident.
106
 The reason for that is the fact that institutions are results of social interaction. 
Therefore, no single actor can be influential enough to be able to modify and transform 
institutions alone. The end result will always be an outcome derived from the activities 
of all the parties involved in the process and in that sense, it is not entirely subjective for 
anyone of them. 
Following this reasoning, I regard borders as created in a process of social 
interaction
107
 that gives rise to specific social practices of inclusion and exclusion. Such 
social practices of inclusion and exclusion are also often referred to as “bordering 
practices”. As the review of the current research on EU borders has demonstrated, at the 
moment there is a very strong trend towards the construction of new types of borders as 
a result of the process of integration. Therefore, the bordering practices in the Union are 
also undergoing significant changes. They are characterised, for example, by a shift in 
the way, in which traditional inclusion/ exclusion along the lines of national-states is 
replaced by novel inclusion/ exclusion dynamics, such as between EU member states/ 
non-EU members. Importantly, this transformation also leads to a change in the 
meaning of borders. Today EU borders are often located in places different from their 
positions in the first half of the Twentieth century. Furthermore, there are modifications 
in the way inclusion and exclusion is implemented in practice.  
This change is another point on which constructivists criticise positivists. In 
distinction to the aim of the latter to find laws that hold true over space and time, which 
requires constancy and implies an essence of the object under investigation (i.e. 
borders), according to constructivists, the meaning of things changes over time.
108
 Thus, 
                                               
106 Ibid., pp. 76-77 
107 For constructivists social interaction takes place at all levels, i.e. between ordinary citizens or between 
national and EU elites. Given that my data is formed primarily of Commission documents, my research is 
focused at the elitist level of border configuration. A collection of studies that examine the “border work” 
of citizens is Chris Rumford  (ed.), „Space and Polity‟, Special Issue, 12: 1 (2008).   
108 Michel Foucault was among the first to develop this argument, which runs through all of his 
contributions. See for example, Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: the Birth of the Prison 
 45 
they argue that the meaning of things: “is conferred by historically specific systems of 
rules.”109 Hence, for constructivists it is of central importance to be able to interrogate 
the ways in which meanings are created. They do this by advancing the concept of 
discourse. This notion has gained an ever-increasing importance in Social Sciences in 
the last decades. However, this growing popularity of the term has been accompanied 
with a proliferation of the ways in which it is employed.
110
 The employment of the term 
in this study follows the way it is understood by post-structuralists. For me discourse 
refers: “to historically specific systems of meaning which form the identities of subjects 
and objects.”111 In these systems: “meaning depends upon a socially constructed system 
of rules and significant differences”.112  
Since above I explained why and how the system of rules is socially constructed, 
the crucial question now becomes how exactly these significant differences function. An 
account of this process is indispensable for understanding the mechanisms through 
which borders are transformed. The post-structuralist account builds upon the earlier 
structuralist work of Ferdinand Saussure. Post-structuralists follow his argument that 
every sign consists of a signifier (the word used) and a signified (the object that the 
signifier denotes). Thus, the meaning of a sign (a word) is a result of the difference 
between this word and other words. For example, the meaning of “fork” is a result of it 
NOT being a “spoon”, a “knife” or a “ladle”. Post-structuralists, however, disagree with 
Saussure‟s view that there is a neat correlation between a signified (the object) and a 
signifier (the word).
113
 Instead, they argue that there is not a clear or stable relation 
between a signified and a signifier. This can be exemplified well with the existence of 
metaphors, which use the same signifier to refer to different signifieds. The reason for 
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this absence of a stable relation between signified and signifier is that nothing derives 
its meaning from outside this interplay between signifiers. This has two important 
repercussions, according to post-structuralists. Firstly, as Derrida shows, it is not 
possible to define anything outside language – every definition ultimately depends on 
other words. Secondly, all meaning is relational, i.e. it is based on particular structuring 
of the relations between different words.
114
 Furthermore, post-structuralists argue that 
there is always something more than what is expressed in a particular text. This “more” 
resides in the resistances that the text encounters, in the unexpected ways in which the 
terms it employs are interpreted, in the unassimilated shifts in surface significations that 
reveal them to have hidden depths.
115
 Therefore, they claim that the meaning of a text is 
always contingent upon other texts. They refer to this as intertextuality.
116
  
Hansen‟s elaboration on the relational nature of meaning is crucial in developing 
an understanding of how meaning is created in discourses. According to her, the 
production of meaning is a result of the simultaneous occurrence of two processes, 
which she refers to as differentiation and linking. Linking is the positive process of 
spelling out the particular characteristics of the signifier in question (i.e. fork), while 
differentiation, is the negative process of delimiting the signifiers that are not the 
signifier in question (i.e. spoon, knife, ladle).
117
 Due to the impossibility of defining 
anything outside of the interplay between signifiers it is possible to construct different 
meanings for the same signifier. These different meanings are an outcome of the 
application of different processes of linking and differentiation with regards to the same 
signifier. For example, the signifier “meat” can be (and is) linked and differentiated in a 
variety of ways (i.e. linked with nutrition, health, strength, power or butchering, 
torturing, waste of resources, unnatural food for humans and differentiated with fruits 
and vegetables). Each of these two systems of linking and differentiation represents a 
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particular discourse on the signifier in question, in our case meat, and produces a 
specific meaning of it (in the first case it is a positive one, contributing to humans‟ well-
being, while in the second case the meaning is negative, associated with harmful or 
unpleasant activities and results). This possibility to have different representations on 
one and the same issue is the reason why post-strucutralists regard discourses as 
inherently unstable, although they are highly structured.
118
 
Furthermore, this instability of discourses also makes them political. As Laclau 
and Mouffe have argued in their groundbreaking work, politics has primacy over other 
issues, such as economy.
119
 Thus, post-structuralists see the various systems of social 
relations as: “articulated sets of discourses, [which] are always political constructions 
involving the construction of antagonisms and the exercise of power.”120 The successful 
exercise of power leads to hegemony. It: “is achieved if and when one political project 
or force determines the rules and meanings in a particular social formation … the 
concept of hegemony centres on which political force will decide the dominant forms of 
conduct and meaning in a given social context.”121 Thus, a hegemonic discourse is one 
that is successful in stabilising the relationships of linking and differentiation between 
signs. Nevertheless, even hegemonic discourses, due to the inherent instability referred 
to above, cannot completely suppress alternative representations. If the alternative 
representations are based on assumptions opposing these of the hegemonic discourse or 
if they in any other way advance understandings incompatible with it, they have the 
potential to present a serious challenge to the hegemonic discourse. In Discourse 
Theory, such a rivalry is called antagonism. It occurs at the margins of every social 
system, where the forces that are excluded in the process of formation of a particular 
discourse contest it and strive to advance an alternative representation.
122
 
In summary, according to post-structuralist discourse theorists, although 
discourses use signs to designate things, they are: “irreducible to the language … and to 
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speech” alone.123 Instead, post-structuralists are concerned with how regular bodies of 
ideas and concepts produce knowledge about the world.
124
 Thus, in their interpretation, 
the term “discourse” becomes an all-encompassing concept, which uses language as the 
primary tool for its analysis but is not concerned with language per se. Instead, post-
strucutralists are focused on the enabling/ disabling of specific conducts by the 
articulations that language makes possible. Importantly, due to the inherent instability of 
discourses and their political nature, pointed out above, there will always be competing 
discourses on one and the same sign. Following these post-structuralist ideas, for me the 
term discourse has a wide meaning and refers to structured systems of signs that create 
knowledge about the world. Therefore, for me discourses are formed not only by 
language but include a broader number of signs. Despite that, language has a primary 
position among other signs because ultimately it is by communicating through language 
that the meaning of the other signs becomes intelligible. This is why in this research I 
have focused on examining texts in a narrow depiction. 
 As I said above, the meaning of borders has been transformed during the 
process of European integration. This is expressed in the advance of new bordering 
practices, through discourses of inclusion and exclusion. Importantly, following the 
logic of post-structuralist discourse theorists, there are multiple ways in which the 
relationship between the new forms of inclusion and exclusion in the Union have been 
articulated. Furthermore, given the argument about the primacy of politics, the various 
agents involved in formulating the different discourses on EU borders, will all try to 
promote their own preferred vision. At any given point in time, however, the ways in 
which inclusion/ exclusion issues in the Union are resolved, is some kind of mixture 
between the articulations advanced by the various agents involved. This is due to the 
fact that, as Berger and Luckman argue, no one is influential enough to decide single-
handedly on the matter.
125
 This interaction between the agents involved in EU border 
transformations is expressed in the various relevant discourses.  
One such discourse is that of the Commission. Following Berger and Luckman‟s 
argument and the argument about intertextuality, it is bound to reflect the on-going 
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struggles between the actors involved on how the inclusion/ exclusion issues in the EU 
should be settled. Therefore, on questions of further integration and opening up spaces 
within the EU, the Commission displays an overriding tendency to act cohesively in 
support of them for reasons that I explained above. Nevertheless, in its discourse other 
influences and opinions will be expressed as well. Because of that, overall, I do not 
regard the Commission discourse as belonging to a particular actor or institution. The 
only sense in which this discourse can be seen as the Commission‟s is because the 
overwhelming majority of the documents that I study, as I explain in section 2.4.2. 
below, are issued by the Commission. Hence, I do not assume that there is a single actor 
behind this discourse. It expresses a plurality of voices. Thus, the bordering practices 
articulated in the Commission discourse will inevitably be affected by the enunciations 
on border matters of other interested parties. Moreover, because of the possibility to 
have various representations on the same issue, the discourses on borders advanced by 
different players can be expected to contain significant differences in their articulations. 
This diversity of voices is an important reason why discourses are ridden by 
contradictions. As the analysis in the empirical chapters shows, Commission discourse 
is no exception, which in turn creates ambiguities in the ways it configures EU borders.     
My contention is that as a result of the process of European integration European 
and EU borders have been transformed. This transformation, however, is not objectively 
given and does not reflect independent reality where borders have essential 
characteristics and can be defined in a value-free way. Instead, the current EU borders 
are an outcome of the struggle between different visions of how the inclusion/ exclusion 
issues should be solved. Furthermore, importantly, one should take into account that 
these different visions will tend to emphasise different configurations of borders, thus, 
constructing specific representations of how have borders been transformed. For 
example, the Commission tends to emphasise the construction of common spaces in the 
EU, thus implying that there is a tendency to de-bordering. It is only through 
examination of discourses that these visions and representations can be unveiled and 
studied. This analysis is carried out in the empirical parts of the study. However, if I am 
going to focus on how Commission discourse configures borders, I have to spell out 
how I think the Commission is able to exercise important influence on the bordering 
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practices in the policy areas under investigation. I also need to specify what types of 
borders the Commission is able to influence and how it does that.   
 
2.3.2. How does the Commission influence EU border-constructions? 
As I showed in the Literature Review, the question of whether the Commission 
is able to exercise independent influence over the process of integration in the EU is a 
highly contested one. Given the close link between borders and integration, this 
argument is central to the study because it relates directly to the Commission‟s ability to 
sway the struggles on bordering practices in its preferred direction. Therefore, an 
investigation into the ways in which borders are configured in the discourse of the 
Commission requires me to show how the Commission is able to exercise significant 
influence over the negotiation of the EU bordering practices. In this section, I address 
this issue. 
Following the position of Neo-functionalists, my contention is that the 
Commission is able to perform entrepreneurial functions and therefore, it can influence 
the way EU borders are configured. Such an ability of the Commission, however, is 
dependent on a particular understanding of “integration” as a process. Under such a 
perception, the capacity of the Commission to advance its preferred positions derives 
from what Nugent has referred to as “a strategic position”126 of the Commission in the 
institutional architecture of the EU. As I outlined briefly in Chapter One, the empirical 
part of the study investigates four policy areas – border controls, free movement of 
people, social policy and ENP. As the empirical chapters show, the Commission has 
contributed to the configuration of all the major types of borders (internal, external, 
territorial, or identity). This is an evidence for the far-reaching repercussions of the 
articulations of the European Commission. Nevertheless, as a result of the pillar 
structure of the EU, the powers and competences of the Commission in these areas are 
different. Thus, the scope of the Commission influence in the configuration of borders 
varies.  The Commission is most influential in the areas that fall under the first pillar 
(border controls, free movement of people, and some social policy issues) where its 
main responsibility is to be legislation initiator. In the first pillar it is the only institution 
that performs this function. In other policy areas (ENP, border controls prior to 2001), 
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in which the Commission is the implementer of the EU policies, its influence is smaller. 
It is sometimes regarded as the bureaucracy, the public administration body of the 
Union responsible for “the implementative, delegative part of the central 
government.”127 This is because in accordance with the duties it is charged with under 
the Treaty of Rome, it scrutinises the transposition and implementation of primary 
treaty articles and secondary legislation into the national law of the member states. If 
there are delays or incorrect transposition of EU legislation, the Commission can take 
the member state responsible to the ECJ. Also, the Commission manages the EU 
budget.
128
  
It is through using these prerogatives that the Commission influences the 
decision-making system in the second and third pillars. Although such influence is 
bound to fall short of setting the long-term trends and norms,
129
 it still allows room for 
exercising discretion. For example, as Coombes argues: “administrative decisions may 
involve deciding whether or not to enforce particular regulations on the basis of the 
facts of the case, applying policy to particular circumstances, or interpreting a policy 
which is expressed only in very general terms.”130 Importantly, by utilising such 
implementation prerogatives, the Commission has in some cases managed to enhance 
its standing on non-first pillar issues, which has put it in a good position to sway the 
decision-making. For example, its management of the Community budget has been of 
crucial importance for the establishment of the Commission as an actor in Community 
foreign policy in its own right. Even under the European Political Cooperation the 
Commission was the one responsible for the conception and management of 
Community aid programs. Partly it is as a result of the Commission having performed 
these responsibilities that the Western Economic Summit Meeting in July 1989 
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entrusted the Commission with the coordination of international assistance efforts to 
Poland and Hungary. Subsequently the program was extended to other Central and 
Eastern European Countries (CEECs). According to Nuttall, the role the Commission 
played in the events in Europe in 1989 and early 1990s “conferred on it greater political 
weight”.131 Thus, even on issues that currently fall outside of the first pillar, the 
Commission has over the years managed to secure an important place for itself. 
Therefore, by using the different kinds of prerogatives it is charged with, the 
Commission can exercise its influence through various means, thus also contributing to 
the transformation of EU borders. Nevertheless, it is on first pillar issues that the 
Commission is in the best position to exercise its leadership. The various ways through 
which the Commission gains its leverage are well summarised in the contributions of 
Nugent
132
 and Pollack.
133
 Some of the important powers they identify are that the 
Commission is able to set the agenda for the decision-making process in the EU; it is 
charged with ensuring the proper functioning and development of the common market, 
it is the first point of contact regarding ideas and initiatives, it is a leading repository of 
knowledge and expertise about EU policies, it is widely regarded as the “conscience” of 
the Union.
134
 Following these findings about the ways in which the Commission is well 
placed to influence the process of renegotiating the EU bordering practices, below I 
outline the main ways in which this happens. I pay particular attention to the different 
types of Commission influence in the various pillars under which the policy areas under 
investigation in this study fall. This outlines the main mechanisms through which the 
Commission influences the configuration of EU borders. 
So far I have argued in favour of the following points. Firstly, that as a result of 
integration (among other things), borders are being transformed. Secondly, I have 
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advocated an understanding of integration as a process that implies a continuous, day-
to-day involvement and effects of it. Thirdly, an understanding of borders as a social 
construction that is an outcome of the struggles of the various ways in which inclusion/ 
exclusion issues are resolved. These battles are expressed through discourses of various 
actors, one of which is the European Commission. Following the above definition of 
integration, the Commission, which is sometimes referred to as “the heart of the 
Union”135 is advantaged when it comes to advancing a particular way for settling the 
struggles over inclusion/ exclusion in the EU.  
The major way in which this comes about is by the Commission setting the 
agenda for the decision-making process. Pollack makes a distinction between formal 
and informal agenda setting. The former refers to the existing constitutional and legal 
arrangements, while the latter is the ability to define issues and present proposals that 
can gain the support of the final decision-makers.
136
 As far as the formal agenda-setting 
function of the Commission is concerned, according to Pollack, the Commission: “may, 
under certain circumstances, enjoy considerable agenda-setting power … namely in 
those circumstances where it enjoys the exclusive right of initiative …”137 Thus, a major 
way in which the Commission can resolve inclusion/ exclusion disagreements in its 
preferred directions is on those issues that fall under the first pillar where it has 
exclusive right to propose legislation. In practice other institutions (such as the Council 
of Ministers) have important input in the formulation of the official proposals, which 
among other things involves bargaining between institutions on the inclusion of their 
preferred policies in the official legislative proposals in various policy areas.
138
 Despite 
that, the formal powers of legislative initiative vested in the Commission inevitably give 
it a strong starting point in this process.  
Perhaps from the point of view of the formal agenda-setting powers of the 
Commission this is most obvious through the fact that being the sole legislation initiator 
allows the Commission in the words of Nugent to have a: “very significant impact on 
what policy issues are considered by the formal decision-takers, in what terms they are 
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considered, when they are considered, by whom they are considered, and with what 
receptivity they are considered.”139 Thus, following the reasoning of Neo-functionalists, 
in the renegotiation of the bordering practices in the areas of free movement of people, 
border controls (after 2001), some aspects of social policy, the Commission can 
facilitate the decreased salience of internal borders by wording its proposals in a 
particular way, by submitting them at time, which is favourable for their acceptance and 
subsequent adoption, or by framing a specific issue as related to achieving the aims of 
the single market. As the analysis in the empirical chapters of the research will show, 
the employment of such tactics can be easily seen in the discourse of the European 
Commission. 
The second way, in which the Commission can influence the renegotiations of 
EU bordering practices concerns the adoption of decisions that fall under the other two 
pillars where the Commission does not enjoy exclusive rights of initiative. In these 
areas, the Commission can sway the decision-making in its preferred direction by 
utilising its powers in informal agenda setting. Even scholars that are in general quite 
skeptical on the ability of the Commission to successfully perform an entrepreneurial 
role, such as Pollack, acknowledge this. According to him, the Commission is 
particularly well placed to set the agenda informally: “the Commission has no 
monopoly over informal agenda setting, but it may nevertheless have a comparative 
advantage over other potential agenda setters, such as member governments or private 
actors.”140 
It does that by carrying out the other functions it is charged with. Overall, these 
functions are rooted in the Commission‟s role as an implementer of EU‟s policies, 
which is its major role in the second and third pillars. As a result of the Commission 
being involved very closely in the day-to-day running and administration of these policy 
areas through carrying out the decisions that are taken and through executing its 
monitoring and budget managing responsibilities, it acquires knowledge, which is much 
bigger in its width and depth to the knowledge on these issues of the other major 
institutions of the EU. This is why Nugent talks about the Commission as being a 
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leading repository of knowledge and expertise about EU policies
141
 and possessing: 
“extensive technical expertise and a fund of information about the content and impact of 
EU policies”.142 This puts the Commission in a very advantaged position in the sense 
that it is the most likely actor to be asked for advice on any of the current or future 
policies in the EU. In turn, this allows the Commission to try to push ahead by putting 
on the formal agenda any propositions that it may deem appropriate.  
Furthermore, as I explained above, given the Treaty provisions and its own self-
interest, it is to be expected that the suggestions and plans the Commission comes up 
with will be in favour of promoting further integration, hence, diminishing the 
significance of internal EU borders. Such an expectation is further justified by the 
widely held belief in the Commission itself that it has a duty to incite integration. As 
Ludlow argues: “the function of animateur permeates the whole structure and ethos of 
the institution”.143 Therefore, the Commission can and does set the agenda even in the 
areas of the ENP or border controls prior to 2001 where it does not enjoy any formal 
powers to do this. The continuous linkage in Commission documents just after the 
adoption of the SEA of border control issues with free movement exemplifies this. This 
linkage pushed for inclusion of border controls into the formal framework of the 
EC/EU. I look into this matter in greater detail in Chapter Three. 
The Commission is, therefore, in a good position to successfully sway the 
decision-making process in the EU, on both first pillar and second and third pillar issues 
in favour of further integration and hence, creating common spaces in the EU. This 
process, however, as Neo-functionalists correctly expected, in fact has ambiguous 
effects on EU‟s borders. Namely, simultaneously with the decreased significance of 
internal EU borders, it leads to the emergence of the Union‟s external borders. 
According to Schmitter this expectation is a result of the initial presumptions of Neo-
functionalists that the process of integration will eventually lead to the emergence of: “a 
supranational state with most of the generic features of the national states it was 
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Policy, 2: 4 (1995), pp. 603-623, p. 608 
142 Neill  Nugent, The European Commission (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001), p. 210 
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supposed to transform”.144 This assumption of the “end-state” is exemplified by the 
persistent efforts in early integration research to reach a conclusion on what should this 
process lead towards
145
 as well as the main characteristics of integration provided by the 
founding fathers of Neo-functionalism. For example, Lindberg has defined as one of the 
conditions for political integration the development of new central institutions and 
central policies
146
 and Haas expected that under integration, in the long-term, the 
loyalties and expectations of the populations would transfer from the nation-states to the 
larger supranational entity.
147
 Thus, overall, the end result envisaged by Haas is: “more 
than a pluralistic security community and less than a political community, defined as the 
successful pluralistic-democratic state writ large.
148
 
Under these assumptions it is hardly surprising that Neo-functionalists did not 
foresee the disappearance of nationalism as guaranteed under integration.
149
 This is 
because as Schmitter correctly hypothesises once nation-states have reached an 
agreement to integrate, they will be compelled to adopt common policies towards third 
countries not involved in this endeavour. He refers to this process as externalisation and 
suggests that the more successful the efforts towards cooperation are, the greater the 
external challenges are likely to be.
150
 Thus, Neo-functionalist literature envisages that 
supranational institutions, including the Commission, will represent a centralised 
upgrading of common interests in a way very similar to a bigger nation-state.
151
 
Therefore, arguably they anticipate the firmer position of the Commission with regards 
to the external EU borders and the ambiguous effects on borders by integration. Section 
2.2.1. has demonstrated in practice this ambiguity. 
                                               
144
 Philippe Schmitter, „Neo-Neofunctionalism‟ in Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener (eds), European 
Integration Theory (1st ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 45-74, p. 69 
145 A famous article that engages with this problem is Donald Puchala, „Of Blind Men, Elephants and 
International Integration‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 10: 3 (1972), pp. 267-284  
146 Leon Lindberg, The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1963), p. 7 (emphasis added)  
147 Haas cited in Wayne Sandholtz, John Zysman, „1992: Recasting the European Bargain‟, World 
Politics, 42: 1 (1989), pp. 95-128, p. 98. 
148 Ernst Hass, „The Study of Regional Integration: Reflections on the Joy and Anguish of Pretheorizing‟, 
International Organization, 24: 4 (1970), pp. 607-646, p. 631 
149 See Idid, p. 645 and Ernst Haas, „International Integration: The European and the Universal Process‟, 
International Organization, 15: 3 (1961), pp. 366-392, pp. 391-392  
150 Philippe Schmitter, „Three Neo-Functional Hypotheses about International Integration‟, International 
Organization, 23: 1 (1969), pp. 161-166, p. 165     
151 Ernst Haas, „International Integration: The European and the Universal Process‟, International 
Organization, 15: 3 (1961), pp. 366-392 
 57 
Nevertheless, Neo-functionalists do not explicitly interrogate what this 
ambivalence will mean for the developments at the external EU borders. Thus, there is a 
lack of detailed analysis of the Commission contribution to the processes at the outer 
edges of the Union. One of the contributions of the present study is to fill this gap. I 
argue that the Commission has facilitated the emergence of salient external EU borders 
through the following main means. Firstly, it has accepted and used the assumptions on 
which certain EU policies are based. Secondly, it has utilised spillover in support of 
further cooperation at EU level and towards harmonisation of the legal provisions of the 
member states. Thirdly, the Commission has advanced the emergence of common 
identity in the EU through articulations of the “Other” and common treats to the Union. 
All of these contribute to the emergence of EU‟s external borders by sharpening the 
distinction between the Union and other parts of the world. Furthermore, following the 
varying competences of the Commission discussed above, in some policy areas it plays 
a more independent role, while in others it is more a passive supporter of the 
preferences of other EU institutions. The empirical chapters provide detailed empirical 
illustrations of these claims. 
 Despite my argument that the Commission can exercise independent influence 
in the decision-making process in the EU and hence have an input into the configuration 
of borders, in doing this it also faces important constraints. Pollack has contributed 
significantly in outlining them.
 152
 As a result, according to Lequesne: “… the EU 
Commission agents can mobilise specific resources in order to behave as “policy 
entrepreneurs” in the EU polity with a certain degree of autonomy from the national 
governments … this policy entrepreneurship is also constrained by endogeneous and 
exogeneous factors which make the Commission dependent on the national 
governments in the EU polity.”153 In practice, however, it is very difficult to examine 
these constraints because as Pollack points out, the Commission is prone to anticipating 
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the reaction of the Council to its proposals and to tailor them accordingly.
154
 However, 
this situation poses a bigger problem when the Commission discourse is perceived as 
having a single author. If one understands it as expressing multiple voices, this becomes 
less important because by definition the discourse is prone to external influences. It is 
not expected to be completely coherent. In fact, to a large extent, the ambiguous 
configuration of borders in Commission discourse is a result of the contradicting 
tendencies that are promoted by various actors. In the present study, this is best 
illustrated in the Chapter on Free Movement of People. Although in this policy area the 
Commission discourse promotes the emergence of a common space in the EU, it only 
manages to achieve this at the expense of establishing some categories of people that 
still do not have complete freedom of movement in the EU. 
The question of the Commission anticipating the Council reactions to its 
proposals and adjusting them accordingly also brings to the fore another crucial issue 
that has to be addressed. If that is the case, I have to spell out why in the empirical 
chapters I interpret the silences and contradictions in Commission discourse as 
constructing borders. Alternatively, these silences and contradictions can be interpreted 
in a much more positive way as the Commission wanting to go further but currently 
having to make concessions, which are only tactical. The reason for my interpretation is 
that regardless of Commission‟s intensions or long-term aims, on a discursive level, its 
current articulations give rise to a particular system of inclusion and exclusion and in 
that respect still recreate (rather than completely dispose of) borders. This is well 
exemplified by the Blue Card initiative, discussed in section 4.5.1., which envisages the 
right of highly qualified TCNs to move within the EU for work purposes. Although this 
can create a precedent in allowing TCNs to benefit from rights currently reserved only 
for EU citizens, Commission discourse achieves this at the expense of establishing a 
distinction between qualified and non-qualified TCNs, which in effect draws a dividing 
line between them. 
This discussion shows that the Commission is not only an actor that due to its 
responsibilities under the Treaties of the EC/EU and its self-interest can be expected to 
promote further integration. In fact, arguably, it can (although under certain conditions) 
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sway the decision-making process in the EU in its preferred direction. Even more 
importantly, as I have argued above, this is the case not only for first pillar issues, where 
the Commission‟s powers are strongest, but also for matters that fall under the second 
and the third pillar, where the leverage of the Commission is weaker. Taken together, 
these constitute very strong reasons for examining the Commission contribution in the 
construction and reconstruction of EU borders. Having presented an account of how I 
see borders in the previous section, and here outlined the main mechanisms through 
which the Commission configures borders, the next issue I have to look into is what 
exactly are the different kinds of borders that the Commission can construct and 
reconstruct in its discourse. Also, I have to elaborate on how exactly are these various 
types of borders constructed in the discourse of the Commission. These are the 
questions I deal with in the last part of the Theoretical Framework. 
 
2.3.3. What borders does the Commission discourse configure? 
In this section, my goal is to develop the framework that will guide the analysis 
in the empirical part of the study. I want to present a classification of the various types 
of borders that can be constructed or reconstructed in the discourse of the Commission. 
It is along this differentiation of borders that the analysis of Commission documents in 
the following chapters is structured. Furthermore, in this part, drawing on the arguments 
developed above, I elaborate in detail how each of these borders is created, thus 
providing the background that informs the subsequent interpretation of the discourse of 
the Commission in the empirical part of the research. 
In this study I classify borders along two main lines. Firstly, as discussed in 
section 2.2.1., following Geddes there is a distinction between territorial (physical), 
functional and conceptual (identity) borders.
155
 Secondly, in distinction to the majority 
of the studies reviewed above that tend to emphasise either the decreased salience of 
borders or the erections of new dividing lines, I analyse three major possible outcomes 
on the borders of the member states as a result of the process of European integration. 
Each of these trends can be manifested on territorial, functional or identity borders.  
Firstly, increased cooperation can lead to the decreased salience of previously 
existing borders between the member states of the Union, thus creating a new common 
                                               
155 See p. 24 above for a definition of each of these types of borders (territorial, functional and identity).  
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space in the EU. In the empirical chapters, I refer to this trend as “de-bordering” or 
decreased salience of borders. For territorial borders this tendency is manifested through 
allowing access to the territory of the member states without formalities. The de-
bordering tendencies in the Commission discourse are articulated predominantly 
through formulation of measures removing the existing obstacles to movement. As 
such, they facilitate movement on the territory of the EU by dismantling previously 
existing physical borders between the member states. In a somewhat similar way, de-
bordering for functional borders involves reducing the administrative requirements and 
the necessary bureaucratic procedures for gaining access to different sites, such as the 
labour markets of other member states. For identity borders de-bordering is 
characterised by the construction of a common identity of the population of the EU. 
There are two main ways in which the discourse of the Commission constructs common 
identity in the EU - firstly, through down-playing the differences between the member 
states of the EU and secondly, through continuous references to inclusive words, such 
as the pronouns “our”, “ours”, “we”, which point to the existence of common historical 
traditions, civilization, experiences, thinking, perceptions, current challenges an so on 
and the labeling of contemporary undertakings as “common action”or “joint 
endeavour”. 
Secondly, as Diez points out, the process of de-bordering in the EU is taking 
place when the focus is on the inside of the EU. However, this simultaneously erects 
new borders on the outside.
156
 It is this creation of a new outside border for the EU, 
which I mean when I talk about border-construction and border reconstruction. To the 
extent that the borders of the member states do not disappear completely, one can talk 
about border reconstruction. However, due to the fact that the new borders that are 
established at the outer edges of the Union are also the limits of an international actor in 
its own right, it becomes meaningful to talk about border-construction. In the empirical 
parts of the study, I refer to this process as the construction of the external borders of 
the EU.  
For territorial and functional borders this is manifested through the emergence of 
new regimes regulating the entry into the territory, labour market or welfare state of the 
Union and its member states for third country nationals. The main way in which the 
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discourse of the Commission constructs the external borders of the EU is through 
articulating some kind of common threat for the Union and building on this, its 
discourses argue in favour of various undertakings that are deemed necessary and 
capable for addressing this danger. The articulation of threat is also core to the 
construction and reconstruction of identity borders. Following post-structuralists, 
identity borders emerge as a result of articulations of “Self” and “Other”. The reason for 
this is that the function of identity is twofold – internally to define the community, and 
externally, to differentiate between the community and the outside. Thus, these 
articulations contribute to the drawing of boundaries which describe who may be 
included and who may be excluded. O'Hagan outlines this process well. It involves two 
interrelated occurrences. One of them is the process of defining collective identity. This 
is achieved through a perception of shared norms, beliefs, institutions, values and goals. 
The other one, which according to post-structuralists is crucial, is differentiation. It is 
the concept of the “Other” that provides the axis on which acceptable and unacceptable 
political activities and identity are constructed. Thus, political identity often emerges 
with greater clarity when the polity confronts the individual whose inclusion is 
ambiguous. This helps to generate abstract principles upon which the community or 
polity is based.
157
 Hence, Campbell argues: “… the constitution of identity is achieved 
through the inscription of boundaries that serve to demarcate an “inside” from an 
“outside”, a “self” from an “other”, a “domestic” from a “foreign””.158 Thus, the 
discourse of the Commission constructs the external identity borders of the EU through 
articulations that create perceptions of what does and what does not belong to the EU. 
Thirdly, the Commission discourse can reconstruct internal borders inside the 
EU.
159
 In section 2.2.1. I outlined the major types of internal borders in the EU. In this 
study, the term “internal EU border” denotes a situation, in which contrary to the 
traditional aims of integration striving to establish a common space between the 
member states, certain aspects of various Union policies lead to the creation of divisions 
either between the EU member states or between various other entities inside the Union. 
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I view the former as a result of incomplete integrative measures, which in effect recreate 
the distinction between the member states and point to the continued existence and 
significance of their national borders. Furthermore, because the integration efforts also 
affect groups of people inside the EU, new internal functional and identity borders also 
emerge. Therefore, integration can result in incomplete de-bordering in the EU when 
differences between the member states may persist and when new divisions are created 
within the EU population. These new borders, however, are quite likely to take different 
forms in comparison to the situation prior to the initiation of integration efforts. For 
territorial and functional borders the reconstruction of an internal border arises if as a 
result of cooperation in the Union different categories of people emerge in terms of their 
rights and regime to access the territory or labour markets and welfare states of the EU 
member states. Namely, despite the Commission rhetoric about the creation of an area 
without internal barriers there are still categories of people that face obstacles for their 
free movement in the Union. The reconstruction of identity internal borders is a 
consequence of the emergence of certain categories of people as an “internal Other” 
from the articulations of the Commission, thus creating a division within the EU 
population.  
The concept of an “internal Other” is another term grounded in post-
structuralism. As I elaborated above, they argue that because of the dense texture of any 
theory or discourse complete fixity of meaning is impossible. Derrida has demonstrated 
this argument through deconstruction. Thus, post-structuralists maintain that within 
each discourse there are possibilities to defer and disrupt indefinitely its claim to 
sufficiency and closure. Crucially, for post-structuralists these disruptions are internal to 
the discourse.
160
 These disruptions mean that within every discourse there will be 
internal inconsistencies and contradictions. The emergence of “Internal Other” is one 
instance of such inconsistencies and contradictions. In this case, it occurs when a part of 
the population of the EU is articulated in the discourse of the European Commission as 
possessing qualities concurrent with the qualities attributed to the “Other” for the 
Union. Such articulations contribute to the reconstruction of the internal divisions in the 
Union because they obstruct the establishment of a perception of sameness within the 
population of the EU.  
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Thus, overall, in the empirical chapters of the study I analyse the ways in which 
Commission articulations configure EU and European borders along two main lines. 
Firstly, I ask: do they contribute to the emerging of a common space in the area in 
question, thus leading to a decreased salience of borders or do they instead contribute to 
the construction of an internal or external border? Secondly, I look into whether this 
configuration refers to a territorial, functional or identity border through the 
construction of unification/ distinction. Given the wide variety of policy areas in which 
the Commission is involved, the over sixty years of existence of the EC/EU and the 
different ways to interpret Commission documents, I have to present my account of the 
time-frame of the study, the reasons for choosing these four policy areas and the ways 
in which I interrogated the Commission documents. These form the methodology of the 
study. 
 
 
2.4. Methodology of the research 
In order to be able to provide a detailed account of how integration efforts have 
led to ambiguous configurations of borders in Commission discourse, I have to do two 
main things. Firstly, I have to demonstrate that despite the explicit overwhelming focus 
only on de-bordering in Commission documents, these articulations have contributed to 
the emergence of new borders and to the reconstruction of old ones. Secondly, I need to 
analyse the specific contribution of the European Commission in this process. The 
question is, however, how can these two issues be studied? The aim of this part is to 
provide an answer to these questions by explaining the methodology of the research. In 
order to do this, it has to address the following main issues: what is the time-frame of 
the research; what are the policy areas under investigation; why did I choose this 
particular period and policies; which documents will form the empirical material for the 
research; according to what criteria were they selected; and how will I analyse them? 
Effectively, I have to elaborate on how I gathered and analysed the information forming 
the bulk of the research. However, prior to that I look into the time frame and policy 
areas of the study. 
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2.4.1. Why this period? Why these Policy areas? 
My research examines the discourse of the European Commission in the period 
after the adoption of the SEA in 1987. The period under investigation in this study is 
limited due to the large amount of documents that have to be examined. The second half 
of the 1980s is a good starting point for this investigation because this period has been 
acknowledged as a time when the integration efforts gained new impetus. As a result, 
various kinds of borders have been constructed and reconstructed, thus providing a 
fertile ground for the empirical analysis. Given this importance of the SEA for the 
study, below I provide a brief outline of the core ideas and aims of the single market 
with the aim of providing the necessary background for the subsequent references in the 
examined documents. In terms of the goals of this initiative, I focus specifically on the 
articulations that clearly configure borders. 
The Single Market Initiative‟s ultimate goal is through economic liberalisation 
to establish the conditions that will allow for the most efficient use of the factors of 
production. This is exemplified by the Introduction of the Commission White Paper on 
the Internal Market, which stipulates that one of the objectives of this endeavor is 
“ensuring that the market is flexible so that resources, both of people and materials, and 
of capital and investment, flow into the areas of greatest economic advantage.”161 In this 
sense the efforts towards the establishment of the single market represent a continuation 
of the logic upon which the Treaty of Rome was founded. However, the 1980s Initiative 
went a step further than the Treaty of the EC. Through its provisions for the adoption of 
measures towards the removal of physical, technical and fiscal barriers to the movement 
of factors of production, it made it more difficult for member states to resort to 
protectionist policies. Examples of such policies are the high number of non-tariff 
barriers to trade that existed between the members of the Community during the period 
after the creation of the customs union.
162
 Furthermore, at the time, these liberal ideas 
represented not only the logic upon which the integration project in the EC was founded 
but also were in tune with a way of thinking that was becoming increasingly popular in 
some parts of the world, the New Right. As Gamble explains in detail, the Neo-liberal 
economic ideas formed a very important part of the belief system of the Thatcher 
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government in the UK.
163
 Thus, the single market appealed to both pro-integration 
member states as well as those that supported Neo-liberal ideas.
164
 
Out of these ideas arose formulations that became enshrined in the 1985 
Commission White Paper and the subsequent SEA.
165
 Most important of these, in light 
of the topic of this study, is an articulation with an important potential to configure 
borders. The SEA defines the internal market as: “an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured …”166 The 
White Paper goes into more detail of what unifying the EC, subsequently the EU, 
market entails: “Member States will agree on the abolition of barriers of all kinds, 
harmonisation of rules, approximation of legislation and tax structures, strengthening of 
monetary cooperation and the necessary flanking measures to encourage European firms 
to work together.”167 These articulations mean that in essence, the establishment of the 
single market is a goal that will result in the emergence of a common space in the 
EC/EU. This is what the above formulation in the SEA implies. In turn, as the citation 
of the White Paper shows, this aim will be achieved through undertaking measures that 
make less important different kinds of borders between the member states. Thus, the 
configuration of borders under the single market articulations is that previously existing 
borders between the states participating in the integration in Europe become less salient.  
 The SEA and the resulting project of an internal market became crucial points 
in the process of integration in Europe because as Wallace argues: “it fits Community 
philosophy, it suits the doctrinal preferences of the current British Conservative 
government, and it would draw in its train a mass interconnections with other fields of 
action.”168 Tranholm-Mikkelsen and George provide more details on the last point. For 
example, according to George: “Functional spillover was clearly at work in the way that 
the economic objectives of the EC pushed it in the direction of also taking over some of 
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the responsibilities for social policy from the member states.”169 And Tranholm-
Mikkelsen argues that: “a functional link is created between the internal market and the 
Community‟s environmental policies.”170 However: “The most obvious examples, 
perhaps, are the consequences of the plans for the abolition of physical frontiers.”171 I 
also show in Chapter Three that there is a strong trend in Commission discourse 
towards linking the efforts in the two areas.  
Thus, the SEA and its project for the internal market is a good starting point for 
an inquiry into the ambiguous configuration of borders by the discourse of the European 
Commission because it has the potential to provide rich empirical examples of border 
transformations. This happens in two main ways. Firstly, it obviously is an endeavor 
towards the construction of a common area where previous borders between the 
member states should become less important. Secondly, the observed functional linkage 
between the original areas encompassed under the SEA (which are economic) and other 
fields (such as environment, social policy and so forth) is very important because it has 
led to furthering the integration efforts in these other fields. As such, the transformation 
of borders has been extended to these other areas as well, making them also eligible for 
investigation. Furthermore, in the light of the focus of my study, the European 
Commission played a very active role in the internal market initiative. According to 
George, for example: “the Commission played a promotive and facilitating role in 
getting the government to realize the dimensions of the problem … and the possible role 
of the EC in supplying a solution … It manipulated a conjunction of international and 
domestic circumstances to push forward the process of European integration …”172 This 
is crucial because it means that when the internal market was initiated, the Commission 
had a leading role to play. The Commission promotion of the SEA coupled with its aim 
                                               
169 Ibid., p. 216 
170 Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, „Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of 
the New Dynamism of the EC‟, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 20: 1 (1991), pp. 1-22, p. 
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171 Ibid., p. 12. Arne Niemann, Philippe Schmitter illustrate this argument in relation to the development 
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Mikkelsen, „Neo-Functionalism: Obstinate or Obsolete? A Reappraisal in the Light of the New 
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of creating a frontier-free area leaves the impression that the Commission is a champion 
of liberalisation and decreased importance of borders. Importantly, this is an 
impression, which in the vast majority of cases, the Commission discourses reinforce 
themselves. They achieve this by using a language that puts the emphasis on 
inclusiveness and mobility. However, this is rarely (if ever) the whole story. Often, for 
different reasons, which I explore in this study, the Commission discourses contribute to 
the construction and reconstruction of internal and external borders as well. Therefore, it 
will be of interest to examine the role it has played in the configuration of borders in the 
policy areas under consideration in this study, which were invigorated after the second 
half of the 1980s.  
This active role of the Commission is coupled with another important 
development under the SEA, which constitutes the third reason why I think this period 
is a good starting point for my investigation. This Treaty increased the powers of the 
supranational institutions of the EC (the Commission and the Parliament). As far as the 
Commission is concerned, there was an increase in the issues covered by qualified 
majority voting (QMV). As Tranholm-Mikkelsen has argued, this demonstrates a 
change in the institutional balance of power in the EU: “The Commission has been able 
to exploit the publicity surrounding the 1992 project and has obtained some leverage in 
its dealing with the Council.”173 These increased powers of the Commission are 
important in light of the focus of the study because they imply that it has strengthened 
its ability to successfully sway the decision-making process in the EU. Hence, a focus 
on the period after the adoption of the SEA is beneficial in terms of the increased ability 
of the Commission to act independently (at least in theory). 
This leads to the second major issue that I have to address in this section: what 
are the reasons for choosing to focus the study exactly on these four policy areas that I 
have concentrated on? Although ultimately, every decision of that sort is at least 
partially arbitrary, overall, my major aim in deciding which policies are going to be 
included was to attain a good balance and comprehensive coverage in analysing the two 
key terms of the study, the European Commission and borders. The four policy areas 
conform to these goals for two main reasons. Firstly, the policy areas that I examine in 
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the empirical part allow me to simultaneously attain balanced and comprehensive 
information for both the European Commission contribution in the construction of EU 
borders and to cover the configuration of multiple borders. I have already dealt with 
aspects of the issue of case studies selection in previous sections of the study. As I 
explained in detail in section 2.3.2., one of the advantages of this selection of case 
studies is that it spans the pillar structure of the EU. As I showed, the Commission has 
different prerogatives and powers under the various pillars. Hence, an examination of 
the configuration of borders in the Commission discourse in the four policies will allow 
analysis of existing differences and similarities in the trends in these bordering 
articulations. 
This pillar structure of the EU is very important from a methodological point of 
view in relation to the decision to examine border controls and free movement of people 
as two separate policy areas in two different chapters. As the discussion in Chapters 
Three and Four shows, in essence the subject matter of these two policy areas is the 
same, dealing with matters of free movement of individuals. However, as the overviews 
of the development of each of these policies show, the particular issues they are dealing 
with evolved in radically different ways. While from its inception free movement of 
people was incorporated into the EEC, cooperation on border controls-related questions 
developed much later and started off outside Community cooperation efforts. Therefore, 
the Commission has had differing powers and prerogatives in the two areas. This makes 
it interesting to investigate whether there are significant differences in the ways its 
discourse in each of the fields configures borders and if yes, how exactly they are 
articulated. Another reason for examining these issues in separate chapters is that the 
types of borders they configure are different. While border controls relate 
predominantly to territorial borders, free movement of people is linked with the 
configuration of different type of borders, functional borders. In that respect, the overall 
selection of the four case studies provides examples of the configuration of all the three 
main types of borders and also looks into how developments in the EU affect the 
configuration of borders through its relationships with its external partners. As some of 
these external partners are in Europe, this has repercussion on the configuration of 
European borders as well. 
 69 
The second major reason why these four areas are a good mix for examining the 
configuration of borders is the understanding of the term “border” I employ in this 
study. As I argued in section2.3.1. for me borders are social constructs that are created 
by human interactions. Therefore, even (or perhaps most of all) one of the most 
important dividers in politics, the borders between states, are a result of countless 
practices of inclusion and exclusion, some of which are not always thoroughly 
examined. As scholars such as Agnew
174
 and Taylor
175
 have argued, the state can be 
viewed as a container that regulates (and therefore constructs borders) along all the 
major types of human relations (social, economical, cultural). Thus, one should expect 
that the process of integration would affect all these types of relations and importantly, 
that bordering practices will be influenced as well. The review of the literature on EU 
borders shows that there has been an important scholarly discussion about European 
values, which is related to at least some of the above human relations. Nevertheless, the 
studies that I reviewed do not explicitly engage with the configuration of borders for all 
of these relations. The selection of case studies allows me to overcome this weakness of 
the existing research. Namely, I can engage not only with the issues that are usually 
associated with borders (which are also very important) but also with issue areas that are 
constitutive to the normalisation of the bordering practices but which are not usually 
widely scrutinised. I achieve this by looking at both policy areas that are unequivocally 
border-related (ENP and border controls) as well as fields, where borders are not 
directly implicated (social policy, free movement of people). Thus, with the issues that I 
discussed in this section, I have narrowed down the focus of the research significantly. 
However, as a next step, I have to address the question of selection of the primary 
material that is going to be included. 
 
2.4.2. Data Collection 
In order to be able to analyse how Commission discourses configure EU borders 
and to critically engage with these configurations, I need to perform two consecutive 
steps. Firstly, I need to reconstruct the discourse on EU borders in each policy area; 
                                               
174 John Agnew, „The Territorial Trap: the Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory‟, 
Review of International Political Economy, 1: 1 (1994), pp. 53-80 
175 Peter Taylor, „The State as Container: Territoriality in the Modern World System‟, Progress in Human 
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secondly, I have to advance a critical reading of these discourses. The account how I 
will carry out the second step is presented in the last section of this part. Below I outline 
how I will perform the first step.  
To reconstruct the discourse on borders in the policy areas under investigation, I 
need to read European Commission texts in each of these areas and aim to reconstruct 
the common themes, objects and categories
176
 around which the bordering practice/s in 
each one of them converge. This allows me to present my interpretation of the socially 
constructed meaning of inclusion/exclusion implied by the discourse and elaborate on 
the rules created by this discourse through the activities it enables or outlaws. Building 
on this, I advance my interpretation of the ways in which borders are configured within 
the discourse in question. My expectation is that the documents of the Commission 
create an impression of the decreased significance of borders as a result of the process 
of European integration. This is because the topics on which these discourses are 
explicit are issues such as common policies, measures for overcoming national 
differences, various unification activities. Furthermore, this configuration of the 
decreased significance of borders is likely to be captured by different terms that employ 
the word “European”, thus implying the emergence of a common space in the EU. 
Therefore, overall the articulations in these policies contribute to for example, enabling 
easier movement within the EU as a result of abolishing intra-EU border-controls, 
accepting professional qualifications and diplomas from a member state in all other 
members and so forth, which effectively decreases the salience of borders.  
In conducting discourse analysis one of the crucial questions is which 
documents the analysis is based on; in my case - which Commission texts exactly am I 
going to read? Why exactly these ones and not others? Answering these questions 
requires looking back at the aims of the research because ultimately the reasons for 
choosing the specific selection of documents lie in the goals of this study. It sets out to 
critically engage with the Commission discourses on EU borders and to investigate the 
Commission contribution to their construction and reconstruction. Therefore, in order to 
be able to analyse these issues I need to gather information about the following: what 
are Commission discourses on borders; what are the Commission policies and priorities 
                                               
176 These are suggested in Jean Carabine, „Unmarried Motherhood 1830-1990: a Genealogical Analysis‟ 
in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie Taylor, Simeon Yates (eds), Discourse as Data – a Guide for Analysis 
(London: Sage, 2001), pp. 267-310, p. 281 
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regarding EU borders; how do Commission proposals configure the Union‟s borders; 
what new rules do these proposals establish; how do the discourses in each of the policy 
areas construct and reconstruct borders? 
In order to be able to collect data about the priorities of the Commission in the 
relevant policy areas I examine the following main kinds of documents: Green and 
White Papers,
177
 and European Council and Presidency Conclusions (such as these at 
Tampere, Lisbon, Thessaloniki). These help me define the scope of the objectives and 
priorities, thus giving me ideas about which the areas where I can expect high 
Commission activity are, and focusing my search. Importantly, these documents form 
the initial phases of the decision-making process of the EU. It is in these types of 
documents that overall objectives or new initiatives are formulated and aired. Thus, 
these texts allow me not only to attain information about the policy priorities but also to 
get a glimpse of the areas that are becoming prominent on the agenda, and hence, where 
formal legislative action can be expected. This is of crucial importance, given that one 
of the aims of the study is to engage critically with the role of the Commission in the 
construction and reconstruction of EU‟s borders. In that respect it is important to have 
an idea of the contents of Council and Presidency Conclusion even though they are not 
Commission documents. If Green and White Papers expose the thinking of the 
Commission in the initial stages of decision-making, the Conclusions formalise the 
accepted goals by making them official priorities for the Union. Therefore, by engaging 
with all these documents I can analyse any concurrences and differences between the 
thinking of the Commission and the future policy directions agreed upon at EU-level. 
Nevertheless, overall the study has had a limited ability to investigate the 
specific origins of border-related policy proposals (i.e. are they promoted by the 
Commission, by the European Parliament or by the Council). Partly this is due to the 
fact that such investigation requires a genealogical analysis, which goes well beyond the 
primary aim of the research. Furthermore, as I argued in the previous section, in tune 
with post-structuralist understandings, in practice things are always intertextual. This 
                                               
177 The former aim at gathering different opinions on a specific policy issue, while the latter contain 
proposals for Community action in a specific area and are used as vehicles for its development. A list of 
the Commission‟s Green Papers is available at 
http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/index_en.htm, accessed on 5.01.2008 and of the 
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means that it is difficult to pinpoint one source of origin for a particular idea or policy 
proposal. Thus, in the Commission discourse the various visions will be expressed. 
Despite that, the institutional structure of the EU allows making assumptions about the 
general trends of the positions on particular proposals that the main EU actors are likely 
to adopt as a result of their self-interests. These help to moderate to a large extent this 
limitation and allow presenting a plausible account of the origins of specific policy 
proposals that are examined in the research.  
The preliminary reading will point out the major areas where I need to collect 
Commission documents in order to reconstruct the discourse of the Commission. The 
bulk of the documents I collected are Commission Communications
178
 (COM
179
 and 
SEC
180
 documents). I complete further my basis of documents through including 
speeches by Commission officials on issues relevant to the studied policy areas.
181
  
These texts include all the major policy proposals and positions of the Commission and 
therefore are a good way of making sure I have not missed out something important in 
the process of reconstructing the discourse.  
As this overview of the documents on which I base my analysis shows, overall, I 
have aimed to refrain as much as possible from using non-Commission issued 
documents. Despite that, I have had to include European Council and Presidency 
Conclusions that have issued landmark decisions and objectives in the policy areas 
under consideration. The reason for sticking to this more narrow definition of 
Commission discourse (rather than one that looks into Commission discourse expressed 
in documents issued by other EU institutions, for example) is that it has the advantage 
of providing a clear boundary for delimiting the discourse I am studying. Thus, I 
achieve a higher consistency and a better comparability between the documents 
                                               
178 These can be accessed through EUR-Lex, the portal to European Union law, available at http://eur-
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considered. At the same time, as a result of the inter-penetration of texts, I will 
nevertheless still be able to trace some of the non-Commission influences in its 
documents. In order to get an idea about the ability of the Commission to attain 
adoption of the policy proposals it issues, I look into their status in the decision-making 
machinery of the EU.
182
 These steps in reconstructing the Commission discourse allow 
me to get a complete picture of the issues considered not only in terms of their content 
but also in relation to their adoption, thus ensuring accurate analysis. Once I have 
executed this process of reconstruction, I am in a position to provide my interpretation 
of the actions these proposals enable, those that become impossible, as well as of how 
these discourses configure borders.  
Ultimately, the information gathered about the discourse of the European 
Commission in the policy areas allows me to analyse its contribution to the 
reconstruction of EU borders. Furthermore, the documents I collect in the different 
policy areas are going to be comparable to each other because all types of documents I 
intend to collect and examine are available for all the policy areas in question, i.e. 
Communications and speeches and landmark Council decisions that have defined the 
objectives. Therefore, I build my analysis on the basis of the same types of Commission 
documents.  
The main Commission–produced documents that are not included in this study 
(these are Registers, which offer access to the internal documents – Commission 
Meetings, Work Programmes, C documents, Committee Deliberations, Expert Groups, 
Application of Community Law, Codecision; General Publications; Audiovisual 
Service
183
) are related either to the internal working of the Commission or are aimed at 
the General Public. The former have been excluded because the information they are 
anticipated to provide will give more inside knowledge into the day-to-day run of this 
institution and I do not consider this as pertinent to the aim of the present study. The 
latter are an inherent part of the reconstruction of borders by the Commission because 
they are aimed at the wider public inside and outside the EU and as such can facilitate 
the process of normalisation of the discourses. However, the goal of critically 
                                               
182 The status of policy proposals can be tracked at http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm?CL=en, 
accessed on 16. 04. 2009. This is the portal that is monitoring the decision-making process between EU 
institutions. 
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examining the way Commission articulations configure EU borders can be performed 
satisfactorily without detailed analysis of these documents for two main reasons. Firstly, 
the bordering configurations in these documents will follow the configurations 
articulated in the Commission documents that I examine because the information 
disseminated to the general public is intended to give the ordinary citizen easily 
understandable information about the EU. Secondly, by analysing the bordering 
configurations in speeches of Commission officials I have already included aspects of 
how the Commission relates to the general public. Therefore detailed analysis of 
Commission documents aimed at the general public goes beyond the scope of this 
research. 
 
2.4.3. Data Analysis 
The materials collected during the empirical research are analysed in two main 
ways. Firstly, a critical reading of the discourses of the Commission is advanced using 
the strategy of double reading, which: “… allows to bring to the surface features of 
discourse which normally are allowed to remain submerged.”184 Building on this, 
secondly, I analyse the Commission contribution to the reconstruction of the EU‟s 
borders. More specifically on the second point, after the second reading of the 
Commission documents is performed, I am concerned with whether there is still only a 
trend towards decreased significance of borders in the discourse in question. A finding 
that points to the construction and/or reconstruction of EU borders through Commission 
discourses will clearly indicate ambiguous configurations of borders in these 
articulations. Crucially, this is contrary to the trend Commission documents to be 
explicit only about the diminished importance of borders. It will show the current 
limitations for the decreased salience of borders, which lead to the construction and 
reconstruction of borders. Furthermore, it will make possible evaluations of the reasons 
why these limitations occur. Given the complex decision-making structure of the EU 
and intertextuality it is of interest for me to analyse to what extent the borders 
configured in the Commission discourse are actually actively promoted by the 
Commission itself. In order to do this, I pay particular attention to the articulations 
concerning the current decision-making system of the EU and pose the question does 
                                               
184 Chris Brown, „‟Turtles All the Way Down‟: Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International 
Relations‟, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 23: 2 (1994), pp. 213-236, p. 222  
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the Commission support it or does it advocate change in it. Also, I trace whether the 
Commission has been successful in securing adoption of its proposals. Taken together 
these analyses will allow me to provide a detailed account of how the Commission has 
contributed to the ambiguous process of border transformation under integration in the 
EU.  
One of the aims of this study will be to show how despite the rhetoric of the 
European Commission about integration (which traditionally is associated with 
decreased significance of borders), a more careful consideration of the relevant texts 
and their interrelation with other policies involved in the same processes brings to the 
fore issues that effectively construct borders (albeit of different kinds from traditional 
state ones). The latter usually go unnoticed and unacknowledged by the discourses of 
the Commission but the method of double reading allows bringing them to the fore by 
critically engaging with the relevant discourses. 
In this method, the first reading presents the discourse under scrutiny in the most 
faithful way and based on this it gives it the most favourable interpretation possible.
185
 
Taking the position of the author and representing what the intention of the text is 
achieves this. In that respect the first reading mimics the discourse in question. The 
second reading, however, places the discourse within a wider context and shows how 
the meaning produced by the specific discourse is interrelated (is affected by and 
affects) other discourses. Therefore, the meaning produced by a particular discourse is 
contingent upon other discourses,
186
 which need to be taken into account as well. Thus, 
in the second reading I am not looking at the authoritative voice in the text but rather try 
to identify the breaks in the argument, the spots in which the assumptions made within 
the text are problematic.  
So, in all the policy areas that I have examined, my initial aim was to reconstruct 
at face value how the relevant Commission documents configure EU borders. In the 
empirical chapters this is done simultaneously with the process of reconstruction of 
Commission discourse in each policy area, which was explained in the previous part. In 
the second reading, however, the aim is to demonstrate that when the wider framework 
is taken into account there are border-producing articulations in these discourses, which 
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usually are not given the necessary attention. There are two main ways in which this can 
be revealed. Firstly, such a situation can be the result of contradictions and 
inconsistencies between aspects of different policies of a particular institution. 
Therefore, it can be expected that these contradictions can be identified within the 
Commission articulations in the different policy areas. For example, some of the 
arguments used by the Commission in its discourse on Enlargement can be read as 
constructing the EU‟s border in the context of the ENP. Secondly, an important 
indicator of the inconsistencies of the discourses consists of its silences, absences. 
These are issues that are not present in the discourse although one may reasonably 
expect them to be covered by it.
187
 These absences, however, are of paramount 
importance because their mere existence points to a de facto inconsistency of the 
discourse. For example, in a discourse framed as free movement of workers one would 
not be content to see measures aimed at opening up borders to refer only to Union 
citizens. In practice the silence on the free movement of third country nationals‟ 
workers of such a discourse does create a border between these two categories of 
people. This points to a rupture in the discourse itself because it obstructs the 
achievement of its declared aims.  
In order to ensure the smooth performing of the technique as well as the 
compatibility of the findings it is useful to develop a list of questions for reading the 
documents. For the first reading, the analysis is conducted through posing the following 
questions: 
1. What aims does the Commission have in the given policy area? 
2. How are these aims justified? What is the rationale behind them? 
3. How are these aims going to be achieved? 
4. How do these actions configure EU internal/ external borders?  
For the second reading, I am looking for: 
1. Are there any inconsistencies and contradictions in the Commission 
discourse? 
2. Are there any silences within the current discourse, which make the 
achievement of the stated aims problematic? 
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3. Do these breaks in the discourse contribute to the configuration of the EU 
internal/ external borders? 
Thus, the double-reading technique allows me to address one of the core 
questions of this research by highlighting the way in which ambiguous configurations of 
borders have been articulated in the discourses of the European Commission. It shows 
that on the surface these discourses tend to emphasise only the transcendence of borders 
as a result of the process of European integration. The account presented with the 
second reading helps to restore the balance by pointing to the border-producing 
configurations in the discourse of the Commission.  
This analysis also enables me to demonstrate how the Commission contributes 
to the construction and reconstruction of EU‟s borders. It allows me to elaborate on 
what I see as the reasons for these configurations, thus signaling the main constraints for 
decreasing the importance of internal EU borders as well as the main ways in which its 
external borders are enunciated under a process of integration. Ultimately, this 
dissection allows me to point out not only the main ways through which the European 
Commission creates and recreates borders in/ of the EU but also to show any distinct 
features of this process in each of the policy areas examined.   
 
 
2.5. Summary 
In this chapter I developed the framework for the analysis in the empirical part 
of the research. I started with a review of the relevant academic debates on EU borders, 
Border Studies and the role of the European Commission in the integration process. 
There are two major shortcoming of the current research on EU borders. Firstly, it tends 
to focus on one particular aspect of border developments (the decreasing significance of 
borders or the emergence of borders). As I have maintained, in distinction to such an 
approach, I consider those two processes as occurring simultaneously. Therefore, I 
argue in favour of developing a way for studying them in accordance with such an 
understanding. I presented my view of how to achieve this in the following parts of the 
chapter. Inspired by the arguments of a particular approach to Border Studies, I claimed 
that borders are social constructions that change under the development of new 
inclusion/ exclusion practices and that they can be studied through examining the 
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discourses on these bordering practices. This issue is related to the second shortcoming 
of the existing literature as well. The overwhelming majority of academic research is 
examining issues related to Enlargement, the external borders of the EU more generally 
or European values. I, however, noted that bordering practices are also taking place in 
other spheres of human relations (i.e. social, cultural and so forth). Thus, it is of 
paramount importance to also examine the discourses of inclusion and exclusion in EU 
policy areas that are not traditionally associated with borders. Also, inspired by the 
debates on European integration, I identified the European Commission as the 
institution that is best suited to concentrate on in this research. I explained that due to 
the institutional structure of the EU and its self-interest, the Commission could 
reasonably be expected to promote further integration, thus contributing to the 
decreased salience of internal borders and the construction of external EU borders. I 
also provided my argumentation why I think the Commission can successfully sway the 
decision-making process in the EU despite the arguments of some scholars against such 
ability. This enabled me to outline the main mechanisms and the scope of Commission 
ability to influence the configuration of EU borders.  
The addressing of all of these issues allowed me to engage with the tools for 
performing my analysis. I will study Commission documents in four EU policy areas 
(border controls, free movement of people, ENP, social policy) in the period after the 
adoption of the SEA. In order to expose the ambiguous configurations of borders by 
Commission discourse, I will employ the double-reading technique, which allows to 
critically interrogate texts and to analyse the inconsistencies and silences in them. The 
analysis is structured along two main lines. On the one hand, I investigate whether 
Commission discourses contribute to the decreased salience of borders or promote the 
construction and reconstruction of EU external and internal borders. On the other hand, 
I interrogate if these configurations refer to territorial, functional or identity borders. In 
the following chapters I perform these analyses in practice, starting with the issue of 
border controls. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
BORDER CONTROLS – THE EXPLICIT CONSTRUCTION OF EU 
EXTERNAL BORDERS 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
As we have seen in section 2.2.1., there is one border-related issue that has received 
overwhelming attention – the Schengen Treaty, its developments and effects on the borders 
of the member states and of the EU. The focal point of the cooperation under Schengen is 
the facilitation and eventually the lifting of internal border controls between the 
participating countries. As such, in this policy area, it is above all territorial (physical) 
borders that are being configured. As was shown, currently the problem that attracts 
significant attention is the argument of many of these studies that as a result of Schengen, a 
new border, very often characterised as difficult to penetrate, has arisen on the edges of the 
Union. This is often referred to as the development of “fortress Europe”. Given the focus of 
this research, my attention is centred on the role of the European Commission in the 
process of erecting EU‟s external borders. As far as this problem is concerned, my central 
argument is that in accordance with the expectations of Neo-functionalists, the discourse of 
the Commission has facilitated the construction of “fortress Europe”. This is a result of the 
Commission undertakings on border controls, which have not only contributed to the 
construction of a common space in the EU but also to the emergence of salient external 
edges of the Union. This comes about as a result of Commission articulations that in effect 
promote the establishment of the particular external borders of the EU we have today. The 
idea of “fortress Europe” also points to the conclusion that despite the efforts towards the 
abolition of internal border controls in the Union, the existing regime for free movement of 
people under Schengen has created new categories of persons and for some of them, there 
are still physical obstacles for their movement across the borders of Schengen-participating 
states. Therefore, my second core claim is that cooperation under Schengen has contributed 
to the reconstruction of internal borders in the EU. Given the evolution of cooperation in 
this area, the Commission cannot be regarded as having played a pivotal role in this 
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reconstruction. Instead, it is rather a result of the limited powers of the Commission to 
overcome the reservations of the member states, which has lead to a reproduction in its 
discourse of articulations that give rise to internal borders in the Union. In this chapter, I 
examine in detail the discourse of the European Commission on border controls, so that I 
substantiate these claims. 
In order to do this, the chapter is divided into three main sections. The first one aims 
to provide a general background of the development of Commission discourse in the field 
of border controls. The second one looks in detail into the articulations, which clearly 
configure borders. On the one hand those that contribute to the diminished importance of 
borders between the EC/EU member states and on the other hand, those that lead to the 
establishment of new borders at the external edges of the Union. The third section 
investigates the inconsistencies and silences in Commission discourse on border controls 
that reconstruct internal borders in the EU rather than lead to their decreased salience.  
 
 
3.2. An Outline of the Development of Cooperation under Schengen and 
Commission Discourse on it 
I start my investigation into the way in which Commission discourse on border 
controls configures borders by briefly outlining the major developments in this issue area. 
The matters it deals with are central to a field of fundamental concern for the European 
integration project – the freedom of movement, which has its origins in the Founding 
Treaties and their subsequent amendments. Nevertheless, border controls itself was not an 
area included in the cooperation under the Treaty of Rome. This was the case because the 
clause concerning the freedom of movement of people in 1957 talked only about the 
freedom of movement of workers and was not encompassing other categories of people, 
such as pensioners or students.
1
 Thus, in the first decades of European integration, the free 
movement of people has been interpreted in a narrow way. As a result, until the mid-1980s 
there was no framework under which to develop cooperation on border controls. This issue 
became prominent on the agenda only with the signing of the Schengen Agreement in 
                                               
1 Article 48, esp. point 1, of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community 
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1985. Its aim was to abolish formalities at the borders of the participating member states. 
As such, it could contribute towards the achievement of the SEA aim of creating an internal 
market through establishing in practice the conditions allowing the free circulation of the 
factors of production, including people. Despite this clear link between the two areas, their 
regulation was completely different. While the SEA was within the EC, for a long period 
the cooperation on issues related to border controls was advanced through 
intergovernmental cooperation of some of the EC member states under Schengen. This has 
had important repercussions for the powers the European Commission has had in this field. 
In this section I aim to briefly outline the major turning points in the evolution of 
cooperation on border controls, to point out the changes that have occurred in the powers 
given to the Commission in this field, to identify the main articulations that contain border 
configurations and the categories of people constructed through the discourse on border 
controls. 
 
3.2.1. Major turning points in the evolution of cooperation on Border Controls and 
the powers of the European Commission in the field 
Cooperation on border controls as an issue area forms a part of integration efforts 
undertaken in the field of JHA. Border controls play an important role for facilitating the 
achievement of the goal of providing freedom of movement for people within the territory 
of the EC/EU. As an issue area it is very closely related to the adoption of measures in a 
number of JHA policy fields – immigration, asylum, police, border-management, visa 
policy, and more recently, more intensified cooperation in the sphere of the judiciary.  
From the mid-1970s on-wards there have been several multilateral forums aimed at 
undertaking actions in these areas at European level.
2
 In 1985, five EC members signed the 
so-called Schengen Agreement, which bound them to abolish identity controls of 
individuals at their common land borders. It is from this landmark decision that the current 
efforts towards abolishing internal border controls in the EU originate. This aim was 
                                               
2 For a brief outline of these various initiatives see for example Emek Uçarer, „Justice and Home Affairs‟ in 
Michelle Cini (ed.), European Union Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 294-311, p. 297 
(box 19.2). See also Andrew Geddes, „International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating 
Europe‟, International Migration, 39: 6 (2001), pp. 21-42, pp. 23-27 
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confirmed at several European Council Meetings, in October 1986, April 1987, December 
1987, and June 1988. There the member states‟ Ministers responsible for immigration 
issued declarations that set the objective of “easing and ultimately abolishing” frontier 
formalities between EC countries.
3
 Such provisions have later been enacted through 
proposals of the Commission, signed by the Parliament and the Council in April 2004,
4
 that 
provide that: “Member states shall grant Union citizens and their family members, 
irrespective of their nationality, leave to enter their territory with a valid identity card or 
passport. No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens.”5 This is 
how in these early days of cooperation in this issue area, the abolition of border controls 
was envisaged.  
As I said above, the abolition of intra-Community border controls is linked to 
facilitating the freedom of movement of people. Importantly, this connection is clearly 
argued in Commission documents. For example, according to the Commission, not only do 
border controls initiatives have the same aim – free movement of persons between the 
countries concerned but also: “This aim is one of the cornerstones of the single market to be 
completed by 1992.”6 Thus, this articulation clearly links border controls (which at the time 
was a cooperation area outside the scope of Community competence) to one of the fields 
central to the EC‟s integration project – the establishment of the internal market. The latter 
is unequivocally a policy field falling within the prerogatives of supranational governance. 
As a result of such linking, among other things, border controls have gradually attained a 
more important role within the integration project, which has led to their progressive 
inclusion within the EC/EU framework. This trend was further strengthened with Part Two 
of the Treaty of the European Union, which establishes citizenship of the Union, which 
guarantees every EU citizen the right to move and reside on the territory of the member 
                                               
3 See European Commission, On the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community Borders, COM 
(88) 640 final, 7.12.1988, p. 4 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=165821, accessed on 24.04.2009 
5 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of Citizens 
of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member 
States, COM (2001) 257 final, 29.06.2001, Article 6, point 1 
6 European Commission, On the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community Borders, COM (88) 
640 final, 7.12.1988, p. 2 
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states.
7
 This constitutes an extension of the right of workers of one EC member state to 
undertake employment in another.
8
 Furthermore, it has enabled the undertaking of further 
actions that abolish border controls between EU member states.  
Despite its link with freedom of movement, as a result of its initial development in 
intergovernmental cooperation, border controls have had a unique dynamic in terms of 
participating countries, their obligations and the prerogatives of the European Commission. 
First of all, to this day not all EU member states apply the Schengen Convention and its 
provisions in the same way. As a result of the fact that the areas of cooperation covered 
under the Convention are directly related to very sensitive issues on which national states 
usually preserve their sovereignty, not all EC/EU members wanted to participate fully in 
the Convention. The UK, Ireland and Denmark for various reasons have sought and 
negotiated opt-outs of their full implementation of Schengen‟s provisions. They have 
subscribed to the freedom of movement of nationals of the member states but have retained 
national border controls for citizens of non-EC/EU countries. This is one of the reasons 
why cooperation on this issue is “a striking example of differentiated integration within the 
EC.”9  
Furthermore, over the years, some non-EC/EU members have been associated with 
cooperation in this area. These are Iceland, Norway and Switzerland, which together with 
the EU member states constitute the European Economic Area (EEA). As a result, despite 
the significant achievements towards reducing the salience of some borders between the 
member states of the EC/EU, the established regime has not unequivocally led to the 
diminished importance of borders and has in fact resulted in the construction of a rather 
complex system regulating the movement of people within the EC/EU territory and even 
beyond it. Nevertheless, the history of cooperation on these issues shows an important trend 
not only towards the gradual decrease of the significance of some important internal 
                                               
7 See Part Two Citizenship of the Union in the Maastricht Treaty, pp. 5-6, available at 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf, accessed on 28.07.2008 
8 See Article 48 of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, p. 51, available at 
http://www.unizar.es/euroconstitucion/library/historic%20documents/Rome/TRAITES_1957_CEE.pdf, 
accessed on 28.07.2008  
9 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union – an Introduction to European Integration (3rd ed.) (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 563 
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borders between the member states but also towards the progressive communitarisation of 
legislation in the field and the increasing powers of the European Commission.  
Despite that, as I explained in Chapter Two, because of the intergovernmental 
origins of cooperation in this field, the Commission has had restricted powers in JHA issues 
in comparison to its prerogatives in the first pillar. In turn, this means that for the longest 
part of the period under consideration in this study, the Commission has had limited ability 
to successfully overcome reservations of the member states on various issues. It has been 
charged mainly with implementing decisions of the Council and has not advanced (with the 
notable exception of the linking between the internal market and JHA) readings that pose 
significant challenge to the member states‟ preferences. In this way, Commission discourse 
on border controls has by and large reproduced the configuration of borders of the Council. 
This issue is especially important for the reconstruction of internal borders, where some of 
the articulations reflect this distribution of power and point to the inability of the 
Commission to overcome opposition of the member states. It is also evident in the first 
reading, where some of the undertakings at the external EU borders, such as FRONTEX 
were proposed by the member states and were only partially modified by the Commission.       
Given the constitutive nature of decisions regarding the powers of the Commission 
in a particular area, it should come as no surprise that the turning points in the development 
of border controls are often related to the Founding Treaties and their subsequent 
amendments.
10
 The first clear manifestation of the above trend after the initial steps 
undertaken in this issue area in the second half of the 1980s was the inclusion of 
cooperation on JHA as the so-called “third pillar” in the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992. This 
step meant that for the first time since its inception, cooperation in this field was formally a 
part of the European integration framework. Nevertheless, the stipulations of the Maastricht 
Treaty indicated that JHA was still cooperation based on intergovernmental, rather than 
supranational principles. As such, the role of the European Commission was limited. The 
key decision-making body was the Council of Ministers and in distinction to its unique role 
                                               
10 For example, Kostakopoulou has adopted a three-phase periodisation, which is concurrent with the one I 
present here. See Theodora Kostakopoulou, „The „Protective Union‟: change and Continuity in Migration 
Law and Policy in post-Amsterdam‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 38: 3 (2000), pp. 497-518, pp. 497-
498  
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of legislation initiator on first (community) pillar issues, in the third pillar the Commission 
was sharing this right with the EU member states.
11
 Despite this restricted role for the 
Commission, as I will show in the next section, there were some important policies 
undertaken in the sphere of border controls.  
The second important constitutional development in this field in the 1990s came 
with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. The most important innovation 
under the Treaty‟s provisions in connection to third pillar issues was the transfer of a 
number of policy areas, such as visa and asylum, directly related to border controls from 
the third to the first pillar.
12
 Thus, in effect Schengen was incorporated into the EC 
framework. In practice this was achieved through a protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty. It 
also stipulated for the non-EU Schengen member states‟ (the Iceland and Norway) 
association with the implementation of the Schengen acquis and its further development.
13
 
As a result of the provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, the decision-making process on 
matters such as visas, asylum and immigration was transformed. This transformation, 
however, was to take its full effect only after an initial transitional period of five years.
14
 
During this time, the decision-making was to stay essentially intergovernmental with the 
Council of Ministers acting unanimously and the Commission sharing the right to 
legislative initiative. Only after these five years, was the more fully-fledged supranational 
decision-making to take effect with the Commission gaining the exclusive right to initiate 
legislation.
15
  
                                               
11 This summary is based on Emek Uçarer, „Justice and Home Affairs‟ in Michelle Cini (ed.), European 
Union Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 294-311, p. 299. However, the Commission did 
not get shared right to initiate legislation in the areas of judicial co-operation in criminal matters, customs and 
police co-operation.   
12 For more details on the changes made to JHA at Intergovernmental Conferences in the period 1996-2004 
see Arne Niemann, „Dynamics and Countervailing Pressures on Visa, Asylum and Immigration Policy Treaty 
Revision: Explaining Change and Stagnation from the Amsterdam IGC to the IGC for 2003-04‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 46: 3 (2008), pp. 559-591 
13 Art. 6 of the Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis into the Framework of the European Union 
14 As Sterkx points out, however, in 2004 the European Council decided to postpone the official application of 
this provision until 1 April 2005. See Steven Sterkx, „The External Dimension of EU Asylum and Migration 
Policy: Expanding Fortress Europe?‟ in Jan Orbie (ed.), Europe‟s Global Role – External Policies of the 
European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2008), pp. 117-138, p. 118 (in footnote 5) 
15 These are a consequence of the provisions on these matters in Art. 2, point 15 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing the European Communities and Certain 
Related Acts   
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Thus, the Treaty of Amsterdam contributed towards creating the conditions for 
more streamlined decision-making on some JHA issues. However, it also created a peculiar 
situation where part of the matters falling within the JHA cooperation were dealt with 
through supranational decision-making rules, while another part remained 
intergovernmental.  This was therefore only a partial success for the supporters of the 
communitarisation of JHA policies because of the absence of conditions allowing for the 
all-out simplification of the existing regime of border controls (amongst other things). 
Hence, it is hardly surprising that in recent years one of the recurring themes in the 
Commission discourse on freedom of movement-related issues is the current decision-
making structure and the problems associated with it.
16
 Nevertheless, such a development is 
probably best interpreted as an indication of the gradual spillover effect where over time the 
number of issues included in the first pillar incrementally increases and as a result, the areas 
of supranational decision-making where the Commission has important input into the 
legislative proposals rises. As far as the above-mentioned Commission articulations are 
concerned, they can be read as an indication of the promotion of its support for further 
integration and harmonisation of the current rules and procedures. 
Furthermore, these developments also indicated the growing importance of Union 
cooperation on issues traditionally dealt with by Interior Ministries. This was confirmed by 
the meeting of EU leaders in Tampere in 1999, which was devoted exclusively to 
discussing JHA matters. It “signalled the member states‟ political commitment to achieving 
real progress in the areas of asylum and immigration policy, border controls, and police and 
judicial cooperation.”17 It was at the Tampere meeting that the idea of the creation of an 
“area of freedom, security and justice” envisaged by the Amsterdam Treaty was given a 
more concrete essence. Furthermore, together with the earlier articulations of the 
establishment of an “area without internal frontiers where the freedom of movement is 
                                               
16 See for example European Commission, Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere 
Programme and Future Orientations, COM (2004) 401 final, 02.06.2004, pp. 3-4; European Commission, 
Strengthening Freedom, Security and Justice in the European Union: Report on the Implementation of the 
Hague Programme for 2005, MEMO/06/252, 28.06.2006, pp. 1-2; European Commission, Implementing the 
Hague Programme: the Way Forward, MEMO/06/254, 28.06.2006, p. 6; European Commission, From SIS to 
SIS II, MEMO/05/188, 01.06.2005, p.1   
17 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union – an Introduction to European Integration (3rd ed.) (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p. 572 
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guaranteed”, it constitutes one of the two most important articulations in Commission 
discourse that configure borders. It is to these and the main policies associated with them 
that I now turn my attention to. 
 
3.2.2. Two main bordering articulations in the Commission discourse on border 
controls and policies stemming from them 
The establishment of an area without internal frontiers was the dominant 
articulation used in Commission discourse on border controls in relation to the 
configuration of borders in the period from the mid 1980s to the adoption of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. As we saw above, it stems from the efforts towards the establishment of the 
internal market in the EC/EU. However, as I discuss in detail in the next section, it was 
repeatedly linked in Commission discourse with the undertakings in the field of border 
controls. Nevertheless, given the delicate nature of the issues at hand as well as the way 
cooperation on the matter has developed, the Commission has adopted the position that: 
“Community legislation in this field [is to] be applied only to those cases where the legal 
security and uniformity provided by Community law constitutes the best instrument to 
achieve the desired goal. This would mean therefore that large scope would be left, at this 
stage, to cooperation among Member States notwithstanding the fact that the Commission 
should be permitted to participate, even on an informal basis … with a view of ensuring 
compliance with the before mentioned objectives.”18 This position reflects the powers the 
Commission had at the time in this field. This is the main reason why during that period, 
some of the important policy decisions were negotiated at intergovernmental forums, where 
the Commission did not have significant input.  
The most prominent examples of undertakings in the area of border controls during 
the period in question are the Dublin Convention on Asylum and the External Borders 
Convention. Although characterised by lengthy ratification procedures, these Agreements 
managed to put some of the important foundations of European level cooperation in the 
areas concerned. Despite the limited role given to the Commission at that time, within the 
                                               
18 European Commission, Communication on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community 
Borders, COM (88) 640 final, 7.12.1988, p. 6 
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scope provided for it by the Schengen Convention and the EC Treaties, there were still 
some important proposals it made. These are dealing with the following main issues: the 
abolition of border controls at intra-community borders
19
 and the establishment of the right 
to travel freely within the Community,
20
 as well as the right to reside in another member 
state for EU citizens,
21
 the establishment of a uniform format for Community visas,
22
 and 
the Community policy on immigration.
23
 These allow summarising the main areas related 
to border controls as measures directed towards implementing the provisions of freedom of 
movement of persons and residence within the EC/EU, immigration and asylum policy, 
common visa policy, border control and management.  
The second major period in the development of border controls–related issues starts 
with the adoption of the Treaty of Amsterdam in 1997. At that point a new main 
articulation that configures borders was advanced – the establishment of “an area of 
freedom, security and justice”, which was added as a new objective of the EU.24 The way in 
which this articulation configures borders follows the same logic as the one of the area 
without internal frontiers, which I explained above. In tune with the meaning given to the 
establishment of “an area without internal frontiers”, the Presidency Conclusions of the 
Tampere European Council define the newly proclaimed area of freedom, security and 
justice as one where the right to move freely throughout the Union is ensured.
25
 However, 
                                               
19 European Commission, Communication on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community 
Borders, COM (88) 640 final, 07.12.1988; European Commission, Abolition of Border Controls, SEC (92) 
877 final, 08.05.1992 
20 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must 
be in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993; European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right of Third-Country 
Nationals to Travel in the Community, COM (95) 346 final, 12.07.1995   
21 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on Voting Rights for Community Nationals in 
Local Elections in their Member State of Residence, COM (88) 371 final, 11.07.1988; European Commission, 
Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Voting Rights for Community Nationals in Local Elections in 
their Member State of Residence, COM (89) 524 final, 17.10.1989 
22 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down a Uniform Format for Visas, 
COM (94) 287 final, 13.07.1994 
23 European Commission, Policies on Immigration and the Social Integration of Migrants in the European 
Community, SEC (90) 1813 final, 28.09.1990 
24 Article 1, point 5 of the Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties 
Establishing the European Communities and Certain Related Acts, p. 7, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/topics/treaty/pdf/amst-en.pdf, accessed on 29.07.2008 
25 Tampere European Council, Presidency Conclusions, p. 2, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/tam_en.htm, accessed on 08.07.2008 
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according to the Commission, the new concept enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty goes 
beyond the previous goals. It: “aims to give “freedom” a meaning beyond free movement 
of people across internal borders. It is also freedom to live in a law-abiding environment in 
the knowledge that public authorities are using everything in their individual and collective 
power (nationally, at the level of the Union and beyond) to combat and contain those who 
seek to deny or abuse that freedom.”26 These aims can be read as a result of the gradual 
inclusion of new policy areas in the first pillar and of the increase of the number of areas in 
which the Commission has the power of legislative initiative. However, they can also be 
regarded as an expression of spillover effects, where integration and the decreased salience 
of internal borders move to new fields. As a result, the Commission discourse on JHA in 
this period often contains documents that are not directly linked to undertaking measures 
directed towards the establishment of the free movement of persons (which is concerned 
mainly with the freedom and security part of the area envisaged) but which are dealing 
instead with dismantling borders in the sphere of justice. Although there is a clear link 
between the first two and the third issue, the Commission documents aimed at creating the 
area of justice overall do not talk about border controls. Therefore, I have not examined in 
detail these articulations in the chapter. 
The increased number of areas of concern is evident in the priorities outlined in the 
Commission documents. These are contained in the bi-annual Scoreboards, in which the 
Commission reviews the progress achieved on the Tampere Programme towards the 
establishment of the area of freedom, security and justice.
27
 For example, the Scoreboard 
from the second half of 2003 enlists the following main areas of action: common EU 
asylum and immigration policy, genuine European area of justice, Union-wide fight against 
crime, policy on internal and external borders, visas, implementation of Article 62 of the 
EC Treaty, converting the Schengen acquis, citizenship of the Union, cooperation against 
drugs, stronger external action.
28
 After the expiration of this Programme, a new one was 
                                               
26 European Commission, Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (1998) 459 final, 
14.07.1998, p. 5 
27 For a Table containing the full details of the Scoreboards issues until 2007 see 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/doc_centre/wai/scoreboard_en.htm, accessed on 30.11.2007 
28 European Commission, Biannual Update of the Scoreboard to Review the Progress on the Creation of an 
Area of “Freedom, Security and Justice” in the European Union, COM (2003) 812 final, 30.12.2003 
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adopted – the Hague Programme, which formulates some of the policy areas slightly 
differently in comparison to the 2003 Scoreboard.
29
 The detailed examination of the way in 
which Commission discourse configures borders in the areas listed in this document is 
presented in the next two sections. Although it spans documents related to a variety of these 
priorities, the issues most heavily related to border controls are the implementation of EU 
citizenship rights in practice, the fight against crime and terrorism, asylum and 
immigration, border management and visas. Therefore, my main focus has been to examine 
the configuration of borders in the documents on these issues.       
As the presentation of the main policy areas related to border controls shows, an 
important distinction that arises from the discourse on these issues is the differentiation 
between nationals of EC/EU member states and nationals of non-EC/EU states.
30
 This 
division can be traced even in the documents predating the Treaty of the European Union 
but with its adoption it became formalised and even more widespread. This is due to the 
establishment of the EU citizenship (referred to above), which confers certain rights to 
individuals holding the nationality of one of the Union‟s member states. A by-product of 
this, however, is the inevitable construction of another category of people, usually referred 
to as Third Country Nationals (TCNs) who because of their lack of EU citizenship cannot 
enjoy certain rights.
31
  
Importantly, it is exactly the developments at EC/EU level that have created this 
situation. This is significant because it has allowed the Union member states to employ 
restrictive measures over border controls at its outer edges.
32
 Thus, the development of EU 
level cooperation allowed member states to achieve their domestic policy objectives while 
                                               
29 See European Commission, The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for the Next Five Years. The 
Partnership for European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 184 final, 
10.05.2005, pp. 4-7 
30
 The latter are referred to as Third Country Nationals (TCNs) in the rest of the thesis.   
31 A notable exception in this respect is the category of TCNs, who are family members of an EU citizen. This 
category of people enjoys a number of rights, including in the area of free movement within the territory of 
the EU. Another type of TCNs that have rights coming closer to these conferred upon EU citizens are TCNs 
who are long-term residents in one of the EU member states. I look into these in more detail in the next 
chapter, Free Movement of People.    
32 For arguments along these lines see for example Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in New Europe – 
Reinventing Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Andrew Geddes, „International 
Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe‟, International Migration, 39: 6 (2001), pp. 21-42 
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avoiding the legal and political constraints that they would have faced at the national 
level.
33
 Huysmans attributes the emergence of this restrictive regime to the two core 
assumptions that have guided the cooperation at EC/EU level, namely that illegal 
movements (including of people) happen primarily at the border and that the free 
movement of people is constituted by abolishing intra-Community border controls. 
According to him both assumptions are contestable.
34
 Nevertheless, they have informed 
policy-making, which unsurprisingly under these circumstances has meant that under the 
process of European integration, migration is constructed as a security question.
35
 As a 
result of such assumptions, the efforts at EU level have been towards fortifying the borders 
through the adoption of restrictive measures at the external edges of the Union. 
As den Boer argues this occurred because the Commission and the member states‟ 
governments accepted and reproduced this thinking. Eventually, this resulted in these ideas 
acquiring the status of knowledge beyond the realm of the contestable.
36
 This claim is 
significant for the present study because it indicates a logic opposing the one that has 
inspired the efforts for the single market. In tune with the developments anticipated by 
Neo-functionalists, it implicates the Commission in the blatant construction of EU‟s 
external borders. At the same time, according to Geddes, the supranational institutions: 
“have done their best to push towards harmonization and to make existing harmonization as 
expansive as possible.”37 For example, as Boswell maintains, after 1997 the Commission 
has utilised its new powers and has put forward a number of proposals and has developed 
new methods for monitoring harmonisation.
38
 Thus, regarding the first reading, the 
                                               
33 Andrew Geddes, „International Migration and State Sovereignty in an Integrating Europe‟, International 
Migration, 39: 6 (2001), pp. 21-42, p. 28 
34 Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and the Securitization of Migration‟, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38: 5 (2000), pp. 751-777, p. 759. Other studies make the same argument. See for example Jörg 
Monar, „The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 39: 4 (2001), pp. 747-764 
35 Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and the Securitization of Migration‟, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 38: 5 (2000), pp. 751-777 
36 Den Boer cited in Arne Niemann, Phillippe Schmitter, „Neofunctionalism‟ in Thomas Diez, Antje Wiener 
(eds), European Integration Theories (2nd ed.)  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 45-66, p. 59 
37 Geddes cited in Terri Givens, Adam Luedtke, „The Politics of European Union Immigration Policy: 
Institutions, Salience and Harmonization‟, Policy Studies Journal, 32: 1 (2004), pp. 145-165, p. 151  
38 Christina Boswell, European Migration Policies in Flux – Changing Patterns of Inclusion and Exclusion 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), p. 110 
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Commission has a Janus-faced role in the field of border controls. On the one hand, it 
argues in favour of further harmonisation which contributes to the decreased importance of 
borders inside the EU. On the other hand, it accepts and promotes the argument that illegal 
movement happens primarily at the borders, which makes it to push towards strengthening 
the external borders of the Union. This leads to the erection of a new border at the outer 
edges of the EU. In the next section I present a detailed account of how the Commission 
discourse on border controls has articulated the assumptions that have guided the efforts 
under Schengen as well as its position on further harmonisation in this policy field. These 
are also the main articulations that configure borders. Following the distinction between 
EU/non-EU nationals, the presentation is also divided into interpreting documents dealing 
with EU citizens and documents dealing with non-EU nationals.  
 
 
3.3. Decreased Importance of Intra-Community Borders and the Construction 
of the External Union Border through Commission Discourse on Border 
Controls 
The area of border controls is a unique one in comparison to the rest of the policy 
areas examined in this thesis because it is the only one that contains references to the EU‟s 
external border that construct it openly but maybe even more importantly it does so 
unapologetically. On the contrary, as I will show below, in this policy area, perhaps more 
than in any other one included in this thesis, the Commission discourse provides rational 
argumentation for the need of an external EU border. Therefore, in this chapter I examine 
the decreased salience of internal borders and the construction of the EU‟s external border 
in one section.  In the field of border controls, both of these tendencies are easily noticeable 
from the Commission discourse. Therefore, in tune with the differentiation made in Chapter 
Two, I classify them as first reading. 
 
3.3.1. De-bordering tendencies  
In this section I focus on examining in detail how the discourse of the European 
Commission has promoted the decreased salience of borders between the member states. In 
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doing this I build upon the above-discussed issues. I present the measures articulated in 
Commission discourse that are aimed at achieving in practice the establishment of the areas 
without internal frontiers and of freedom, security and justice. These are classified along 
the lines of the rights of EU citizens to movement and residence within the territory of 
another member state; the current regime for free movement of TNCs and the establishment 
of European identity. Also I show the grounds on which the Commission has advocated 
these policies. The rationale presented in its documents concurs with the arguments of 
Huysmans and Geddes that the Commission has promoted harmonisation as a way of 
achieving the goal of free movement of people in the EC/EU. 
As I said above, one of the important reasons for the successful increase of 
cooperation in the field of border controls has been the functional spillover to this policy 
from the single market. The Commission discourse strongly promotes such thinking. This 
is articulated through linking the achievement in practice of the goals of the SEA with the 
abolition of intra-Community border controls. The rationale advanced in Commission 
documents has been that without lifting intra-Community border controls, the goals of the 
SEA cannot be achieved. For example, the Commission‟s stance has been that the 
achievement of the goal of establishing the single market requires all checks and formalities 
at internal Community borders to be abolished because: “the continued existence of just 
one of them would undermine the political objective laid down”39 in the SEA. Thus, for the 
Commission: “One of the essential aspects of any internal market is the right of any person 
lawfully in that market to move freely to any point therein in order to obtain goods and 
receive services there. In other words, an internal market … cannot function properly if the 
movement of persons within it is hampered. It will be unable to offer all the economic 
benefits that can be expected of the integration of national markets … if some people are 
prevented from, or have difficulty in, moving in that market …But the economic 
disadvantages are just as tangible when the obstacles to movement within the internal 
market stem from legal disparities which lead to the introduction of procedures and controls 
                                               
39 European Commission, Abolition of Border Controls, SEC (92) 877 final, 08.05.1992, p. 8 
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which in turn prevent or impede the movement of persons.”40 The Commission interprets 
this concept as a Community-wide market that operates under conditions equivalent to 
those of a national market.
41
 Thus, the full benefits expected from the single market can 
only be achieved if everyone on the territory of the Union can move freely within the whole 
of it. The fulfilment of this requirement is only possible, however, if certain measures are 
undertaken in the area of border controls. Importantly, according to the Commission, the 
way to guarantee this is very specific. Allowing the single market to function along the 
provisions of national markets is: “an objective that goes beyond the mere easing of frontier 
controls”; it is a goal that necessitates internal frontier controls to be abolished.42 This 
articulation is crucial because it promotes a radical change in the way the movement of 
production factors between the member states is regulated. It argues in favour of complete 
eradication of national border controls, which is a position that dents deeply into state 
sovereignty.  
Thus, these Commission articulations clearly promote the adoption of ideas that, if 
accepted, will require a higher involvement and importance of the EU-level institutions. 
Hence, such articulations increase the relative powers of the supranational institutions. As a 
result, this position was bound to encounter resistance from the member states. This 
resistance is not completely overcome even at the time of writing because as I said above, 
some member states have opted-out of certain Schengen provisions on border controls. 
Nevertheless, as the discussion below shows, the Commission has over the years managed 
to secure acceptance and implementation of some of its radical interpretations.   
Another way in which the European Commission has advocated the decreased 
salience of internal borders for movement of persons in recent years, is on the grounds of 
the increased importance EU citizens attach to issues related to it and their understanding 
that action undertaken at EU level provides the appropriate way to respond. According to 
Commissioner Franco Frattini: “… we have expectations from our very own EU citizens to 
                                               
40 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right of Third-Country Nationals to Travel 
in the Community, COM (95) 346 final, 12.07.1995, p. 4 (emphasis in the original)   
41 European Commission, Abolition of Border Controls, SEC (92) 877 final, 08.05.1992, p. 8 
42 European Commission, Communication on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community 
Borders, COM (88) 640 final, 07.12.1988, p. 5 
 95 
fulfil. “Eurobarometers” and other polls continue to indicate that if there is one policy area 
in which EU citizens … are in favour of a common, an EU, approach, than it is that of 
combating organized crime and terrorism … It is therefore … our citizens expectation that 
the prevention and the fight against such cross-border organized crime can no longer be 
tackled merely at the national level, but instead can only be addressed effectively with a 
cross-border, common EU approach: indeed this is an area in which Europe not only can 
but should make the difference!”43 Importantly, this articulation also promotes explicitly 
action at supranational level, which is the level where the Commission has greatest 
leverage. The increased importance of border controls-related issues in recent years is 
further reflected in the following data: 17 per cent of all legislative proposals of the 
Commission are in the area of freedom, security and justice
44
 and according to Commission 
Vice-President Frattini: “Almost one in five of all major Commission initiatives concern 
Justice, Freedom and Security.”45  
As such, the main themes in the rationales for decreasing the importance of borders 
between EU member states boil down to economic reasons and popular requirements. By 
themselves these are not unique for this policy area alone because similar reasons are used 
to justify action towards diminishing the significance of borders in other policy areas, as the 
analysis in the other empirical chapters of this thesis shows. What is distinctive about this 
particular policy area, however, is the specific way in which the de-bordering trend is 
articulated in the discourse of the European Commission. In contrast to the social policy, 
where the decreased importance of internal EU borders is attained primarily through the 
construction of a common European identity, in the area of border controls the de-bordering 
tendencies in the Commission discourse are articulated predominantly through formulation 
                                               
43 Franco Frattini, Speech at the Inauguration of Mr Ratzel as Director of Europol, SPEECH/05/297, 
24.05.2005, p. 2 (emphasis in the original). For other documents containing similar ideas see for example: 
Franco Frattini, Inauguration Speech of the Frontex Agency, SPEECH/05/401, 30.06.2005, p. 2; Franco 
Frattini, Declaration on Terrorism, SPEECH/05/487, 07.09.2005, p. 2; European Commission, Commission 
Presents Comprehensive Counter-Terrorism Package, IP/05/1166, 21.09.2005, p. 2; Franco Frattini, 
Responses to the Threat of Terrorism and Effects on Communities, SPEECH/05/718, 24.11.2005, p. 2   
44 European Commission, From Tampere to Tampere: Commission Responds to EU Citizen‟s Demands to 
Build up Europe as an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, IP/06/848, 28.06.2006, p. 1  
45 European Commission, The Hague Programme – Scoreboard Shows for 2006 Both Good Progress and 
Unacceptable Delays in Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, and Underpins the Need to End EU-Pillar 
Structure in This Area, IP/07/1005, 03.07.2007, p. 1 
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of measures removing the existing obstacles to movement (i.e. the need to attain visa or the 
necessity to pass through customs and police formalities at the borders of a member state). 
As such, they facilitate movement on the territory of the EU by dismantling previously 
existing physical borders between the member states. 
  The Commission understanding of physical borders can be derived from the 
following quotation: “If the Community is to become a genuine internal market and if this 
market is to operate under the same conditions as a national market, physical frontiers must 
be abolished. This means the abolition of all controls, formalities, procedures, checks, 
examinations, inspections, etc. … at internal frontiers, just as there are no border controls 
between regions in national markets.”46 The Commission advocates that this will dismantle: 
“… all obstacles to the operation of the common market arising from the existence of 
internal frontiers [which] must be eliminated by 31 December 1992 at the latest”.47  
The articulations of the Commission on the abolition of physical borders contribute 
to the further undermining of previously existing divisions. They acknowledge that the 
achievement of a genuine area allowing for the free movement of people will not be 
possible if within it member states continue to make a differentiation in the nationality of 
the person exercising their right of free movement within the EC/EU: “The complete 
abolition of physical frontiers for individuals exercising their right of freedom of movement 
necessarily implies the complete abolition of controls on all individuals who cross internal 
borders, irrespective of their nationality.”48 This formulation is not only an expression of 
the Commission‟s understanding of how the political objective of creating the internal 
market is to be achieved but importantly, it is also one that implies that the formal 
distinction between member states‟ nationals and TCNs when they exercise their right of 
free movement within the Schengen territory should be made redundant. In turn this 
undermines the national borders of the participating member states because they lose their 
previously existing ultimate control over the entries to and exits from their territories if the 
persons crossing the border come from a Schengen-participating member state. 
                                               
46 European Commission, Abolition of Border Controls, SEC (92) 877 final, 08.05.1992, p. 9 
47 Ibid. 
48 Ibid., p. 12 
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Importantly, this also concurs with the Commission understanding presented above of how 
the internal market should function in terms of free movement of people.   
An analysis of the documents of the European Commission shows that it has 
achieved further progress towards implementing its understanding. This is evident in the 
position of the Commission that free movement of persons must not be confined only to 
workers from another member state, but has to encompass non-economically active 
nationals of the Community as well as citizens of non-member countries.
49
  Over the years, 
the Commission has made some important proposals that have contributed towards the 
implementation in practice of the basic principles advanced by it, thus contributing towards 
the dismantlement of physical borders between the member states and the de-bordering of 
the EU territory. These include a variety of proposals on concrete measures that concern the 
freedom to travel within the Schengen territory of TCNs and the rights of residence 
anywhere in the EU of its citizens. 
  A good illustration of how this is done in respect to EU nationals can be provided 
with three Commission documents on the issue.
50
 As I said above, in the years following 
the SEA the set of rights conferred to nationals of the member states as well as the scope of 
people that enjoy them expanded. More specifically: “These extended rights are contained 
in three Directives adopted on 28 June 1990 on the right of residence of students, retired 
persons and other non-economically-active persons.”51 Importantly, the Commission 
Report on the Implementation of the Directives on the Right of Residence deals with the 
transposition process and measures of the three Directives of all the member states, 
including those that have negotiated opt-outs (UK, Ireland and Denmark) from their 
participation in certain Schengen measures. As such, this discourse contributes to the 
decreased salience of the national borders of all the member states and constructs a border-
                                               
49 Ibid., p. 10 
50 I do not provide here an analysis of a higher number of Commission documents because the right to 
residence, which is articulated together with the right to movement within the territory of the EU is 
intrinsically related to the issue of free movement of people. As such, I will provide a detailed analysis of the 
configuration of borders of Commission documents on these matters in the next chapter.  
51 European Commission, Report on the Implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365, 93/96 (Right of 
Residence), COM (1999) 127 final, 17.03.1999, p. 2 
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free area encompassing the whole territory of the EU. As I show later, this is not the case 
with respect to the abolition of internal Union borders, if they are crossed by TCNs.     
Despite this de-bordering discourse of the Commission, according to the Report of 
the High-Level Panel on the Free Movement of Persons, there are still: “persistent obstacles 
to the right to move and reside freely in the territory of the Member States,” which are of 
the following main types: “continued existence of checks at internal frontiers, shortcomings 
in administrative practices and legislative deficiencies.”52 Furthermore, according to the 
Commission the: “step-by-step extension has meant … that beneficiaries have been 
compartmentalized in a way that is no longer in keeping with modern forms of mobility or 
with the establishment of citizenship of the Union.”53  
 In order to address these obstacles and thus reduce further the existing border 
controls over EU citizens within its territory, the Commission has sought to develop: “a 
single set of rules on free movement”.54 To that end in 2001 it adopted a proposal that 
aimed to review and facilitate the exercise of the right of free movement for EU nationals 
and their family members. The Council and the Parliament subsequently adopted this 
proposal in April 2004.
55
 The clauses of the proposal contribute to the de-bordering in the 
Union in two main ways. Firstly, these clearly show the Commission‟s aim to continue to 
promote free movement for these categories of people that were not entitled to it under the 
initial provisions of the Treaty of Rome: “The development of mobility of students, 
researchers, those undertaking training, volunteers, teachers and trainers is recognized as a 
political priority of the European Union.”56 Secondly, it introduces a number of important 
innovations with regard to previously existing law. One of them is the codification of a 
complex corpus of legislation and extensive case law of the ECJ into a single, simple legal 
instrument. This makes the right to free movement more transparent and easier to apply. 
                                               
52 The quotation and the typology are from European Commission, Communication on the Follow-up to the 
Recommendations of the High-Level Panel on the Free Movement of Persons, COM (1998) 403 final, 
01.07.1998, p. 2 
53 Ibid., pp. 8-9  
54 Ibid., p. 2 
55 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=165821#364809, accessed on 
21.04.2009 
56 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of Citizens 
of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the Member 
States, COM (2001) 257 final, 29.06.2001, Preamble, point 4 
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The other modifications are the creation of a single legal regime for free movement and 
residence for all categories of Union citizens, the improvement and facilitation of the 
exercise of the right of residence through the extension of family reunification rights, the 
introduction of autonomous right of residence for family members, or the reduction of 
administrative formalities.
57
 All in all, these provisions will contribute to further reduction 
of previously existing formalities at the borders, hence leading to less border controls. 
Thus, these articulations of the European Commission clearly contribute to the decreased 
salience of borders inside the territory of the Union. Furthermore, importantly, they show 
that the Commission has consistently aimed to promote and implement its interpretation of 
the areas without internal frontiers and freedom, security and justice. It does that by 
extending the provisions for free movement to cover an ever-wider number of categories of 
people.  
This trend is continued in the second main category of Commission documents that 
promote decreasing importance of internal borders. These are the undertakings in the field 
of establishing the right of TCNs to travel freely inside the EU through abolishing controls 
at the internal borders. This is directly related to the Commission understanding, presented 
above, that if the political objectives of the internal market are to be achieved, it will be 
necessary to go beyond mere easing of border controls and instead create an area where 
people can circulate freely irrespective of their nationality. This requires actions at EC/EU 
level that allow physical controls of TCNs previously exercised at national borders of 
member states to be disposed of. There are two major fields in which the Commission has 
undertaken actions that contribute to this aim – the establishment of a EU regime for entry 
into its territory and the undertaking of measures that will ensure the security of this area. 
These have led to the creation of common visa policy, the establishment of EU-level 
information systems (Visa Information System – VIS and Schengen Information System – 
SIS) and in more recent years a more pronounced trend towards common management of 
the external Union borders. 
                                               
57 As summarised in European Commission, Enhancement of Free Movement and Residence Rights for EU 
Citizens: a New Milestone in EU Integration Process, IP/06/554, 02.05.2006 and European Commission, The 
Directive on the Right to Move and Reside Freely in the Union/ Seven Million European Citizens Already 
Live in Another Member State, MEMO/06/179, 02.05.2006  
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A brief outline of the Commission discourse in each of the above will show that the 
aims pursued straightforwardly abolish border controls between Schengen-participating 
member states. Prior to the entry into force of the Schengen Agreement in 1995, the right of 
entry and residence of TCNs even for a short period was: “governed by Member States‟ 
domestic laws, which are neither harmonized nor coordinated.”58 This is a situation that 
clearly clashes with the principles of the internal market upheld by the Commission. 
Therefore, it adopted a Directive proposal that stipulates that: “Member States shall grant 
third-country nationals … the right to travel in the territories of the other Member States 
…”.59 In order to enable the implementation of this right, in the same proposal the 
Commission advocated the acceptance of the principle of equivalence between residence 
permits issued by member states and visas and the principle of mutual recognition of visas. 
The latter, however, can only be applied if there are “harmonized criteria applicable to the 
issue of visas, that is to say to visas valid for the whole Community.”60 Thus, according to 
the Commission: “the objective of Article 100c(1) of the EC Treaty [is the] complete 
harmonization of visa policies.”61 The Commission, however, eventually withdrew this 
proposal.
62
  
Despite that, several Commission documents envisaged different measures 
contributing to the achievement of its aim. There has been a proposal for a regulation that 
sets out the uniform format for the visas issued by the member states,
63
 a Communication 
that listed the TCNs who need a visa when crossing the external borders of the Union and 
those that are exempted from this requirement,
64
 a proposal for a Directive establishing a 
                                               
58 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Right of Third-Country Nationals to Travel 
in the Community, COM (95) 346 final, 12.07.1995, p. 5 
59 Article 1, point 1 in Ibid., p. 21 
60 The quotation and the principles are from Ibid., p. 6 
61 Ibid., p. 18 
62 European Commission, Withdrawal of Commission Proposals, COM (2001) 763 final/2, 21.12.2001, p. 30 
63 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation Laying Down a Uniform Format for Visas, 
COM (94) 287 final, 13.07.1994; European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European 
Parliament and of the Council Amending the Common Consular Instructions on Visas for Diplomatic 
Missions and Consular Posts in Relation to the Introduction of Biometrics Including Provisions on the 
Organization of the Reception and Processing of Visa Applications, COM (2006) 269 final, 31.05.2006 
64 European Commission, „Communication in Application of Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 of 15 
March 2001 Listing the Third Countries Whose Nationals Must be in Possession of Visas when Crossing the 
External Borders and Those whose Nationals are Exempted from that Requirement‟, Official Journal of 
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general consistency of the provisions regulating the free movement of TCNs within the EU 
and guaranteeing the same interpretation of the requirements for the various categories of 
TCNs across the member states,
65
 and a proposal establishing a Community Code on 
visas.
66
 The first of these proposals was adopted in April 1995,
67
 the Commission in March 
2006 withdrew the third one,
68
 the second one has been accepted but the list of countries 
has changed several times since the initial proposal was made and the last one is still 
pending final decision at the time of writing.
69
 Despite this mixed overall success on the 
acceptance of Commission proposals on these matters, in general the Commission has 
managed to attain an acceptance of the main principles it has supported. Nowadays, as a 
result of various provisions, even TCNs can travel within the territory of Schengen-
participating countries with much fewer formalities. This is a sign that over the years the 
Commission as the representative of the common interests has managed to secure 
agreement on practical issues, such as the common lists of TCNs that need visas when 
entering the territory of Schengen.
70
 These make some of the aims of SEA and Tampere a 
reality, thus establishing a common space between the territories in question.    
    Another strand of measures that imply a similar configuration of borders are 
those adopted by the Commission with the objective of ensuring the abolition of intra-
Community border controls at a high level of security. The most prominent amongst them 
                                                                                                                                               
European Communities, C 363/21, 19.12.2001, pp. 21-30. This List has subsequently been amended but has 
retained the same principles.   
65 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Conditions in which Third-
Country Nationals Shall Have the Freedom to Travel in the Territory of the Member States for Periods not 
Exceeding Three Months, Introducing a Specific Travel Authorization and Determining the Conditions of 
Entry and Movement for Periods not Exceeding Six Months, COM (2001) 388 final, 10.07.2001  
66 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Community Code on Visas, COM (2006) 403 final, 19.07.2006 
67 See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=101280, accessed on 21.04.2009  
68 European Commission, Outcome of the Screening of Legislative Proposals Pending before the Legislator, 
COM (2005) 462 final, 27.09.2005, p. 9. The Communication does not make the reason for the withdrawal of 
this proposal explicit, thus it is not possible to establish what exactly the grounds on which it was deemed 
inconsistent with the Lisbon objectives are.    
69 See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=194509, accessed on 21.04.2009  
70 For more details on the initial stage of developing Commission proposals on common visas see Jörg Monar, 
„The Dynamics of Justice and Home Affairs: Laboratories, Driving Factors and Costs‟, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 39: 4 (2001), pp. 747-764, esp. p. 751 
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have been the proposals in relation to the VIS and SIS I and II, EURODAC
71
 as well as the 
gradual establishment of common management of the external borders of the Union 
through FRONTEX
72
 or the joint maritime patrols in the Mediterranean Sea. In 
Commission discourse the various information exchange systems are articulated as an 
expression of compensatory measures necessary for the improvement of cooperation and 
coordination between the authorities of the member states in order to guarantee the internal 
security in the area of free movement.
73
 VIS, for example: “shall improve the 
administration of the common visa policy, the consular cooperation and the consultation 
between central consular authorities …”74, while the External Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States (FRONTEX): 
“will coordinate/ assist the competent services of Member States responsible for 
implementing Schengen acquis on control of persons at the external borders …”75  
Importantly, at least for some of the above measures (such as FRONTEX), the 
initiative for their establishment was not with the Commission but with the Council. 
However, as a study by Neal shows, in the case of FRONTEX the Commission has not 
only accepted and reiterated the aims that guided its establishment but also had important 
input during the process of negotiating the exact details of the envisaged body.
76
 
Nevertheless, as the research on FRONTEX shows, in the early stages of negotiating the 
                                               
71 In European Commission, EURODAC Guarantees Effective Management of the Common Asylum System, 
MEMO/05/214, 21.06.2005, p.1, EURODAC is defined as the EU-wide fingerprint database for the 
comparison of the fingerprints of asylum seekers and illegal immigrants.  
72 According to its web site, FRONTEX strengthens the freedom and the security of the citizens of the EU by 
complementing the national border management systems of the member states and actively promotes the 
cooperation among border related law enforcement bodies responsible for the internal security at EU level. 
See http://www.frontex.europa.eu/more_about_frontex/, accessed on 21.04.2009 
73 Some studies have focused on how different compensatory measures are framed as security issues, while 
others have argued that any such measures have limited ability to provide the sought-after complete security 
within the frontier-free area. See respectively Jef Huysmans, „European Identity and Migration Policies. 
Socio-Economic and Security Questions in a Process of Europeanisation‟, paper prepared for the Annual 
BISA Conference held at the University of Durham, 16-18 December 1996 and Didier Bigo, „Frontiers and 
Security in the European Union: the Illusion of Migration Control‟ in Malcolm Anderson, Eberhard Bort 
(eds), The Frontiers of Europe (London: Pinter, 1998), pp. 148-164 
74 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the Exchange of Information between Member States on 
Short Stay-Visas, COM (2004) 835 final, 28.12.2004, p. 1 
75 European Commission, Basic Facts about the External Borders Agency, MEMO/05/230, p.1 
76 Andrew Neal, „Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: the Origins of FRONTEX‟, Journal of Common 
Market Studies, 47: 2 (2009), pp. 333-356, esp. pp. 339-341 
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cooperation at the EU‟s external borders, the Commission was supporting operationally 
independent European Border Guard. Such a position is in tune with Neo-functionalists‟ 
expectations. This, however, was not the preference of the member states.
77
 In that respect, 
the establishment of FRONTEX is a good example of the merit of approaching 
Commission discourse as a result of complex interactions during which decisions are 
negotiated discussed in Chapter Two.  Once a particular settlement is reached, it has wider 
repercussions, which in this case are related to the configuration of borders in Commission 
discourse. Therefore, I regard the Commission as being directly involved in (although 
maybe not always driving) the articulations of measures, which I interpret as contributing 
towards the creation of the supranational administration of the area of free movement.
78
 
The de-bordering trend in each of them as well as in their combination is in allowing to put 
in place an order that makes it possible to lift controls at national frontiers, thus establishing 
a unified space where people can move without having to face any formalities, delays or 
checks. This emergence of a supranational administration functions along two main lines.  
Firstly, the databases (SIS, VIS, EURODAC) establish the conditions for exchange 
of information between the relevant authorities of the member states. Importantly, this still 
leaves the operational responsibilities primarily with the individual national authorities and 
the Commission continues to have limited involvement. Nevertheless, Commission 
discourse shows that it has promoted the establishment of these systems. According to 
former Commission Vice-President Frattini: “The Commission‟s role is to propose EU 
legislation corresponding to the needs of our common area of security and justice. Our aim 
is to give the relevant national services suitable tools for efficiently pursuing and 
                                               
77 See for example, Johannes Pollak, Peter Slominski, „Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The 
Role of Frontex in Managing the EU‟s External Borders‟, West European Politics, 32: 5 (2009), pp. 904-924, 
pp. 908-909; Julien Jeandesboz, „Reinforcing the Surveillance of EU Borders. The Future Development of 
FRONTEX and EUROSUR‟, Challenge: Liberty and Security, Research Paper no. 11, August (2008), p. 12; 
Helene Jorry, „Construction of a European Institutional Model for Managing Operational Cooperation at the 
EU‟s External Borders: is the FRONTEX a Decisive Step Forward?‟, Challenge: Liberty and Security, 
Research Paper no. 6, March (2007), p. 2. 
78 Systems, such as VIS, SIS, etc. are important because as Huysmans has argued, the technologies of border 
controls are not simply instruments for controlling movement but also shape the particular modalities for 
conducting free movement in Jef Huysmans, „A Foucaldian View on Spill-over: Freedom and Security in the 
EU‟, Journal of International Relations and Development, 7: 3 (2004), pp. 294-318. A later version is 
available in Jef Huysmans, The Politics of Insecurity – Fear Migration and Asylum in the EU (London: 
Routledge, 2006), ch. 6   
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prosecuting … to set up frameworks for exchange of information. This is an area where 
action at the European level can bring clear benefits.”79 Also a memorandum describes the 
development of SIS II as: “indispensable so that the new Member States can connect to the 
system and the Schengen area without internal border control can be extended …”80 Such 
articulations can be read as the Commission utilising the means at its disposal for 
harmonisation through promoting measures contributing to achieving its declared aim of 
abolishing internal border controls.  
Secondly, measures such as the joint maritime patrols and FRONTEX provide 
opportunities for colleagues from different member states to work side-by-side. One 
outcome of such a practice can be the unification of working practices and the exchange of 
professional information and procedures. All of these in medium to long-term can 
contribute to the emergence of a common European space as a result of the decreasing 
internal differences within the EU. Also, importantly, these practices are different from the 
ways in which Commission discourse envisages the achievement of the diminished 
importance of national borders in other policy areas. For example, as I will show in Chapter 
Five, in social policy, the main way this is promoted is through establishing benchmarks 
and exchange of best practice. Arguably, the practices in the field of border controls can 
deliver results faster because they require a more direct and intense interaction between the 
professionals involved.    
There is one significant difference in relation to the configuration of borders in 
these Commission documents and those decreasing the significance of borders for EU 
citizens. While, as I pointed out above, the provisions for the former are applicable to all 
member states and in that respect they result in affecting the whole territory of the EU, the 
latter do not apply in the same way on the whole area of the Union. The Commission 
provisions on border control-related documents for TCNs usually contain a clause devoted 
to the applicability to the UK, Ireland and Denmark.
81
 This is a consequence of the 
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constitution of cooperation in this policy area. As such, these in practice constitute an area 
of this policy, where internal borders have not been dismantled completely and therefore, 
there still are physical obstacles to the free circulation of people as a result of the persistent 
existence of border controls. Namely, the opt-outs allow the principle of non-discrimination 
on grounds of nationality for all categories of people, upheld by the Commission, to not be 
applied in its entirety, thus recreating previously existing divisions but changing the way 
they work for novel, different types of people. However, in distinction to other instances of 
the construction of borders by Commission discourse when the Commission was not the 
one that initiated a particular bordering articulation such as FRONTEX, on this issue the 
Commission has not promoted this situation. Thus, I do not discuss it in greater detail in the 
section devoted to the reconstruction of internal borders in this policy area by the 
Commission discourse. Despite the differences in the borders constructed by the 
Commission discourse on border controls towards EU citizens and TCNs, they share one 
important commonality – they contribute to the decreased salience of borders between the 
member states participating in Schengen and construct a common European space. 
Besides de-bordering through the abolition of physical barriers, which is 
constructed by the above articulations, the undermining of internal EU frontiers is also 
achieved by articulations that construct European identity within the area without internal 
frontiers/ of freedom, security and justice. Although not as strong a line in the discourse in 
this policy field as in some others (social policy), there are still articulations that can be 
interpreted as contributing towards the emergence of a common identity. There are two 
major themes in the discourse that have this effect – the EU citizenship as promoting the 
feeling of belonging into the Union and the necessity to develop mutual trust and enhance 
cooperation between the member states as a prerequisite for the successful achievement of 
the aims of the areas of free movement. These can be illustrated with the following 
examples, respectively: “Guaranteed permanent residence for Union citizens who have 
                                                                                                                                               
Travel in the Territory of the Member States for Periods not Exceeding Three Months, Introducing a Specific 
Travel Authorization and Determining the Conditions of Entry and Movement for Periods not Exceeding Six 
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19.07.2006, p. 13  
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chosen to settle long-term in another Member State strengthens the feeling of holding a 
common citizenship …”82; “… these rights are becoming an integral part of the legal 
heritage of every citizen of the European Union …”83 and “This implies reinforcing the 
existing mutual trust with Member States … For the fight against terrorism - and also 
organized crime – to be effective, the exchange of information between law enforcement 
authorities … between different Member States is vital.”84 The flip side of all the 
articulations examined so far, however, is that they simultaneously contribute to the 
construction of new external borders at the outer edges of the Union. 
 
3.3.2. The construction of EU‟s external borders 
I said that Schengen is also directly associated with the so-called “fortress Europe”. 
As Huysmans‟ and den Boer‟s studies have argued, this fortress has emerged because EU 
institutions have continuously maintained that the aims of the SEA and Tampere can only 
be achieved if they are accompanied by compensatory measures at the external borders of 
the EU.  
The Commission has been no exception to that trend. In fact, this is a recurring 
articulation in its documents. I will illustrate the reasoning on which such thinking is based 
with the following two examples. According to a memorandum from 2005:  “The creation 
of an area where people can circulate freely should never represent a loss in terms of 
security for the Member States”.85 Another document provides more details on this logic: 
“Free movement of persons within the Schengen area … requires action to counter security 
deficits caused by the abolition of border controls as perpetrators of criminal acts are 
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equally able to move as freely as law abiding citizens. Impunity caused by obstacles to 
cooperation must be removed.”86  
Because of this perception of a loss of security, it is argued that the actual 
achievement of the aim of free movement of people will not be possible without: 
“Solidarity, mutual trust and shared responsibility between Member States [which] is a key 
requirement in an area without internal borders …”87 As a result of such thinking, the 
Commission has come to promote the idea that the efforts towards the establishment of the 
area without internal frontiers and subsequently of the area of freedom, security and justice 
should be accompanied directly by a: “flanking measure to the free movement of persons 
with respect to external border controls”.88 In the Commission‟s view such measures 
should: “provide the legislative base for establishing the agreed rules for crossing the 
external borders in which all Member States can have confidence.”89  
Thus, the construction of the external EU border is grounded on the security 
perception that there are dangers to the common European space, which can be addressed if 
the necessary steps are taken at the external edges of the Union.
90
 Although there has not 
been substantial change in the way these dangers are formulated, there have been slight 
alterations in the accents. While 15-20 years ago the aim was sometimes formulated more 
generally, as: “to enable threats to public policy and public security to be eliminated in the 
Member States”,91 currently, the most prominent threats, according to the documents of the 
Commission, are terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration. This can be well 
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illustrated with the statement that: “The Union and the Member States must respond 
together in the fight against organized crime and terrorism, but also in the management of 
migration flows and the control of external borders.”92 This is because “Terrorism and 
organized crime will remain a constant threat in the coming years.”93 and the perception 
that there is “mounting migratory pressure at the EU‟s external borders.”94 which require 
measures to “stop illegal immigration and to combat those who organize it.”95 Thus, given 
these articulations, it can be concluded that the Commission endorses fully the logic that 
has led to the adoption of restrictive measures at the external EU borders.   
   Such articulations contribute to the construction of the external border of the 
Union because they promote the understanding that as a result of the commonality of the 
problems, a common response is necessary. Commission documents tap into this to 
promote the idea that: “The creation of an area of freedom, security and justice requires all 
Member States to effectively apply common rules. The common security system is only as 
strong as its weakest point.”96 This understanding promotes the construction of the external 
EU border in two important ways – through constructing a common identity and through 
providing a rationale for common action at the Union level. The construction of common 
identity comes about as a side effect of internalising the understanding of mutual 
dependence that leads to the development of a feeling of solidarity, a “we-feeling”, which 
in turn constructs a common European identity. The latter, establishes the ground on which 
the perception that: “the creation of an area in which persons may move freely should be 
accompanied by measures with respect to external border controls, asylum and 
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immigration”97 is advanced. The adoption and implementation of measures on these matters 
has led to the construction of a new regime that is enacted through putting in place physical 
obstacles to the free crossing of the external borders. The discourse of the Commission on 
this matter has two important features that are significant in terms of the thrust of this 
research – the first is related to the way the external border operates and the second to the 
way it is constructed within the Commission discourse. 
The construction of the EU‟s external border in the field of border controls is 
closely related to the establishment of Union citizenship. This citizenship defines a new 
area, the EU territory, as a place where certain rights, including freedom of movement 
without border controls can be exercised. The limit of applicability of these rights is where 
the external border lies. As explained above, every EU citizen has the right to enter the 
territory of the Union. Non-EU citizens, however, do not have the same right, even when 
possessing a visa.
98
 It is this distinction in rights as well as the concrete measures 
undertaken for regulating the regime for entry into the EU territory that has constructed the 
external border of the Union.  
As I pointed out above, the Commission has had limited ability to exercise 
independently any significant influence due to the particular way in which the cooperation 
in this issue area has evolved and to the powers it has commanded. However, I also said 
that the Commission as one of the supranational institutions of the Union has consistently 
promoted, within its powers, further harmonisation and as extended as possible 
cooperation. For example, in 1992 in a Communication subsequently examined by the 
Council and the European Parliament,
99
 the Commission points out the problems that the 
intergovernmental framework creates and puts forward its position on the issue of abolition 
of border controls for individuals: “The work undertaken in the intergovernmental 
framework creates a problem of coherence with that carried out in the Community 
framework … For the Commission this ambiguity could not bring into question the scope 
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of Article 8 A which imposes itself on the text of an intergovernmental convention … 
Article 8a provides for the effective abolition by 31 December 1992 of all controls applied 
at internal frontiers … the Commission as guardian of the Treaty, will have to ensure that 
this obligation is fulfilled and hereby declares that it is resolutely determined to use all legal 
and political means at its disposal to ensure that the work program stemming from Article 
8a is carried out in full.”100 In a similar way more recently, the Commission has referred to 
the length and difficultness of the decision-making process in JHA as an impediment to 
successful action
101
 and has argued in favour of the abolition of the pillar structure and the 
extension of the Community method to the whole JHA under the Constitutional Treaty.
102
  
Through their references to the complications posed by intergovernmental 
cooperation, these clearly indicate a position advocating further integration and 
determination to utilise all the competences at its disposal to achieve this. However, one of 
the outcomes of such undertakings is the emergence of external EU borders. For example, 
the documents of the European Commission promote this thinking: “A frontier-free area 
demands a common policy on freedom to travel in the territory of the Member States … 
There is accordingly a need for a Community provision relating to persons who plan on 
moving within the frontier-free area …”103 Consequently, the control exercised over the 
crossing into the territory of the member states constitutes the establishment of the external 
border of the Union. Besides EU citizenship, this is achieved through measures in a number 
of other fields – visa, asylum application or border management – “… the creation of an 
area in which persons may move freely should be accompanied by measures with respect to 
external border controls, asylum and immigration.”104 
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The undertakings in these different fields share the aim of establishing the concrete 
conditions for entry into the territory of the Schengen-participating states and hence 
constitute the border controls exercised at the newly established external territorial borders 
of the EU. For example, according to the Commission, the common visa policy has to 
establish a body of common legislation. Among other things it should assure the 
harmonised application at operational level of practices and procedures to be followed by 
the diplomatic missions and consular posts of the member states when processing visa 
applications.
105
 One of the overarching goals of the efforts in the field of common asylum 
policy is to establish standards applicable throughout the Union: “The purpose of the 
proposal for a directive on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status is to establish in the short term a minimum level of 
harmonisation of the rules applicable in the matter in the Community … At a second stage, 
the definition of a common procedure implies restricting the possibilities for options in the 
areas where the first stage allows a degree of flexibility or the possibility of derogating 
from certain provisions.”106  
The articulations of the Commission show that common legislation and procedures 
in both policy areas have to address very similar problems, termed respectively “visa 
shopping”107 and “secondary movement”108 – the opportunity for TCNs to exploit any 
existing differences in national regimes for entry into the territory of a member state and 
from there through using the frontier-free area in the EU to move to the territory of other 
Union members whose national legislation would not have allowed them entry. This is well 
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exemplified with the following statement from the common visa policy: “Member States 
could not be expected to recognize visas granted by each other without a minimum 
harmonization. Otherwise the Member States would lay themselves open to the abusive 
practice of “visa shopping”.”109 The discourse of the Commission shows that the 
achievement of the goals of these policies in practice has taken the form of providing 
detailed guidelines on a number of technical issues, such as requirements of the uniform 
formats for visas and lists of countries whose nationals should have visas when entering the 
Union, the procedure for issuing them, the organisation of member states‟ external 
representations in the sphere of common visa policy and setting up standards for receiving 
asylum seekers, and processing their applications as well as the procedure for granting and 
withdrawing asylum in the common asylum policy. Other measures advanced in the 
Commission discourse in the area of common visa policy are co-location
110
 and the 
establishment of common application centers for visas. The common application centers are 
envisaged as: “a first step towards the future European common consular service.” 111 In 
April 2007 the first Common Visa Application Centre was open in Moldova.
112
  
As I explained in the previous section, all of the above measures can be read as 
contributing to the internal de-bordering in the EU. However, at the same time, they also 
construct a new border, one at the outer edges of the Union - the external EU border. In this 
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policy field, given the concrete measures articulated in the Commission documents, it can 
be concluded that the external border is constructed mainly through putting in place 
modified physical obstacles to the entry of TCNs into the territory of the Union. As such, 
overall, the nature of most of the measures in question does not represent a qualitatively 
new development but is rather a modification of tools employed by individual nation-states. 
An important exception from this rule, however, is the very intensive exchange of 
information under the VIS, SIS and EURODAC databases between the relevant authorities 
of the member states. It has as one of its aims: “to facilitate checks at external border 
checkpoints and within the territory of the Member States”.113 To that end: “A joint list of 
persons to whom the Member States shall refuse entry to their territories shall be drawn up 
on the basis of national notifications…”114 Without a doubt such information exchange has 
become possible as a result of the technological advances in the last few decades. However, 
it can be quite safely guessed that the scale of the information transferred, in terms of the 
number of countries involved in the exercise as well as the amount of data loaded, is going 
to be at levels higher than the average rate for international exchange of information on 
security-related issues. Such density will not only be an indication for the decreased 
importance of intra-Community borders but will also contribute to the construction of the 
Union‟s external border in two main ways. Firstly, through marking the area beyond which 
such intensive co-operation does not occur. Secondly, through a clear dividing line between 
those individuals that do not need their details to be uploaded into the databases (EU 
citizens, TCN - members of the family of EU citizen, TCNs that do not need visa to enter 
the territory of the Union) and those that do. The category of TCNs (those that need visa to 
enter the EU) is also the one that most clearly feels the newly constructed EU external 
border as difficult to penetrate from the outside. This is the main reason why the 
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overwhelming majority of existing studies on Schengen, as the Literature Review has 
shown, refer to the new regime as creating the “fortress Europe”.         
As this discussion has shown, the major contribution by the Commission towards 
the construction of the EU‟s external border in the field of border controls has been 
twofold. On the one hand it has been promoting greater harmonisation of the existing 
practices: “The Commission considers that the various provisions in force on the movement 
of third-country nationals in the territory of the Member States need an overall approach to 
establish general consistency and guarantee that the requirements for the various categories 
of third country-nationals are interpreted in the same way.”115 On the other hand, it has 
been supporting and facilitating more cooperation between the relevant authorities of the 
member states. One example of this is the Commission‟s proposal (adopted by the Council 
in October 2006)
116
 on the establishment of a mutual information procedure on national 
measures taken in the areas of asylum and immigration that can affect other member states. 
According to Franco Frattini this mechanism: “will enhance trust among Member States 
and will facilitate, through mutual information, the adoption of coordinated approaches to 
solve questions of mutual interest.”117 Therefore, according to the Commission: “The 
purpose of this exchange of views is to facilitate the identification of problems of common 
interest …”118    
The above clearly shows that in the field of border controls, the Commission often 
makes references to the EU‟s external borders. Although a side effect of the decreased 
salience of borders inside the Union is the construction of its external borders, in the field 
of border controls, the discourse of the Commission does that in a very explicit way. This 
sets it apart from the discourses in other policy fields. As I will show in the next chapters, 
in other policy areas the construction of external borders comes as a result of the 
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interrelation and inconsistency in the way issues in different policy areas are tackled (like in 
the ENP) or has to be deducted from the Commission discourse on the policy area in 
question (social policy). In the field of border controls, however, as the above discussion 
shows, the Commission very often explicitly makes references to the “external border/s” of 
the Union. In that respect, the construction of these borders is going to be contained in any 
attempt to recreate the discourse of the Commission in this field. Thus, I have classified it 
as belonging to the first reading, according to the methodological differentiation made in 
Chapter Two. This leaves only the analysis of the construction of internal borders in the EU 
by the Commission discourse on border controls for the second reading, which is presented 
in the next section. 
  
 
3.4. The Construction of Internal Borders in the EU through Commission 
Discourse on Border Controls 
Despite these configurations of borders in the Commission discourse on border 
controls, an analysis of its documents reveals that the opposite trend that contributes to the 
reconstruction of internal borders in the EU is still present. Below I present a detailed 
account of how this takes place. As in the other policy areas examined in this thesis, 
internal borders are reconstructed through the existence of contradictions and silences in the 
Commission discourse. In this policy area, three things stand out in particular. Firstly, the 
examined silences and contradictions contribute to the construction of border controls for 
one specific group of people, TCNs and do not affect EU nationals. Secondly, the 
reconstruction of internal territorial borders in the EU through Commission discourse in 
this policy area is a result of the limitations for the Commission in the institutional structure 
of the EU rather than a product of its own pursuits. As I explained in section 3.2.1., the 
intergovernmental nature of cooperation on border controls lasted until mid-2000s during 
which time particular patterns of solving border controls issues were established. These 
established approaches have tended, on certain issues, to emphasise the role of member 
states, which is normal for intergovernmental cooperation. However, because of path-
dependency they still determine the trajectory of cooperation on border controls. As 
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Lavenex argues: “Although the Treaty of Amsterdam has shifted asylum and immigration 
from the intergovernmental third pillar to the Community pillar … intensive 
transgovernmentalism still prevails … limiting the scope for defining a common European 
asylum system”.119 This has left the Commission with little space for manoeuvring and has 
meant that over the years, its discourse has had to reproduce the agreed upon solutions, and 
as such contribute, to the reconstruction of internal borders in the EU. Thirdly, following 
the differentiation of types of internal borders outlined in section 2.2.1., the internal border 
articulated in this policy field is along the old dividing lines demarcating national divisions 
between the member states of the EU.  
 
3.4.1. Absences from the discourse: common visa policy is for short-stay visas only 
The first main way in which Commission discourse is involved in the reconstruction 
of internal borders in the EU is through the articulation of provisions that envisage the 
harmonisation of conditions for issuing visas for entry into the EU‟s territory only for short 
stays.
120
 Therefore, the common visa policy, which as I argued above contains a number of 
measures that imply de-bordering, in fact has the shortcoming that overall, it only deals 
explicitly with stays for up to three months. Thus, it does not tackle openly the issuing of 
visas for entering EU territory for longer stays. This was the case especially during the 
period prior to the signing of the Treaty of Amsterdam. Hence, although the articulations on 
this matter that I examined above have made significant contributions towards abolition of 
border controls in the EU for TCNs, currently not all border controls for TCNs are 
completely unified. The conditions for issuing visas for long stays into the territory of the 
member states remain by and large a prerogative of the relevant authorities of the state in 
question. This creates the conditions for the re-emergence in Commission discourse of 
references to “member states‟ national legislation”. On one level, this clashes directly with 
the aims of the common visa policy because it goes against the proclaimed aim of 
                                               
119 Sandra Lavenex, „The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional 
Legacies‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 5 (2001), pp. 851-874, p. 854 
120 As Bigo and Guild clarify, the issue of long stay visas is only in the process of incorporation into the EU 
law. Thus, they also follow this division of visas into long and short stay ones in Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, 
„Policing at a distance: Schengen Visa Policies‟ in Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: 
Free Movement into and within Europe  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 233-263, p. 261  
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establishing an area where individuals can move freely within EU territory without border 
controls at intra-community borders. On another level, the common visa policy should be 
taken to mean all types of visas (short and long stay) and therefore, references only to short 
stay visas fall short of covering all visas that reasonably can be expected to be included. As 
such it is an example of the reconstruction of internal borders in the EU. Therefore, the 
absence of articulations, in the overwhelming majority of Commission documents, that 
contain explicit provisions for long-term visas to the EU are an important silence, which 
make it possible to recreate the divisions between the member states on a certain level. In 
turn, this is an example of the continued existence of non- unified border controls. 
A few further examples will illustrate this point. Under the provisions of the 
common visa policy: “A Member State shall not require a visa issued by its own authorities 
of a person applying to stay for a short time within its territory who holds a uniform 
visa.”121 The EU Code on visas defines uniform visa as a visa that is “valid for the entire 
territory of the Member States.”122 Also, a person, holding a residence permit of a member 
state is entitled to enter the territory of other members for short stays.
123
 These provisions 
unequivocally have de-bordering effects on internal border controls because they allow 
TCNs to cross the borders of Schengen-participating states for short stays (up to three 
months) with a visa/ residence permit issued by any of the other Schengen member states. 
The logical consequence of the qualifications contained in these provisions, however, is 
also the stipulation that: “Persons who propose to stay in a Member State other than for a 
short time shall enter that State under the conditions laid down in its national law”.124 
Therefore: “Visas for stays exceeding three months shall be national visas issued by one of 
                                               
121 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must 
be in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993, p. 32 (emphasis added). This is the case during the first three months of validity of the long-stay 
visa. 
122 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Community Code on Visas, COM (2006) 403 final, 19.07.2006, p. 41 (emphasis added) 
123 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must 
be in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993, p. 25 
124 Ibid., p. 26 
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the Contracting Parties in accordance with its national law.”125 For TCNs who are not 
subject to visa requirement, the Schengen Implementing Convention states that each 
member state has the right to extend an alien‟s stay on its territory beyond three months in 
certain circumstances.
126
 Given these provisions it should come as no surprise that even as 
late as mid 2000s, the proposals of the Commission on common visa policy, which are still 
through the EU decision-making process,
127
 talk about short-stay visas: “entry for an 
intended stay in that Member State or in several Member States of a duration of no more 
than three months in total”.128 Also they state that further legal instruments will be needed 
to assure: “the exchange of data on long stay-visas which are not concurrently valid as 
short-stay visas by the VIS; this would need further political orientation in view of the 
absence of a common acquis for such visas.”129 These, however, are only two examples of 
the recent manifestations of a trend in the Commission discourse on visas.
130
  
This trend indicates that in this discourse the Commission does not talk about 
common long-stay visas.
131
 Therefore, I classify that as a silence in its articulations. As the 
reference to the lack of an acquis for long-stay visas in the quotation above indicates, the 
reason for this absence is that currently there is no EU-level agreement for the issuance of 
                                               
125 Article 18, Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (emphasis in the original). This stipulation 
is repeated in Council of the European Union, Regulation on Freedom of Movement with a Long-Stay Visa, 
(EC) No 1091/ 2001, p. 2  
126 Article 20 (2), Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (emphasis in the original) 
127 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=194509, accessed on 24.04.2009  
128 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Community Code on Visas, COM (2006) 403 final, 19.07.2006, p. 41.  
129 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the Exchange of Information between Member States on 
Short-Stay-Visas, COM (2004) 835 final, 28.12.2004, p. 2 
130 Other examples of key Commission documents referring only to short-stay visas are: European 
Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council Amending the 
Common Consular Instructions on Visas for Diplomatic Missions and Consular Posts in Relation to the 
Introduction of Biometrics Including Provisions on the Organization of the Reception and Processing of Visa 
Applications, COM (2006) 269 final, 31.05.2006, particularly p. 5; European Commission, Proposal for a 
Council Regulation Laying Down a Uniform Format for Visas, COM (94) 287 final, 13.07.1994, p. 4; 
European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must be 
in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993, p.24 
131 A very rare example of a Commission document referring explicitly to “long-term visas” is European 
Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third Country 
Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities, COM (2001) 386 
final, 11.07.2001, p. 4 
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long-term visas. Hence, this silence in the Commission discourse is because of the limits of 
the Commission to go beyond certain point. Currently it has no legal grounds on which to 
step in order to attempt to promote harmonisation. Despite that, as the discussion in 
Chapter Four shows, in recent years the Commission has been at the forefront of the efforts 
to harmonise and facilitate the movement of TCNs in the EU for work purposes. This is 
exemplified by the adoption of several proposals that provide for more favourable 
conditions for entry and residence for TCNs for work purposes. These imply the crossing of 
intra-EU borders and as such are related to the issue of border controls. Therefore, these 
articulations can be read as potentially facilitating the establishment of a common policy on 
long-term visas in the future. Nevertheless, currently these documents do not talk explicitly 
about “long-term visas”. As I discussed in Chapter Two, this may be due to the 
Commission anticipating the reactions of the Council. Therefore, this silence in its 
discourse is probably best interpreted as a result of a realistic calculation that currently any 
attempts to establish common policy on long-term visas do not have chances of success and 
therefore the Commission does not want to lose political capital. Nevertheless, I think that 
these absences are very important because they implicitly support the status quo established 
during the previous years and therefore contribute to the reproduction of the currently 
existing internal EU borders. This obstructs the achievement of the goals discernable from 
some Commission articulations (movement of TCNs in the EU for work purposes) as well 
as the emergence of the genuine border controls-free areas implied by the SEA and 
Tampere formulations.     
This is because such an absence has important consequences on borders in the EU, 
which are contrary to the de-bordering trend evident in the Commission documents on 
border controls. The lack of harmonisation efforts in certain types of visas opens the door 
for references to the “member states”. In turn, such articulations point to the existence of 
national divisions within the Union, which is a sign of the persistent relevance of internal 
borders and border controls in the EU despite the efforts towards their abolition. Examples 
of these are the provisions that national law will guide the issue of long-stay visas and the 
stipulation that: “Member States shall … take back any person to whom they have issued a 
residence permit or provisional residence permit … and who is illegally resident in the 
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territory of another Member State.”132 These articulations point to the possibility that under 
certain circumstances different areas in the EU apply different rules with respect to border 
controls and free movement of TCNs, which is a clear example of the continued relevance 
of internal borders in the Union.  
Importantly, it should also be noted that the absences in the Commission discourse 
on this issue reconstruct a specific kind of internal physical EU borders in that they are 
obstacles to the movement of TCNs only and are not applicable to EU citizens. As long as 
barriers to the movement of EU citizens are concerned, the current provisions in the acquis 
have led to the dismantlement of border controls for this category of people. There are, 
nevertheless, still specific requirements in terms of EU citizens‟ right of residence in other 
than their member state, which can be interpreted as reconstructing internal EU borders. 
These, however, recreate functional borders and therefore are more closely related to the 
right of free movement of people. Thus, I examine them in detail in Chapter Four. 
 
3.4.2. Inconsistencies in the discourse  
The second main way in which Commission discourse on border controls can be 
interpreted as contributing to the reconstruction of internal borders in the EU is through the 
inconsistencies in the articulations in its documents. There are two main examples of that – 
the particular provisions of the procedure for applying for Schengen visas and the discourse 
on the common asylum policy. Again, in both cases the main cause of the Commission 
articulations is the established pattern of cooperation in JHA, which has left little space for 
the Commission to advance proposals that envisage greater involvement of the 
supranational level.   
Due to references to “member states”, the latter can be regarded as displaying 
similar characteristics with the line in the Commission discourse examined in the previous 
section. Despite that, the articulations on the common asylum policy reconstruct internal 
borders in a different way – through inconsistency in the discourse, rather than silences in 
it. There is a clash within this discourse of the Commission between the articulations on the 
                                               
132 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must 
be in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993, p. 25 
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establishment of the EU as a unified area for asylum seekers and the continued references 
to “member states”. For example, the Green Paper on the future Common European 
Asylum System states that its idea is to make: “the European Union a single protection area 
for refugees …”133 The achievement of this goal requires diminished salience of borders 
between the EU members. To that end, as I showed in the previous section, a considerable 
amount of effort has been put into devising a Union-level system for handling asylum 
applications and preventing applications in more than one member state, which can have 
important input into the establishment of a Common Asylum area in the EU.
134
  
However, the Commission discourse on this matter has articulated two main areas 
of concern. Firstly, as the above discussion shows, the setting of minimum standards on 
procedures has been one of the dominant principles on the issue of asylum. Its goal “is to 
establish in the short term a minimum level of harmonisation of the rules applicable in the 
matter in the Community. It does not require the Member States to apply uniform 
procedures.”135 Therefore, “Within the current legal framework, the responsibility for 
determining asylum claims lies with individual Member States.”136 Thus, as Lavenex 
rightly points out, during the initial years of cooperation on the common asylum policy, the 
predominant approach has been to leave to national legislation important questions, such as 
who qualifies as a refugee and what form of protection are different types of refuges 
entitled to.
 137
 This has left scope for considerable divergence on these issues, which in turn, 
as the Commission Green Paper on asylum acknowledges, has left gaps in the Union acquis 
                                               
133 European Commission, Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System, COM (2007) 301 
final, 06.06.2007, p. 2 
134 For studies examining the development of cooperation on Asylum and Refugees at European level, see 
Sandra Lavenex, „The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional 
Legacies‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 5 (2001), pp. 851-874 and Eiko Thielemann, „Symbolic 
Politics or Effective Burden Sharing? Redistribution, Side-payments and the European Refugee Fund‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 43: 4 (2005), pp. 807-824 
135 European Commission, Towards a Common Asylum Procedure and a Uniform Status, Valid throughout 
the Union, for Persons Granted Asylum, COM (2000) 755 final, 22.11.2000, p. 8 
136 European Commission, Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System, COM (2007) 301 
final, 06.06.2007, p. 4 
137 Sandra Lavenex, „The Europeanization of Refugee Policies: Normative Challenges and Institutional 
Legacies‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 5 (2001), pp. 851-874, p. 861. Footnote 7 gives particular 
examples of how this plays out in practice. For other examples of how diverging national legislations affect 
asylum applications see European Commission, Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum 
System, COM (2007) 301 final, 06.06.2007, p. 5. 
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on asylum.
138
 From the point of view of border configurations, this contributes to the 
reconstruction of internal territorial and functional borders inside the EU.  
Importantly, many of the articulations in Commission documents show that the 
Commission is aware of this situation and enunciate measures that potentially can alleviate 
this shortcoming of the current arrangements. For example, according to the Green Paper 
on Asylum, national rules need to be “further approximated” and it is necessary to “re-
assess the content and added-value of certain procedural devices”.139 So far the 
Commission has been successful in securing acceptance in principle for further integration 
on asylum issues. For example, the Parliament adopted the Communication on a Common 
asylum procedure and a uniform status
140
 and the Green Paper on Asylum was discussed in 
the Council in June 2007 and the Commission was charged with creating a road map of the 
necessary future work on the basis of the on-going reflection on the functioning of the 
current asylum system in the EU.
141
 
Secondly, analysis of Commission articulations on the common asylum policy 
reveals that during the so-called first phase
142
 of the policy, there has been one very specific 
concern, which has guided a lot of the integrative work. This is the issue of the member 
state responsible for examining an asylum application. One of the first articulations that 
reveals the specifics for addressing this matter is expressed in a 1988 Communication that 
reads: “determination of the Member State responsible for examining an asylum requests: 
responsibility would lie with the Member State which had first shown its consent to the 
asylum seeker entering its territory (by the issue of a residence permit or visa) or through 
which he first entered the Community …”143 Therefore, the pattern for dealing with asylum 
                                               
138 European Commission, Green Paper on the Future Common European Asylum System, COM (2007) 301 
final, 06.06.2007, p. 3 
139 Both are from ibid., p. 4 
140 This is available in the Bulletin of the EU 10-2001, accessible at 
http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200110/p104010.htm, accessed on 22.07.2009  
141 European Council, 2807th Council Meeting. Justice and Home Affairs, C/07/125, 12-13.06.2007, p. 28 
142 The Second phase is envisaged to start in 2010. See for example European Commission, Green Paper on 
the Future Common European Asylum System, COM (2007) 301 final, 06.06.2007, p. 2 
143 European Commission, Communication on the Abolition of Controls of Persons at Intra-Community 
Borders, COM (88) 640 final, 07.12.1988, p. 23. For another Commission document reiterating this approach 
see European Commission, Commission Staff Working Paper: Revisiting the Dublin Convention: Developing 
Community Legislation for Determining which Member State is Responsible for Considering an Application 
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applications has been to establish a EU-level system for determining which member state 
will deal with which cases. However, an approach that invokes “member states” hampers 
the establishment of a genuine single area for asylum seekers. This is because these 
references to “member states” imply that it is still an important question which part of the 
single area will deal with which application. In turn this reaffirms the importance of the 
existing territorial borders between the EU members, thus signalling the continued presence 
of internal Union frontiers and the accompanying them border controls. In distinction to the 
first problem discussed above, on this matter, there is a lack of articulations in Commission 
discourse that suggest likelihood for its abandonment or even an attempt to challenge it and 
change it. This is not surprising, however, given that the Commission is bound to face 
fierce opposition on any such attempts in the Council. Despite half a century of integration 
in Europe, this issue cuts deeply into national identity questions, which are still the most 
powerful way of identification in the EU.      
In a similar way the provisions for short-stay visas under Schengen contain some 
clauses that can be interpreted as reconstructing the internal borders in the EU. These are 
the stipulations guiding the exact way for issuing short-stay visas.
144
 The principles were 
laid down in the formative years of cooperation under Schengen and proclaim that: “The 
Member State which is the main destination shall normally be responsible for issuing the 
visa. If it is not possible to determine that destination, the Member State of first entry shall 
be responsible.”145 These principles are adhered to in the 2006 Code on Visas, which adds 
that: “When a visa with multiple entries is applied for, the Member State of usual 
                                                                                                                                               
for Asylum Submitted in one of the Member States, SEC (2000) 522, available at 
http://www.arena.uio.no/sources/jpa/dublin/com/paper/2000/SEC522.pdf, accessed on 27.05.2010 
144 It is important to note that these requirements are significant not only in terms of the issuance of the visa, 
but also when the actual entry into the Schengen territory is taking place. Recently (October 2007) I was told 
a story about a TCN who was in possession of a Schengen visa issued by the French authorities. The person 
had a transit flight to France, which stopped in Greece, where he stayed for few days. Upon exiting Greece, 
the Greek authorities told the TCN that he should never had been allowed to enter Greek territory because his 
visa is issued by the French officials and therefore France should had been the country through which he 
should had entered the Schengen area. Under such circumstances, the Greek authorities can expel the TCN 
from the Schengen area. 
145 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation Determining the Third Countries whose Nationals Must 
be in Possession of a Visa when Crossing the External Borders of the Member States, COM (93) 684 final, 
10.12.1993, p. 35 
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destination shall be responsible for processing the application”.146 Also a TCN residing 
legally in a member state without holding a residence permit from it, who has justified 
reasons for travelling to another member state: “shall apply for a visa at the diplomatic 
mission or consular post of the Member State of destination.”147 Thus, as Guild and Bigo 
argue: “the rules of application are strictly limited on the grounds of nationality – that of the 
state. The integration of the Union is not apparent here ... The EU visa is a national de facto 
visa which gives facilities to enter the territory of the other States but which does not ensure 
the entry into a single territory where freedom of movement is guaranteed.”148  
These principles mean that in practice TCNs applying for a Schengen visa still 
cannot submit their application to any diplomatic or consular mission of a EU member state 
but have to do so to a specific one. However, this goes against the aim of establishing 
Schengen as an area in which there are no internal frontiers in terms of border controls. The 
ideal-typical implementation of such a goal would require reaching a condition where it is 
not necessary to mention which is the authority that issued the visa. If there is a uniform 
visa valid for the whole Schengen area, ultimately it should not be important who issues the 
visa. However, currently this is not the case and the continuing references to “member state 
responsible for the visa application” presented above have the effect of bringing back 
national distinctions between EU‟s members and hence – reconstruct internal borders in 
relation to border controls in the Union.
149
  
Another provision that has such an effect is the stipulation that persons moving 
within the frontier-free area for a period between three and six months are not entitled to 
remain in the territory of a single member state for longer than three months.
150
 Again, 
                                               
146 European Commission, Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
Establishing a Community Code on Visas, COM (2006) 403 final, 19.07.2006, p. 43 
147 Ibid. (emphasis added)  
148 Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, „Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies‟ in Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild 
(eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe  (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 233-
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149 As I said above, some Commission documents refer to a Common Diplomatic Service for the EU as a 
future goal. If and when this becomes reality this way of reconstructing internal Union borders will be 
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150 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Conditions in which Third-
Country Nationals Shall Have the Freedom to Travel in the Territory of the Member States for Periods Not 
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within a unified territory that allows for free movement of people, such as Schengen, such 
stipulations recreate the divisions that have existed prior to the launch of integration efforts. 
As such, these provisions work towards undermining the establishment of a single area and 
instead through confirming the relevance of the issue of which member state‟s territory the 
TCN/s are on, reconstruct internal borders and border controls within the EU.
151
  
Therefore, the main inconsistency in the Commission discourse that contributes to 
the recreation of internal borders consists of the references to “member States”. These have 
the effect of confirming the continued relevance of national territories of the Union 
members and hence, leading to a division (rather than unification) of the Schengen area. 
However, it is important to note that these internal borders are tangible for a particular 
category of people – TCNs. EU citizens cannot experience it. This again shows that the 
undertakings in the area of border controls and more specifically, the discourse of the 
European Commission have resulted in establishing differently operating frontiers for new 
types of people for some of which internal borders and border controls in the EU are still 
relevant. Therefore, it is more accurate to talk about reconstruction rather than decreased 
salience of internal EU borders in the field of border controls. 
 
 
3.5. Summary         
As the discussion in this chapter has shown, in the field of border controls territorial 
borders are the main type of border configured through the Commission discourse. It does 
that in two main ways. Firstly, it has clearly talked about the aim of creating common 
spaces in the EC/EU, which implies the diminished importance of borders between the 
member states. Also it has promoted the idea that this new area requires strong controls at 
its external edges. These border configurations are clearly talked about in the Commission 
documents and as such constitute their first reading. As I have shown, over the years the 
                                                                                                                                               
Exceeding Three Months, Introducing a Specific Travel Authorization and Determining the Conditions of 
Entry and Movement for Periods Not Exceeding Six Months, COM (2001) 388 final, 10.07.2001, p. 5 
151 Bigo and Guild make essentially the same argument and provide some other interesting examples of this. 
See Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild, „Policing at a Distance: Schengen Visa Policies‟ in Didier Bigo, Elspeth 
Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 
233-263, pp. 247-248   
 126 
Commission has articulated positions that contribute to the implementation of these 
configurations. Firstly, it has consistently argued for greater cooperation at EC/EU level. 
Secondly, it has advanced some quite radical interpretations of the existing legal 
documents. One of the outcomes of these articulations has been facilitating the emergence 
of the so-called “fortress Europe”. This provides one example of how the Commission has 
contributed to the construction and reconstruction of EU borders. It has done that in two 
main ways. Firstly, it has accepted and reproduced the assumptions on which the policy on 
border controls is based and it also has argued in support of the need for greater 
harmonisation of policies at EU level, thus employing the logic of functional spill-
over.Thus, in the case of border controls, the reconfiguration of borders has taken the form 
of ultimately liberalising the regime for EU nationals at the expense of TCNs who often 
face modified obstacles to their movement inside the EC/EU. This distinction is also 
important because as I showed in the last section, when TCNs are concerned, the discourse 
of the Commission contributes, through its silences and inconsistencies to the 
reconstruction of the internal borders in the Union. This is significant because it is in direct 
contradiction to the declared aims in Commission discourse. Thus, it illustrates some of the 
current limits to the possibility to decrease the importance of borders between EU member 
states. I argued that the major reason for the occurrence of the silences and inconsistencies 
in Commission discourse on border controls is the current acquis communitare, which is 
lacking legal provisions that the Commission can use in order to advance any alternative 
visions. However, as I will show in the next chapter, even when the policy area in question 
is from the first pillar, the Commission discourse still configures borders ambiguously. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
FREE MOVEMENT OF PEOPLE – AMBIGUOUS BORDER 
CONFIGURATIONS EVEN IN THE FIRST PILLAR 
 
 
4.1. Introduction 
As we have seen in the previous chapter, the Commission has contributed 
significantly towards abolishing intra-Community border controls. As a result, physical 
borders have been reduced significantly, which has helped to come closer to achieving the 
aim of creating an area of free movement. However, I have also shown that Commission 
articulations construct two different categories of people (EU-nationals and TCNs) who 
enjoy different rights in respect to crossing EU borders. As the discussion in section 3.4. 
demonstrated, as far as TCNs are concerned, in certain cases internal borders in the EU are 
simply reconstructed rather than abolished. This is a trend that persists in the area of free 
movement of people as well. Here, just as in border controls, TCNs are articulated as the 
major group of people that experiences continued existence of borders under integration.  
Nevertheless, there are some important differences between these two fields in 
terms of both the types of borders configured and the potential role of the Commission in 
their configuration. These differences are crucial in light of the goals of this research and 
thus, I examine Commission discourse in these two policies separately. In distinction to 
border controls where the measures undertaken overall configure physical (territorial) 
borders, in the free movement of people, the overwhelming majority of measures concern 
functional borders because they regulate issues such as access to the labour market or the 
welfare state. Contrasting with the intergovernmental origins of cooperation on border 
controls, issues falling within free movement of people have been part of the EC since the 
Treaty of Rome. Therefore, on free movement of people the Commission is better placed to 
overcome the limitations it has faced on border controls issue, which puts it in a better 
position to transcend internal EU borders. In this chapter I interrogate whether this is the 
case in practice. I argue that the Commission has been successful in setting up trends that 
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overcome current internal borders but that this still only reconfigured rather that 
transcended them. 
In order to develop this argument, I have divided the chapter into five sections. The 
first one aims to provide a background for the following discussion. I look into the major 
developments related to free movement of people. In the second part, I establish the main 
articulations in Commission discourse that configure borders and present and analyse the 
articulations in Commission discourse that contribute to decreased salience of internal 
borders. In the third section, I look into how Commission articulations contribute to the 
emergence of a new border at the outer edges of the EU. In the fourth section, I focus on 
the silences and contradictions within Commission discourse on free movement that 
contribute to the reconstruction of some internal borders between the member states and 
analyse the reasons for their occurrence.       
 
 
4.2. Major Developments in the Field of Free Movement of People and Main 
Themes in Commission Discourse  
As I emphasised earlier, the free movement of people has its origins in the Treaty of 
Rome. It refers to the abolition of any discrimination based on nationality between workers 
of the member states regarding employment, work conditions, and remuneration. The free 
movement of people implies the rights to take up employment in other member states; to 
move freely within the territory of the member states for work purposes; to stay in a 
member state other than the workers‟ own for employment purposes.1 As such, from its 
inception free movement of people was related to functional borders. Therefore, it is a 
complex matter and encompasses a variety of policy areas, such as social security, 
professional qualifications, or immigration. However, while the first two are issues that 
have been dealt with at the supranational level since the first decade of integration, the third 
one has gained prominence only in recent years. Furthermore, traditionally immigration has 
fallen within the remit of JHA. As I explain in greater detail in section 4.4. it was only it the 
                                               
1 Article 48, Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, p. 51 
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last decade that immigration issues started to be linked more consistently with free 
movement.  
The complexity of free movement, where questions often form an interrelated web 
with problems that nominally fall outside of the scope of the policy on the free movement 
of people, precipitates a situation where articulations from different discourses (i.e. border 
controls and free movement of people) configure borders in a similar way. An example of 
such a situation is the construction of different categories of people under existing EU law 
(EU nationals and TCNs) that enjoy different rights in relation to their freedom to move in 
the EU.
2
 Thus, in this chapter, as well as in the previous chapter, the different categories of 
people constitute a major division line along which the analysis is organised. In other 
words, I will examine policy proposals of the Commission that relate to both EU citizens 
and TCNs and scrutinise whether they lead to decreased importance of borders/ 
construction and reconstruction of borders for Union nationals and/ or TCNs.  
 As I also pointed out in the previous chapter, in the period after the adoption of the 
SEA to the present a very important shift has occurred in the understanding of which EU 
nationals are entitled to free movement in the EU. Before the Treaty of the EU was adopted 
in 1992, a narrow interpretation to the entitlement to free movement prevailed and it was 
only conferred upon workers.
3
 It was only with the new integration impetus in the second 
half of the 1980s that the conditions were established for expanding the scope of the 
provisions to cover more groups of people. However, importantly in distinction to the 
development of border controls this evolution was within the EC.  
Both the gradual extension of the groups of people covered and this falling within 
the remit of the EC can be illustrated with the following Commission articulations. 
According to its White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, the issue of the free 
movement of people is still explicitly linked to their status as economically active 
                                               
2 A more detailed analysis of how this is achieved is provided in Chapter Three, Border Controls. See section 
3.2.2. 
3 For studies that make the same point see Gallya Lahav, Immigration and Politics in the New Europe – 
Reinventing Borders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), esp. pp. 38-51; Hans-Werner Sinn, 
„EU Enlargement, Migration and New Constitution‟, Economic Studies, 50: 4 (2004), pp. 685-707; Andrew 
Geddes, Immigration and European Integration – Towards a Fortress Europe? (Manchester: Manchester 
University Press, 2000), p. 44 
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individuals in the member state to which they have moved: “The Commission considers it 
crucial that the obstacles which still exist within the Community to free movement for the 
self-employed and employees be removed by 1992 … the Commission intends to make the 
necessary proposals which will eliminate the last obstacles standing in front of the free 
movement and residence of migrant Community workers.”4 The wider interpretation 
became possible with the TEU, which established EU citizenship to all nationals of the 
Union‟s member states. According to the Maastricht Treaty: “Every citizen of the Union 
shall have the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States …”5 
This however, meant that provisions had to be put in place for allowing non-economically 
active citizens (students, pensioners, etc.) to be able to enjoy the rights conferred upon them 
in their status as EU citizens. This is clearly evident from the Commission‟s position that 
Community legislation on free movement of people has to be made clearer and restructured 
around the notion of Union citizenship.
6
 This development considerably enlarged the scope 
for Commission action in terms of the fields in which it could now make proposals. This 
can be exemplified with Commission proposals, such as the Green Paper on the obstacles to 
transnational mobility
7
 in education, training and research
8
 and the Report on the 
implementation of the Directives on the Right of Residence.
9
  
All in all, the main fields that were involved in guaranteeing the free movement of 
people were provisions for the harmonisation of social protection, recognition of 
professional qualifications, and the terms regulating the freedom to reside in a member state 
other than the national‟s own. Despite this expansion of the applicability of the right to free 
                                               
4 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final, 14.06.1985, p. 27 
5 Article 8a, The Maastricht Treaty – Provisions Amending the Treaty Establishing the European Economic 
Community with a View to Establishing the European Community, p. 5, available at 
http://www.eurotreaties.com/maastrichtec.pdf, accessed on 10.01.2009 (emphasis added)  
6 European Commission, Report on the Implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 (Right of 
Residence), COM (1999) 127 final, 17.03.1999, pp. 2-3 
7 It has to be pointed out that Commission documents very often refer to “mobility” for movements within the 
EU, which as a term is usually employed for movements within a country and not for cross-state migration. 
For this distinction see for example Franck Dűvell, „Migration, Minorities and Marginality: New Directions in 
Europe Migration Research‟ in Chris Rumford (ed.), The Sage Handbook of European Studies (London: Sage, 
2009), pp. 328-346, p. 330  
8 European Commission, Green Paper – Education- Training – Research. The Obstacles to Transnational 
Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996 
9 European Commission, Report on the Implementation on Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 (Right of 
Residence), COM (99) 127 final, 17.03.1999 
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movement of people, some scholars continue to argue that it: “is still economically linked 
to a great extent.”10 This suggests that EU nationals that do not meet certain economic 
criteria are very likely to still have their freedom of movement within the EU curtailed. In 
the last section of this chapter I will engage in greater depth with this argument in order to 
show how it is articulated in the Commission discourse and to show that such enunciations 
have contributed to the reconstruction of the EU‟s internal borders.    
As far as TCNs are concerned, their rights to free movement within the EU are 
regulated in two main interrelated contexts. Firstly, as workers and residents in a member 
state of the Union and secondly, under the emerging regime of the EU common policy on 
immigration. The foundations of the latter: “have been gradually established under the 
Tampere and Hague Programme”11 and encompass issues of legal and illegal migration, 
Schengen, visas and the management of the EU external border and the external dimension 
of the policy.
12
 The main trend in Commission discourse on the rights of TCNs as workers 
and residents in a EU member state is along the lines that it is necessary to guarantee to the 
greatest extent possible equal treatment between TCNs and EU citizens. In order to do this, 
the Commission has had a: “long-standing policy to improve the legal status of third 
country nationals residing in the Community.”13 This is to be achieved through integration 
policy: “based on non-discrimination, equal treatment, rights and duties [that] allows 
immigrants to contribute more to society …”14 Furthermore, in 2003 the EU Regulation on 
                                               
10 Sergio Carrera, „What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?‟, European 
Law Journal, (2005), 11: 6, pp. 699-721, p. 721. Similar claim is made in Hans-Werner Sinn, „EU 
Enlargement, Migration and New Constitution‟, Economic Studies, 50: 4 (2004), pp. 685-707, p. 700 
11 European Commission, Towards a Common Immigration Policy, COM (2007) 780 final, 5.12.2007, p. 3 
12 Ibid., pp. 3-7. These are reiterated in a number of speeches of EU officials, such as Antonio Vitorino, 
Migratory Flows and the European Labour Market: toward a Community Immigration Policy, 
SPEECH/01/334, 9.07.2001; Antonio Vitorino, Migration as a Resource to be Managed for the Mutual 
Benefit of Sending and Receiving Countries, SPEECH/03/417, 18.09.2003; Franco Frattini, Legal Migration 
and the Follow-up to the Green Paper and on the Fight against Illegal Immigration, SPEECH/05/666, 
07.11.2005; Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Migration, External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
SPEECH/06/30, 24.01.2006; Franco Frattini, Management of Migration Flows, SPEECH/06/539, 27.09.2006 
13 European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement of Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 
12.11.1997, p. 12. For an overview of the measures undertaken see Antonio Vitorino, What EU Strategy for 
Integrating Migrants, SPEECH/04/340, 30.06.2004 
14 European Commission, Towards a Common Immigration Policy, COM (2007) 780 final, 5.12.2007, p. 2 
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coordination of social security systems between the Union member states was extended to 
cover the rights acquired by TCNs as well.
15
   
Thus, the Commission undertakings in the field of free movement of people have 
undergone significant development in the last two decades. Partly this is a result of the 
constitutional changes in the EU that have been put into place by successive Treaty 
amendments (such as those of Maastricht and Amsterdam).
16
 As the former European 
Commissioner for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino declares: “Aside from 
Article 3 (c) of the Treaty of Rome which talks about „the abolition … of obstacles to 
freedom of movement for persons, services and capital‟, there was nothing in the Treaty of 
Rome as a precursor to EU powers in asylum and immigration.”17 As I explained in detail 
in Chapter Two, it was only in the second half of the 1980s that the push towards the 
establishment of the internal market in the EC laid down the foundations that enabled these 
particular developments in the following years. As Commissioner Vitorino summarises: 
“The impetus came from the concept of „Europe without frontiers‟ so well articulated by 
Jacques Delors …” because it required: “creating common rights at European level for 
bona fide migrants whether for protection or economic purposes.”18 This opened the avenue 
for European integration to proceed in a number of new fields as a repercussion of the need 
to ensure the proper functioning of the internal market. As Commissioner Vitorino 
summarises: “It made no sense to have an internal market for free movement of goods, 
services and capital without free movement of persons. And from that sprang the evident 
need, … expressed at Maastricht, to legislate for common policies.”19 
  Therefore, overall, over the years there has been a clear trend towards widening 
the scope of the rights of free movement – from free movement of workers to free 
movement of people in general. This has been accompanied by an increase in the number of 
                                               
15 See for example, European Commission, The Community Provisions on Social Security – Your Rights when 
Moving within the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European 
Communities, 2005), p. 40 
16 A significant part of these changes relates to third pillar issues, which are spelled out in greater detail in the 
section dealing with the evolution of cooperation under Schengen in the Chapter on Border Controls.  
17 Antonio Vitorino, Migration as a Resource to be Managed for the Mutual Benefit of Sending and Receiving 
Countries, SPEECH/03/417, 18.09.2003, p. 2 
18 Both quotations are from Ibid., p. 3 
19 Ibid. 
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fields that are involved in the efforts towards implementing this goal. The European 
Commission has contributed to these trends through a number of proposals, some of the 
provisions of which I examine in detail in the following parts of this chapter.    
 
 
4.3. De-bordering in Commission Discourse on Free Movement of People  
There are a number of ways in which Commission discourse contributes towards 
the decreased salience of previously existing borders between the member states of the EU 
in the field of free movement of people. These can be classified into several major 
categories. Firstly, they can be dealing with the free movement of EU citizens or 
alternatively of TCNs. Secondly, as far as EU citizens are concerned, Commission 
discourse can be contributing towards the diminished importance of different 
manifestations of functional borders or establishing a common European identity. Thirdly, 
some Commission documents contain articulations that promote the idea that the temporary 
border for free movement of workers for the member states that joined in 2004 should be 
eliminated. Below I present and analyse all these articulations. What these articulations 
have in common is that they all relate to several main formulations, which I argue the 
Commission has used to promote decreased salience of previously existing borders between 
EU member states. 
 
4.3.1. Main Commission articulations configuring borders  
These formulations are related to the major fields concerned with the free 
movement of people: the existing regime for workers‟ access to the labour market and the 
welfare state, education and immigration. In each of these areas, the Commission has 
articulated formulations implying the existence of a common European space. For example, 
as I explained in greater detail in Chapter Three, the creation of an “area of freedom, 
security and justice” is viewed as an important route for addressing some of the challenges 
raised by immigration. As I explain below, certain immigration issues have been 
persistently linked to free movement of people since the early 2000s. The Commission 
discourse also promotes the attainment of the goal of free movement of people through a 
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number of articulations concerning mainly EU citizens. In the field of education this is 
exemplified by the support the Commission has given to: “a variety of programmes for 
transnational mobility of persons who are keen to undergo training … or contribute to 
training activities in another Member State of the Community.”20 Mobility is also a key 
term in Commission discourse on the free movement of workers in general: “Worker 
mobility is a key instrument for an efficiently functioning single market …”21 Furthermore, 
as far as the regime for free movement of workers is concerned, there are a number of terms 
employed by the Commission that contribute to the construction of a common space. The 
most prominent of them are: “European labour market”, “a single European employment/ 
labour market”, “European-wide labour markets”, “the creation of an employment and 
work area on a Community-wide scale”.22 These formulations are important in terms of 
how they configure borders. There are two main reasons why efforts of the Commission 
towards free movement of people should be interpreted as aimed at de-bordering. Firstly, in 
its discourse terms such as mobility are linked with phrases such as “united Europe” and 
“development of solidarity between all Europeans”.23 Thus, the overall goal is to reduce the 
existing divisions between the member states. Secondly, the anticipated emergence of a 
common area in the EU as a result of the increased mobility is regarded as contributing 
towards the achievement of a single market,
24
 which as explained in depth in Chapter Two 
is premised on the idea of creating a frontier free area in the EC/EU. Below I present a 
                                               
20 European Commission, Green Paper – Education- Training – Research. The Obstacles to Transnational 
Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996, p. 1. For other references to mobility in relation to learning see for 
example European Commission, Recommendation on the Establishment of the European Qualifications 
Framework for Lifelong Learning, COM (2006) 479 final, 05.09.2006, p. 14 
21 European Commission, Mobility, an Instrument for More and Better Jobs: The European Mobility Action 
Plan (2007-2010), COM (2007) 773 final, 06.12.2007, p. 2 
22 The first three formulations can be found in European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement 
of Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 12.11.1997, pp. 8-17. The last formulation is from European Commission, 
Green Paper – Education- Training – Research. The Obstacles to Transnational Mobility, COM (96) 462 
final, 2.10.1996, p.1. For other references to “the European Labour Market” see for example European 
Commission Report, Towards a Single European Labour Market, COM (2007) 116 final, 16.03.2007 and 
Anna Diamantopoulou, The New Technologies and a Single European Labour Market, SPEECH/01/75, 
20.02.2001 
23 European Commission, Green Paper – Education- Training – Research. The Obstacles to Transnational 
Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996, summary and p. 1 respectively 
24 See for example, European Commission, Mobility, an Instrument for More and Better Jobs: The European 
Mobility Action Plan (2007-2010), COM (2007) 773 final, 06.12.2007, p. 2 
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detailed account of how this de-bordering is articulated in this policy area for different 
categories of people and analyse what types of borders it configures. 
 
4.3.2. Free movement of TCNs  
Terms such as “European labour market” or “area of freedom, security and justice” 
promote the idea of the existence of a common space inside the EU in each particular field 
and that previously existing borders are less salient. Furthermore, usually when the 
Commission employs these terms, there are no qualifications added. Thus, they suggest that 
not only is the area in question de-bordered, but also, importantly, that this is the case for 
all the people on this area – EU citizens and TCNs alike.25 However, from time to time 
there are articulations that remind the reader that in fact this is not yet the case. For 
example, the Commission Action Plan for Free Movement of Workers reads: “Third 
country nationals do not currently enjoy the right to free movement under Community law, 
and this proposal does not imply the granting of such a right”26; “The right to free 
movement of workers … gives every European citizen the right to enter the territory of any 
Member State in order to work or to look for work. The purpose is to open European labour 
markets to all EU workers …”27  
Nevertheless, the Commission discourse shows obvious moves towards overcoming 
some of the still persisting barriers. A number of proposals contain provisions that aim at 
facilitating the free movement of some TCNs. This is well illustrated by the following 
examples. According to a Commission Action Plan, accepted with a resolution of the 
European Parliament in July 1998
28: “It is no longer justifiable that a worker who is 
covered by national security arrangements should be completely excluded from the 
protection offered by the Community co-ordination system simply because he or she is not 
                                               
25 I. e. according to Guild, there has been much academic debate about the possibility of including TCNs into 
the concept of workers under the Community law. See Elspeth Guild, „The Legal Framework: Who is Entitled 
to Move?‟ in Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within Europe 
(Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 14-48, p. 22 
26 European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement of Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 
12.11.1997, p. 12 
27 Ibid., p. 5 
28 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:1998:292:0102:0201:EN:PDF, pp. 44-48, 
accessed on 25.04.2009 
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an EU national.”29 This principle has been put into practice through signing agreements 
with third countries that coordinate the social security systems between the EU and the 
respective third country. This allows nationals of these third countries to aggregate the 
insurance periods they have acquired by working in different EU member states.
30
 Thus, 
these provisions follow the logic applied a few decades earlier when the free movement of 
Community workers had to be implemented. However, now the aim is to extent the current 
provisions on coordination of social security benefits to cover not only EU nationals but 
also TCNs that move between different member states.
31
 This facilitates movement 
between EU member states for TCNs through removing previously existing legal and 
administrative barriers that are impeding it. In their place they establish new structures that 
make it much easier for TCN workers to preserve their social security benefits acquired 
through work in various EU member states.  
Another way in which Commission discourse on free movement of TCNs promotes 
decreased importance of borders in the EU is via the provisions regulating the access to the 
member states and their labour markets for certain categories of TCNs. The two most 
prominent examples to date are the status of long-term TCN residents
32
 in a EU member 
state and highly qualified TCN employees.
33
 On the issue of the status of long-term 
residents, the position of the Commission is that: “there should be a common status for 
long-term residents, so that all third-country nationals residing legally can acquire it and 
enjoy it on much the same terms in all the Member States … For the sake of certainty as to 
                                               
29 European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement of Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 
12.11.1997, p. 12 
30 See for example European Commission, Proposal for Council Decision on the Position to be Taken by the 
Community within the Association Council Created by the Euro-Mediterranean Agreement Establishing an 
Association between the European Communities and their Member States, of One Part, and the Republic of 
Tunisia, of the Other Part, with Regard to the Adoption of Provisions on the Co-ordination of the Social 
Security Systems, COM (2007) 788 final, 11.12.2007 
31 For a general overview of the current system of social security coordination see 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=26&langId=en, accessed on 28.08.2009 
32 Prior to the official Commission proposal on this issue, it commissioned a report on the legal status of 
TCNs in the EU member states. On the basis of the report its authors published an article. See Kees 
Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild, „Converging Criteria: Creating an Area of Security of Residence for Europe‟s 
Third Country Nationals‟, European Journal of Migration Law, 3: 1 (2001), pp. 37-59 
33 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment, COM (2007) 637 final, 
23.10.2007 
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the law governing third-country nationals, it is essential that acquisition of the status should 
not be left to Member State‟s discretion where the conditions are actually met.”34 To that 
end, the Commission has proposed to harmonise the conditions for conferring and 
withdrawing long-term resident status granted by a member state as well as the rights on 
which long-term residents enjoy equal treatment with EU nationals. Furthermore, according 
to this proposal, TCN long-term residents will enjoy the right to reside in a member state 
different from the one that conferred them the status.
35
 The Council formally adopted this 
proposal in November 2003.
36
  
In a similar way, the proposal for the conditions of entry of TCNs for the purposes 
of highly skilled employment
37
, which was adopted by the Council in May 2009
38
, argues 
that the attractiveness of the EU for this category of people can be enhanced only through 
Community action and can be implemented only if there is a common system for admitting 
such workers. The aim is to ensure common rules for admitting this type of workers and 
that they enjoy the same rights throughout the Union. Furthermore, in drastic distinction to 
the existing system in other fields of employment, this proposal envisages the possibility of 
the TCN to move from one member state to another.
39
 Thus, both these proposals provide 
for facilitating the free movement of highly-skilled or long-term resident TCNs within the 
EU through the removal of previously existing legal and administrative barriers. In turn this 
contributes to the establishing of an area of free movement of people. Furthermore, the 
tools employed in Commission discourse are the establishment of harmonised rules at EU 
level for regulating the free movement of the categories of TCNs concerned.  
This harmonisation of rules and procedures in EU member states is also expressed 
in other Commission proposals. One example is the common conditions and common 
                                               
34 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Status of Third-Country Nationals 
who are Long-Term Residents, COM (2001) 127 final, 13.03.2001, p. 7 
35 Ibid., p. 29 and p. 34 
36 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=164059, accessed on 25.04.2009  
37 For a good legal analysis of the provisions of this Commission proposal see Elspeth Guild, „EU Policy on 
Labour Migration – a first Look at the Commission‟s Blue Card Initiative‟, CEPS Policy Brief, num. 145, 
November 2007  
38 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196320, accessed on 04.09.2009 
39 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment, COM (2007) 637 final, 
23.10.2007, p. 7 
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procedural standards on the entry and residence of TCNs for the purposes of paid 
employment or self-employed economic activities.
40
 This proposal, however, was officially 
withdrawn in 2006 because: “Whilst the other European Institutions gave positive opinions, 
discussion in the Council was limited to a first reading of the text …”41 Other examples of 
efforts to achieve harmonisation of rules and procedures within the EU are the laying down 
of a uniform format for residence permits for TCNs
42
 (adopted by the Council in April 
2008)
43
 and the application procedure for a single work and residence permit for TCNs in 
the territory of a member state. It is important to note that the latter proposal, which is still 
under discussion in the decision-making system of the EU,
44
 allows the holders of the 
permit if they have valid travel documents to enter and move freely on the territory of 
Schengen-participating member states for up to three months.
45
 This is in tune with other 
Commission documents that regulate the short-term movement of TCNs in the EU and 
again demonstrates the drive towards simplifying and guaranteeing easier movement inside 
the Union for TCNs. Thus, overall, a tendency towards decreasing the salience of internal 
borders in the area of free movement of TCNs can be traced in Commission discourse. This 
trend is even more pronounced in the articulations on free movement of EU citizens. 
                                               
40 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of Third 
Country Nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities, COM (2001) 
386 final, 11.07.2001 
41 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment, COM (2007) 637 final, 
23.10.2007, p. 3 
42 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Regulation Amending Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 Laying 
Down a Uniform Format for Residence Permits for Third-Country Nationals, COM (2003) 558-2 final, 
24.09.2003 
43 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=185533, accessed on 25.04.2009 
44 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196321, accessed on 25.04.2009 
45 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on a Single Application Procedure for a Single 
Permit for Third-Country Nationals to Reside and Work in the Territory of a Member State and on a Common 
Set of Rights for Third Country Nationals Legally Residing in a Member State, COM (2007) 638 final, 
23.10.2007   
 139 
 
4.3.3. Free movement of EU citizens 
According to the Commission: “many practical, administrative and legal barriers 
still prevent citizens from exercising their freedom of movement.”46 The Commission, 
however, is committed to make the area of free movement of people a reality. To that end it 
has promoted measures contributing to the diminished importance of internal borders on all 
of the major issues related to free movement of people listed above (social security or 
recognition of diplomas and professional qualifications) in its efforts to tackle the existing 
obstacles to free movement of people. As explained above, the right to free movement in 
the Union of EU citizens represents an expansion of the previously existing right to free 
movement of workers. As such, Commission discourse in the period after the adoption of 
the SEA builds upon the de-bordering measures adopted in the 1960s and 1970s.
47
  
A number of Commission documents are concerned with issues such as pensions, 
healthcare rights, and social security contributions for EU nationals exercising their right to 
free movement.
48
 Also, some of the proposals are concerned with further limiting the 
possibility of member states to employ only its nationals for certain public sector positions 
                                               
46 European Commission, Free Movement of Workers – Achieving the Full Benefits and Potential, COM 
(2002)  694 final, 11.12.2002, p. 3. Some of the persisting obstacles to free movement of people are examined 
and possible measures for their overcoming are suggested in a number of Commission documents. See for 
example, European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement of Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 
12.11.1997; European Commission, Follow- up to the Recommendations of the High Panel on the Free 
Movement of Persons, COM (1998) 403 final, 01.07.1998; European Commission, Education – Training – 
Research. The Obstacles to Transnational Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996; European Commission, 
Supplementary Pensions in the Single Market – a Green Paper, COM (97) 283 final, 10.06.1997 
47 Studies that provide detailed examination of earlier periods of integration in relation to free movement of 
people are Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare – European Integration and the New Spatial Politics 
of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe – 
Centre Formation, System Building and Political Structuring between the nation-state and the European 
Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). For an overview of the labour migration law see Elspeth 
Guild, „Who is Entitled to Move and who is in Charge? Understanding the Legal Framework of European 
Labour Migration‟ in Didier Bigo, Elspeth Guild (eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement into and within 
the Europe (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 100-139  
48 See for example, European Commission, Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the 
Council on Improving the Portability of Supplementary Pension Rights, COM (2005) 507 final, 20.10.2005; 
European Commission, The Community Provisions on Social Security – Your Rights when Moving within the 
European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005); 
European Commission, The Elimination of Tax Obstacles to the Cross-border Provision of Occupational 
Pensions, COM (2001) 214 final, 19.04.2001; European Commission, Supplementary Pensions in the Single 
Market – a Green Paper, COM (97) 283 final, 10.06.1997; European Commission, Proposal for a Council 
Regulation on Coordination of Social Security Systems, COM (98) 779 final, 21.12.1998  
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such as the armed forces, the judiciary, the tax authorities and the diplomatic corps.
49
 On 
this matter, the Commission: “has actively promoted increased access to the public sector, 
and continues to do so.”50 Its position has been that: “ not all posts in these fields imply the 
exercise of public authority and responsibility of the safeguarding the general interest.”51 
Thus, posts concerned with administrative tasks, technical consultation and maintenance 
cannot be restricted to nationals of the host member state.  
Since the transmission of this proposal to the European Parliament in December 
2002, however, it has not been processed through the decision-making system of the EU.
52
 
This can be read as drawback of this Commission effort to promote its interpretation of 
what freedom of movement of EU nationals entails. However, the Commission has used 
other tools at its disposal to that end. In performance of the duties vested in it by the 
Founding Treaties it has for example undertaken infringement procedures against member 
states that do not comply with the legal requirements on this issue. In 1988 the Commission 
launched an action plan aimed at increasing the access to employment in some public 
sectors, such as teaching and public health care and has undertaken infringement 
procedures in the ECJ against Luxembourg, Belgium and Greece.
53
 The ECJ ruled in 
favour of the Commission in all these cases.
54
   
Another way in which the Commission discourse has promoted the decreased 
salience of internal EU borders from the period prior to the SEA is the constant efforts 
towards establishing a system in the EU that will facilitate the recognition of professional 
                                               
49 For more details see European Commission, Free Movement of Workers – Achieving the Full Benefits and 
Potential, COM (2002) 694 final, 11.12. 2002, pp. 17-24 
50 Ibid., p. 18 
51 Ibid., p. 19 (emphasis in the original) 
52 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=178951, accessed on 25.04.2009 
53 European Commission, Free Movement of Workers – Achieving the Full Benefits and Potential, COM 
(2002) 694 final, 11.12. 2002, pp. 18-19 
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 See European Court of Justice, Judgment of the Court, Case C-473/93, Commission v Luxembourg ECR 
[1996] I-3207, 02.07.1996; European Court of Justice, Judgement of the Court, Case C-173/94, Commission 
v Belgium ECR [1996] I-3265, 02.07.1996; European Court of Justice, Judgement of the Court, Case C-
290/94, Commission v Greece ECR [1996] I-3285; 02.07.1996  
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and vocational qualifications. On this question in the period after 1990s, in tune with the 
change in the discourse on social policy, one of the accents has been on life-long learning.
55
  
All of these measures are predominantly concerned with overcoming existing 
functional obstacles for free movement between the member states by alleviating legal and 
administrative barriers. This trend is further reinforced by the expansion of categories of 
EU nationals that are entitled to move within the Union. The inclusion of students, 
pensioners, and researchers who are EU citizens into the category of people that can 
exercise free movement has necessitated the Commission to reduce existing legal and 
administrative barriers to their movement in the Union as well. For example, the European 
Parliament and Council adopted a Commission proposal in April 2004.
56
 It promotes the 
right of EU citizens to reside in another member state by reducing the administrative 
burden on EU citizens moving within its territory through arguing that the requirement for 
issuance of residence cards by the host member state should be restricted to cases where 
this is genuinely justified. Instead, the proposal only requires registration with the 
competent authorities of the member state for stays over six months.
57
 Furthermore, the 
Commission has monitored the implementation of the Directives on the right of residence 
by member states and has undertaken measures to assure their compliance with the 
Directives‟ provisions where necessary.58 The Green Paper on Education, Training and 
Research has aimed to launch a debate on the possible measures to overcome the range of 
legal and administrative obstacles, which still impede the free movement of people 
undergoing training, those engaged in transnational research and those working in 
training.
59
      
                                               
55 See for example European Commission, Proposal for a Recommendation of the European Parliament and 
of the Council on the Establishment of the European Qualifications Framework for Lifelong Learning, COM 
(2006) 479 final, 05.09.2006 
56 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=165821, accessed on 10.01.2009  
57 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of Citizens 
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58 See European Commission, Report on the Implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 (Right of 
Residence), COM (99) 127 final, 17.03.1999 
59 European Commission, Education – Training – Research. The Obstacles to Transnational Mobility, COM 
(96) 462 final, 2.10.1996  
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However, despite the extensive facilitation these can have for free movement, a 
number of Commission documents acknowledge that mobility within the Union is still 
relatively low. According to the 2005 Labour Force Survey, less than 2 per cent of EU 
citizens live and work in another member state – a proportion that has not changed 
significantly over the last thirty years.
60
 This low mobility is very likely a sign that as far as 
movement of people is concerned, abolishing administrative, legal or physical barriers may 
not be enough for achieving the aims of a frontier-free area.
61
 Important dividers, such as 
identity borders are likely to continue to exist for much longer after the removal of other 
borders. In that respect a skeptical reading of “mobility” can pose the argument that even if 
achieved, it can in fact lead to greater appreciation of the existence of differences and 
therefore, borders. For example, if people regard a movement as crossing a border it can 
have the effect of solidifying the perception of persisting divisions.
62
 
However, some of the measures articulated by the Commission in the last 10-15 
years show that it is aware of this danger. In response, some of its documents have 
advanced the proposal of complementary measures for promoting the free movement of 
people. These are aimed at tackling practical obstacles to mobility, such as the lack of 
information and language and cultural skills for free movement. These efforts have resulted 
in the establishment of a number of EU-wide programs and the launch of several databases 
in a variety of fields related to the free movement of people. For example, the European 
Commission has sought to promote the development of language and cultural skills (such 
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as knowledge of other EU member states‟ societies) by supporting student exchanges 
between Universities in the EU. The most prominent illustration of these efforts are the 
ERASMUS, LINGUA and SOCRATES programs, the latter two of which have as one of 
their activities language teaching.
63
 Furthermore, the Commission has sought to promote 
language learning through putting a target of citizens in the EU learning at least two EU 
languages in order to be able to benefit from the occupational and personal opportunities 
offered by the single market.
64
 
As far as the lack of information is concerned, one of the most important 
undertakings of the Commission has been the establishment of European Employment 
Services (EURES). The Commission launched it in September 2003. Its objective is to 
provide Europe-wide access to available jobs, thus contributing to improving information 
and transparency of job opportunities throughout the EU. EURES links together Public 
Employment Services of the member states with partners such as employers and trade 
unions. It also provides workers and employers with practical information on job mobility. 
From 2006 it allowed all EU citizens to have direct access to all job vacancies published by 
the Employment Services of the member states. According to the Commission EURES has 
become one of the most visited Commission websites.
65
  
Another development that facilitates free movement of people inside the Union is 
the adoption of EU-wide cards on several issues, such as the European Health Insurance 
Card and European level professional cards that allow for the vocational qualifications 
recognitions.
66
 The articulations of Commission officials imply that it supports such 
measures. For example, on the issue of the European Heath Insurance Card Commissioner 
Špidla argued that: “The high acceptance of the European Health Insurance Card clearly 
shows that this EU-project gives added value to its citizens.”67 Furthermore, he praised the 
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idea of the introduction of a European Engineer‟s Card: “Engineers do not just pave the 
way for technical progress; they can also be pioneers through good practices for promoting 
mobility.”68  
All these measures clearly indicate the efforts made by the Commission in 
overcoming a variety of borders still existing for the free movement of EU citizens, and 
hence, show a trend towards the construction of a common European space. Time-wise the 
overwhelming majority of measures striving to overcome practical obstacles to mobility 
have started to emerge in Commission discourse later than the administrative and legal 
measures. While the former have been present since the first decades of European 
integration, the latter became much more pronounced during the period under consideration 
in this study – after the mid-1980. The advancement of measures that aim at overcoming 
practical obstacles to mobility are evidence for the comprehensive nature of the 
Commission understanding of the types of factors that hamper free movement of people. 
Furthermore, this is an indication of the Commission‟s desire to achieve genuine freedom 
of movement, not only one contained in the provisions of legal and administrative 
requirements. Given the diversity of languages, cultures or practices within the Union, 
elimination of legal and administrative barriers to free movement is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition. If mobility is to be achieved, practical measures are unavoidably 
required once the administrative and legal framework has been transformed. Thus, 
Commission discourse can be regarded as contributing towards creating this area without 
internal borders for movement of people. 
The focus on these practical obstacles to movement indicates that Commission 
discourse on this matter is not only concentrated on eliminating functional barriers. It is 
also becoming more concerned with establishing a common identity in the EU. This is 
evident from the following Commission articulations: “Transnational mobility … 
contributes to the development of „European citizenship‟ complementing existing 
citizenship, of the country of origin.”69 It is anticipated that with the increased freedom of 
movement: “should come a growing European consciousness instilled through greater 
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awareness of others as a result of exposure to new cultures and societies. Mobility within 
the Community ought to contribute to the development of solidarity between all Europeans 
at all levels …”70 This is considered to be a fundamental condition for the emergence of a 
true “citizens‟ Europe” without which it is impossible to conceive of a European social 
area.
71
 Thus, in the field of free movement, Commission discourse constructs a common 
area through the elimination of functional borders by the adoption of a number of technical, 
legal and administrative measures. These, however, in recent years have been more and 
more accompanied by subtler measures that can eventually contribute substantially to the 
emergence of a common identity in the EU.    
The last important aspect of Commission discourse that contains significant 
evidence for its contribution towards a de-bordering in the EU for the free movement of 
people is the Commission‟s position on the free movement of workers from the countries 
that joined the Union in 2004 and 2007. The provisions of the Accession Treaties are that 
(unless an “old” member state decides to wave it) there will be a seven-year transition 
period after accession before workers of the “new” member states are allowed to seek 
employment in countries that have been members of the Union before them. During the 
2004 Enlargement three “old” member states (the UK, Ireland and Sweden) did not impose 
restrictions to free movement of workers from the former Communist acceding countries 
and in May 2006 several other member states lifted the restrictions.
72
 The Commission has 
been consistently arguing in favour of free movement within the entire Union and 
supporting the lifting of the restrictions for East European workers. There are three main 
ways in which this position is articulated.  
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Firstly, the Commission has reiterated its commitment to free movement of labour 
throughout the EU. According to the Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social 
Affairs and Equal Opportunities, Vladimir Špidla: “Free movement of workers is one of the 
four freedoms of the EU and should be enjoyed by all. I urge all Member States to seriously 
examine whether transitional periods cannot be dropped.”73 Secondly, the Commission has 
pointed out on different occasions that the free movement of East European workers has 
had an overall positive impact on the member states that have lifted the restrictions for the 
movement of workers from these countries. For example Commission President Barroso 
maintained that: “A recent analysis from the Commission clearly shows that workers‟ 
mobility from the EU Member States in Central and Eastern Europe to the EU15 has had 
mostly positive effects.” 74 More specifically: “Workers from EU10 helped to relieve 
labour market shortages and contributed to better economic performance in Europe. 
Countries that have not applied restrictions after May 2004 … have experienced high 
economic growth, a drop of unemployment and a rise of employment.” Furthermore: 
“There was no evidence of a surge in either numbers of workers or welfare expenditure 
following enlargement in comparison to the previous two years.”75 Also there is a line in 
the discourse that points out that there have not been spectacular flows of migrants to the 
member states that opened up their labour markets and no serious disturbances to labour 
markets.
76
 Thirdly, the Commission has expressed its satisfaction that more “old” member 
states are dropping the restrictions before the end of the seven-year transition period. For 
example, Commission President Barroso welcomed: “the recent announcement that 
Finland, Portugal and Spain will join Ireland, United Kingdom and Sweden in lifting … 
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restrictions on the free movement of workers. I look forward to more countries joining the 
club!”77 Commissioner Špidla has also made similar statements.78   
Thus, overall there is a strong trend in Commission discourse that is promoting 
decreased significance of internal borders in the EU. This contributes to the establishment 
of an area where an increasing number of Union nationals and TCNs can enjoy the rights of 
free movement between the member states of the Union. The analysis of Commission 
articulations shows that they promote mainly the abolition of functional borders through the 
implementation of legal and administrative measures relevant for EU citizens and/ or 
TCNs. Despite its lesser visibility, there is also a trend in Commission discourse towards 
the abolition of identity divisions through the promotion of a common identity on the 
territory of the Union. These trends are further reinforced by the support, evident in a 
number of articulations, for a quicker lifting of the restrictions on free movement of labour 
from the “new” EU member states. However, a critical examination of Commission 
documents reveals that there are also configurations of borders, which are less obvious and 
which lead to the construction and reconstruction of EU borders. I examine them in the next 
two sections, starting with the construction of the external border of the EU. 
 
 
4.4. The Trend in Commission Discourse towards the Construction of an 
External EU Border 
As I discussed in Chapter Two, a shortcoming of Neo-functionalism is that it does 
not provide an in-depth account of the Commission configuration of external EU borders. 
In order to address this weakness, in this section I analyse how exactly Commission 
documents articulate them. In distinction to its discourse on border controls, where 
Commission documents explicitly refer to the external EU border, on the free movement of 
people there are no such references. Hence, this discourse is more similar to the 
articulations on social policy and the ENP. The external border in the field of the free 
movement of people is constructed in Commission discourse both through the erection of 
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new functional barriers and through the promotion of a new, common European identity. 
The emerging new functional border is more directly related to the regime for the free 
movement of TCNs, while the construction of identity borders concerns mainly EU 
citizens. Before I examine these two types of borders, however, I outline the main themes 
in Commission discourse on the free movement of people that lead to the emergence of 
EU‟s external border.  
 
4.4.1. Main themes of Commission discourse on the Free Movement of People that 
lead to the construction of the EU’s external borders 
 In the area of the free movement of people, the construction of external EU borders 
is a result of articulations in one specific field, Immigration. However, as an issue area 
immigration is also related to border controls. Therefore, for the sake of analytical clarity I 
specify the immigration issues that are most closely related to free movement of people 
(and therefore are examined in this chapter rather than the border controls one). I do this by 
presenting and analysing an important shift in the discourse of the Commission in the last 
decade. 
Since the early 2000s, Commission documents start to increasingly make a 
distinction between illegal immigration and legal migration. As we saw in the previous 
chapter, illegal immigration is still articulated as an unwanted phenomenon that needs to be 
fought against. In distinction to this, legal migration is enunciated as forming the focal 
point of the “proactive” immigration policy, which the Commission began to advocate 
during the same period. The aim is to develop the tools that will allow controlling 
immigration according to the needs of the European labour market.
79
 To that end, a new 
theme in the Commission documents is that they start to emphasise the increased possibility 
for legal migration into the EU.
 80
 This trend towards articulating a distinction between 
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illegal and legal immigration is well illustrated by the following assertions by senior 
Commission officials. According to Commissioner Frattini the EU: “must … aim at 
efficient and effective management of legal migration flows and, at the same t ime, fight 
illegal immigration in all its dimensions.”81 In the same vein President Prodi declared: “We 
must send a clear message to our citizens. We will be tough on illegal immigration and the 
trafficking of human beings but at the same time we must acknowledge that legal migration 
is good for Europe. It is a source of vitality and energy which an aging Europe needs”82 and 
Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner argues: “But of course we need legal migration … Getting 
the balance right between clamping down on illegal immigration and welcoming those 
immigrants that we need for our economic and social well-being is essential.”83 
Importantly, these articulations also clearly indicate that the Commission is at pains to 
emphasise that it understands the need to get the balance right and that the necessary 
measures to secure this are undertaken. This is because as a part of the highly controversial 
issue of immigration, “The European Commission understands how politically sensitive it 
is to suggest that immigration is the answer to labour shortages …”84 Nevertheless, this 
new distinction between illegal and legal migration is important because it constructs legal 
immigrants as TCNs who will be entitled (under certain conditions) to work on the territory 
of the EU. Thus, legal migration is inextricably linked to issues of free movement of 
people, which is why I examine it in this particular chapter.
 
The reason for this new line in Commission discourse on migration is the argument 
that it will be indispensable to overcome a threat that has been continuously articulated.
85
 
This is the threat of an aging population in the Union and its economic and social 
consequences. This line comes through in a number of Commission documents. Its starting 
                                                                                                                                               
Future of EU Migration and Integration Policy, SPEECH/07/98, 23.02.2007; European Commission, 
Towards a Common Immigration Policy, COM (2007) 780 final, 5.12.2007   
81 Franco Frattini, The Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, SPEECH/05/364, 
20.06.2005, p. 3 
82 Romano Prodi, Speaking Points Concerning the Seville European Council, SPEECH/02/290, 18.06.2002, p. 
2 
83 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Migration, External Relations and the European Neighbourhood Policy, 
SPEECH/06/30, 24.01.2006, p. 2   
84 Claude Moraes, „The Politics of European Union Migration Policy‟, Political Quarterly, 74: 1 (2003), pp. 
116 – 131, p. 126  
85As the analysis in the next chapter that deals with social policy shows, the threat of aging population in the 
EU is a theme that emerges in other Commission articulations as well. 
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point is the statistics on demographics in the EU, which the Commission discourse 
reproduces. Projections indicate that in the period 2010-2030 there will be a decline in 
employment in the order of 20 million workers in the EU-25.
86
 This enables the 
Commission to summarise: “Our populations are getting smaller and growing older.”87 
Already in many European countries the net increase in population is entirely due to 
immigration. Current projections indicate that by 2050 the population of Austria would 
shrink by a quarter if there were no immigration.
88
 Furthermore, the age structure of the 
population will change with the share of people aged 60 and over increasing from 22 
percent in 2001 to 27 percent in 2020 on average for the EU.
89
  
These demographic trends are expected to have significant repercussions on the 
economic performance of the Union because they can trigger shortages of manpower, thus 
impacting on the productivity of the block. At the same time the aging of the population 
will lead to higher spending for social security, which can have dire consequences. 
According to one of its Communications on Supplementary Pensions: “Resolving the 
retirement provision problem related to an aging population is one of the major challenges 
confronting all Member States of the European Union.”90 This is because: “There are today 
four workers to every pensioner. In 2040 the ratio will be two to one. Without reform, the 
level of expenditure of state pension schemes could in some Member States reach 15-20% 
of GDP (1997: approximately 10%). The scale of the possible fiscal implications must be 
underscored: in some Member States, unfunded pension liabilities could rise to 20% of 
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GDP.”91 In these conditions the Commission has on several occasions identified the 
demographic situation as one of the challenges the EU is currently facing.
92
 
As I pointed out in Chapter Two, the main way through which the external EU 
border is constructed is through articulating some kind of danger. Hence, in the case of free 
movement of people, the external border of the Union is created as a result of the need to 
ensure the persistence of favourable economic and demographic conditions within the EU, 
which are currently under threat. As the above articulations in the Commission discourse 
indicate, one of the ways for achieving this is through legal migration. This need 
contributes to the emergence of the external borders of the EU through providing rationales 
for action at the level of the Union. In doing this, one of the effects is to encourage a 
perception of the EU as an entity. It is precisely this understanding that brings the external 
borders into being.  
This perception of the EU as an entity is articulated through putting the emphasis on 
the commonality of the situation of the member states. Also it downplays any differences 
that may exist between them. For example, although the demographic data referred to 
above shows that some member states will be worse affected than others, it nevertheless 
still makes clear that these statistics will affect the whole of the EU in much the same way. 
As the former Commission Vice-President and Commissioner responsible for Justice, 
Freedom and Security Franco Frattini declared the current demographic trends in the EU: 
“… will undoubtedly affect some Member States more than others. Nevertheless, it is a 
common trend.”93 As the studies of O‟Hagan94 and Campbell95 that I referred to in Chapter 
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Two explain, such articulations of threat contribute to the internal cohesion of a 
community, while at the same time they differentiate it from the rest of the world. Hence, 
this provides a justification for action at the Union level. 
After the threat has been articulated in this way, it is much easier to successfully 
argue for common European action: “Europe is tackling these challenges … working 
together to pre-empt the challenges posed by an aging population in Europe …”96 This 
trend can be illustrated further with a number of other articulations. According to 
Commission officials: “We need a European approach, which can help the EU address 
unwanted phenomena …, while ensuring that Europe can welcome the migrants its 
economy needs and its society is capable and willing to welcome.”97 Or as Commission 
President Barroso declared: “Immigration is one facet of globalization which demands a 
European rather than a national response to be effective.”98 According to Commission 
officials, a common approach is necessary because: “Working together makes the EU 
stronger not just when dealing with problems such as illegal migration and border 
management, but also in seizing the opportunities which migrants embody. Common action 
at EU level also gives Member States a stronger voice on the international stage …”99 This 
is significant because it is exactly the efforts towards a European approach on the matter 
that eventually bring the tangible external borders of the EU into existence. 
Furthermore, it allows references to “Europe” in Commission discourse. For 
example, Commissioner Frattini declared: “I am convinced that Europe will need more 
immigration, since labour and skills shortages are already noticeable in a number of sectors 
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and they will tend to increase”100 and Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner argued immigration: 
“will help us make the transition to a new economic situation, and maintain a certain level 
of growth. To maintain their dynamism countries need human capacity. For Europe, with 
its falling, aging population that will inevitably mean attracting brains and labour from 
outside.”101 Such a position is in tune with undertakings in the developed world, where: 
“immigration has become a structural necessity.”102 However, it is important because it 
implies Europe‟s existence as something different and identifiable from the rest of the 
world, thus bringing into existence its external borders. 
Thus, analysis of Commission discourse shows that the main ways through which 
the external border of the EU in the field of free movement of people is constructed are the 
articulations on the current demographic trends in the Union and the threat of aging of its 
population. Building on these, Commission discourse has argued in favour of common 
undertakings at EU level to tackle the current problems. An analysis of Commission 
discourse shows the following major tools that bring the external borders of the EU into 
being. Firstly, it has promoted the need for common action at EU level in the field of legal 
migration. Secondly, and related to that, Commission articulations on legal migration 
construct a particular vision of the Union and its “Others”. Thirdly, implementing the 
agreed upon common action at EU level has allowed the Commission to advance concrete 
measures on issues related to free movement of people in response to the threats posed by 
current demographic trends in the EU. All of these contribute to the construction of EU‟s 
external borders. However, the first two of these responses are more closely related to the 
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emergence of a common European identity within the Union. As such, it is associated more 
with the reconfiguration of identity borders. The common actions at EU level, on the other 
hand, lead to the creation of new functional borders at the external edges of the Union, 
which affect mainly the rights of TCNs to move within its territory. I examine both in the 
following sections.  
 
4.4.2. The construction of the external EU border through the promotion of a 
common identity 
As I argued above, the first main line contributing to the construction of the Union‟s 
external border articulated in Commission discourse is the need for common action at EU 
level on legal migration as a response to the challenge of aging populations in the EU. Its 
premise is the same as the rationales articulated in a number of other policy areas (such as 
social policy and border controls) - “Free movement of people … is meaningless without a 
unified labour market. A Europe without internal borders is impossible without common 
action at those borders.”103 As with the discourse in the fields examined in Chapters Five 
and Three, such articulations contribute to the emergence of a new border – the external 
edge of the EU. This is the case because they enunciate a meaning for the entity EU. 
Generally, as the articulations on the demographic trends presented above demonstrate this 
is articulated through downplaying any differences that may exist between the member 
states. Instead, Commission discourse emphasises the commonalities through references to 
the “European Union” and “Europe”, thus encouraging a perception of the EU as a unified 
whole. As with the ENP and social policy and in distinction to border controls, the above 
articulation does not refer explicitly to the external border of the EU.
104
 Instead, it is 
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constructed indirectly, as a by-product of the decreased significance of borders within the 
Union through the establishment of a regime for free movement of people. It is the internal 
de-bordering that prompts cooperation at EU-level. Commission officials argue that this is 
because: “… decisions to admit third country nationals are no longer the exclusive remit of 
each Member State. Such decisions affect other Member States and the EU labour market 
as a whole … This „political difference‟ has encouraged Member States to review their 
national policies and to discuss a common way to proceed.”105 This quotation is also 
interesting because it shows the Commission employing Neo-functionalist logic – the 
previous decisions on integration have “locked up” the member states‟ independence, so 
that now any meaningful action will necessitate joint efforts, which will lead to further 
integration.  
Detailed examination of Commission articulations on the free movement of people 
will reveal the meaning they ascribe to “Europe”/the “EU”. Furthermore, it will allow 
analysis of the types of borders that are reconfigured. One of the ways forward in 
addressing the current economic and demographic threats identified in Commission 
discourse is to make sure the EU is attractive to highly skilled migrants. As Franco Frattini 
declared: “We want Europe to become at least as attractive as favourite migration 
destinations such as Australia, Canada and the USA.”106 This is because: “To maintain and 
improve economic growth in the EU, it is essential for Europe to become a magnet for 
highly skilled immigrants and, at the same time, to attract high caliber students into 
European Universities … We must work hard to make the EU an attractive destination for 
such people.”107 Furthermore, according to Commissioner Frattini: “Europe‟s ability to 
attract highly skilled migrants is a measure of its international strength.”108 However, to 
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achieve this: “Europe has to compete against Australia, Canada, the USA and the rising 
powers in Asia.”109  
All these articulations promote a particular vision of the EU. As such they 
contribute to the emergence of its external borders through constructing an identity for the 
Union and its citizens. Therefore, Commission discourse on the free movement of people 
reconfigures borders through advancement of a common European identity. The above 
articulations link “the EU” with a number of (economic) powers across the globe as well as 
“international strength”. Thus, the suggestion they make is that the Union is one of the 
strong players in the international arena. Furthermore, these comparisons enunciate a 
number of “Others” for the EU. These are other internationally strong powers – the USA, 
Canada, Australia, and the “Asian tigers”. In distinction to the discourse on social policy, 
however, as we will see in the next chapter, the articulations of Others on legal migration 
fall short of maintaining superiority of the system in the EU in comparison to that of its 
Others. On the contrary, if anything, the suggestion these articulations make is that the EU 
has to catch up. Therefore, demographic threats and legal migration contribute to the 
construction of the EU‟s external identity border but do not do so by claiming that the 
Union is better in attracting outside labour force. 
This discourse on the “Others” for the EU is continued in the choice of countries the 
EU‟s statistics on legal migration are compared to: “85% of unskilled labour goes to the EU 
and only 5% to the USA, whereas 55% of skilled labour goes to the USA and only 5% to 
the EU. We have to reverse these figures …”110 Also: “The EU as a whole … seems not to 
be considered attractive by highly qualified professionals … for example, the EU is the 
main destination for unskilled to medium-skilled workers from the Maghreb (87% of such 
immigrants), while 54% of the highly qualified immigrants from these same countries 
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reside in the USA and Canada.”111 Importantly, these also articulate another significant 
“Other” for the EU: “unskilled labour”. This is the case because the above quotations 
clearly show that the EU‟s goal is to attract more skilled migrants, so that it changes in a 
positive for itself way the statistical data. Therefore, this also indicates a perception of the 
Self in the EU as an entity that is highly productive, at the forefront of international 
economic competition and engaged in branches of the economy that require highly 
qualified labour force. As the analysis in Chapter Five shows, this trend in the perceptions 
of the “Self” and the “Other” is very evident in the field of social policy as well. In 
distinction to the articulations there, however, in the area of the free movement of people, 
the Commission discourse clearly shows that the EU has to improve itself further because 
at present the data does not indicate the state desired by the EU. 
According to Commission President Barroso there are a number of reasons why this 
is the case. Firstly, it is a result of the existence of twenty-seven different and sometimes 
conflicting procedures for admitting migrants into the EU. Secondly, there is a lack of 
cross-border dimension in member states‟ policies on legal migration, which makes it 
difficult for qualified workers to move within the Union. Thirdly, there is a gap in the rights 
of legal immigrants in comparison to EU citizens.
112
 In recent years there have been 
important policy proposals of the Commission that aim at addressing these problems. The 
implementation of the envisaged measures should help the Union to successfully meet the 
challenges identified in Commission discourse, thus contributing to the emergence of the 
European identity promoted in the above articulations. Therefore, they are supporting the 
construction of EU‟s external borders through aiding its successful competition with its 
rival “Others”. Furthermore, these proposals also contribute to the creation of functional 
borders at the external edges of the Union because they can lead to the establishment of a 
novel regime for TCNs to work and reside in the territory of the EU. 
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4.4.3. The construction of functional external borders of the EU – the emerging 
regime for free movement of TCNs 
The functional external borders of the EU are progressively being shaped by the 
discourse of the European Commission. This is a result of a number of undertakings in 
which the Commission has been actively involved. Examples of these are the regulation of 
the rights of long-term residents in the member states or the efforts to allow free movement 
of highly skilled migrants. Below I examine in detail Commission articulations that 
contribute to the construction of functional borders at the external edges of the EU.  
There are several main tools that lead to that. Some Commission documents offer a 
good summary of the main ways through which this is achieved. According to former 
European Commissioner responsible for Justice and Home Affairs Antonio Vitorino the 
approach endorsed by the Commission: “comprises the establishment, on the one hand, of a 
normative framework laying down the conditions of entry and of stay of immigrants and, 
on the other hand, of an open coordination mechanism to encourage the progressive 
convergence of the policies of the Member States as regards the management of migratory 
flows.”113 As a result of the implementation of such measures, gradually the conditions and 
procedures for TCNs for entry, stay, family unification, employment and movement 
between the member states of the EU will be unified. This will mean that increasingly these 
issues will be regulated at the EU-level, which will decrease to a certain extent the 
importance and salience of member states‟ national borders at the expense of the border of 
the EU. Therefore, this will lead to the establishment of an ever more visible and important 
barrier at the external edges of the Union. Furthermore, to the extent that this border will 
regulate the possibility of actual entry into the labour markets and the welfare states of the 
members of the EU, this newly-emerging external dividing line constitutes a functional 
border between the Union and the rest of the world. 
The major areas in which these developments have taken place are the regimes for 
long-term residents in a EU member state and for the employment of migrants, where since 
the late 1990s there have been a number of important Commission proposals. The measures 
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envisaged can be divided into three main groups in terms of the tools employed for 
constructing the external EU border. The first type encompasses unification through 
common legal action. Examples are the proposal on sanctions against employers of illegally 
staying TCNs;
114
 the proposal envisaging common status in the member states for long-
term TCNs;
115
 and the proposals establishing common conditions of entry and residence for 
employed, self-employed
116
 and highly skilled immigrants.
117
 The first of these proposals at 
the time of writing is still being processed through the decision-making system of the 
EU.
118
 The Council, however, adopted the last one in May 2009
119
 as well as the second 
one, in November 2003. 
120
 The effects of some of the measures provided for in the latter 
were noticed soon. For example, according to Boswell, the approximation of legislation in 
the EU has put some member states under pressure to liberalise their national provisions on 
issues such as naturalisation or the treatment of long-term residents.
121
 However, the 
Commission has not always been able to secure the adoption of its proposals as the 
withdrawal of the proposal establishing common conditions of entry and residence for 
employed and self-employed immigrants indicates. The Commission renewed its efforts in 
this area in 2007 with the proposals on highly skilled migrants,
122
 which was successfully 
adopted. Thus, Commission activities on these matters can be read as an indication that it is 
persisting in trying to find issues on which an agreement on common action at the EU level 
can be secured.  
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The second tool articulated in the Commission discourse consists of measures that 
simplify and unify the issuance of documents, such as residence and work permits, by the 
member states. It is exemplified by amended rules on the uniform format for residence 
permits of TCNs
123
 and the proposal for a single application procedure for work and 
residence permits for TCNs on the territory of a member state.
124
 The Council adopted the 
former in April 2008
125
 and the latter at the time of writing is still being discussed in the 
Council of Ministers after the Commission has given its position on the amendments 
made.
126
 The third tool concerns the convergence of the policies of the member states on 
legal migration issues. An illustration of this approach is the Communication on the open 
method of co-ordination in this field
127
 and the common agenda for integration of TCNs in 
the EU.
128
 The European Parliament passed the first of these proposals with a Resolution in 
June 2003
129
 and the second one, in July 2006.
130
  
The Commission discourse portrays the effect of these measures as helping to 
facilitate “a gradual and smooth move from national to Community rules … [by] giving a 
common legal frame to Member States and … determin[ing] common definitions, criteria 
and procedures regarding the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals 
…”131 For example, the push towards more equal treatment of TCN and EU employees (an 
issue core to the better integration of TCNs) started in 1994 with the Commission White 
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Paper on Social Policy.
132
 This discourse contributes in important ways to the establishment 
of functional external borders of the Union. The measures it envisages not only (as 
discussed in the section on de-bordering) lead to increasing unification of the member 
states‟ migration regimes but also establish the EU as an entity on this matter, which has its 
own distinctive system in comparison to the rest of the world. 
Importantly, according to the Commission: “This common legal frame is a starting 
point.”133 This is crucial because it points to the possibility that what has happened so far is 
not the “end of the road”, so to speak, at least not from the perspective of the Commission. 
One of the reasons for this is that in this policy area so far there has been very little transfer 
of prerogatives to the EU-level in respect to TCNs. This is contrary to developments in 
other areas such as border controls. The chapter analysing Commission discourse shows 
that on border controls there have been important developments towards establishing EU-
level systems for exchange of information on visa, etc. On free movement of TCNs, the 
erection of functional external borders has been achieved following a different logic: until 
now the Commission discourse has very rarely articulated undertakings that will lead to the 
establishment of EU-wide databases or to the performance of certain tasks at Union level. 
In that respect, as President Barroso summarises: “the Commission‟s role is one of 
facilitator in the service of the Member States of the Union.”134 This leads to a situation 
where the conditions and procedures for entry and stay for TCNs are increasingly 
harmonised as the above discussion of Commission discourse has shown. It is in this 
respect that one can talk about the construction of functional external borders of the Union. 
However, this is not accompanied by an increased role of the Commission, provisions for 
free circulation of TCNs between the member states or establishing databases accessible to 
the authorities in the member states.  
However, some Commission articulations point to its ambitions to amend this 
situation. Since 2006 some Commission proposals have implied an increase in its role in 
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the field of economic migration and the possibility for some TCNs to attain the right to 
move freely within the EU only 2-3 years after their first entry. The former is illustrated by 
Commissioner Frattini‟s introduction of the so called “mobility partnerships” made at a 
conference in Tripoli in November 2006. If accepted, this will become a mechanism that 
will enable the Commission to directly negotiate with third countries the quotas for 
accepted TCNs into the EU on the basis of national quotas set by member states in view of 
their labour market needs.
135
 For its part, the proposal for the admission of highly-qualified 
TCNs envisages that after two years of residence in a member state the highly qualified 
worker, as holder of an EU Blue Card, will be allowed to move with his/ her family to 
another member state for the purpose of highly qualified employment.
136
 Thus, these two 
proposals show an attempt by the Commission to increase its role on free movement of 
TCNs. Importantly, if it is successful in promoting its vision, this will put the foundations 
for transforming the way functional external borders of the EU are constructed. Such 
articulations can potentially lead to establishment of EU-wide systems for TCN quotas and 
to promotion of the idea of free movement of TCNs within the EU for economic purposes. 
Therefore, both of these proposals further reinforce the current trend evident in 
Commission discourse on free movement of TCNs towards the establishment of an external 
EU border. 
This discussion has highlighted the trend in Commission discourse on free 
movement of people towards the construction of EU‟s external borders. It has shown that 
such a trend is evident in relation to the articulation of a European identity and the regime 
for free movement of TCNs. This trend is a result of the articulation of a threat in 
Commission documents posed by aging of EU‟s population. One of the solutions of this 
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challenge identified in Commission documents is an increase in the number of migrants 
admitted to the Union, which in turn implies that there will be greater freedom for 
movement of people. In relation to European identity, Commission articulations contribute 
to the construction of the external border of the Union by manifesting specific “Others” 
thus also enunciating a particular identity for the EU itself. Therefore, this constructs 
identity borders. As far as TCNs are concerned, the documents examined contribute 
primarily to the establishment of a new regime for legal entry and movement into the EU 
for work purposes. As such, they construct functional external barriers. Thus, in the sphere 
of free movement of people, just as in border controls, the construction of external EU 
borders comes about as a result of the differentiation of rights of EU citizens and TCNs.  
Furthermore, the articulations in the end of the above analysis clearly indicate the 
ambition of the Commission to increase its role on the matters of free movement of people. 
However, at present the Commission still faces important constraints in its ability to 
promote a reading of the undertakings in the field of free movement of people that will 
bring about a genuine area without internal borders in this area. This means that some 
internal borders between the member states continue to exist. In turn, this implies that a 
reconstruction of the internal borders in the Union has taken place. However, in distinction 
to the reconstruction of internal borders examined in the previous chapter, on some issues 
in the field of free movement of people the Commission has managed to attain a leading 
position and to secure acceptance for its vision. In the next section I present how these 
developments are articulated. 
 
 
4.5. The Reconstruction of Internal EU Borders through the Commission 
Discourse on Free Movement of People 
In Chapter Three I showed how the Commission has had a significant input in the 
reconfiguration of EC/EU borders. It employed neo-functionalist logic in linking border 
control issues with the completion of the internal market. This allowed it to advance a 
radical reading according to which the goals of the SEA could only be achieved if intra-
community borders were abolished altogether. In a similar vein, currently the Commission 
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has secured the acceptance of a potentially groundbreaking arrangement for free movement 
for work purposes of some TCNs. This provides evidence for the ability of the Commission 
to employ its powers in the first pillar, thus giving a different example of how the 
Commission contributes to the reconfiguration of borders in the EU. Despite that, as I 
pointed out in Chapter Two, the Commission faces constraints to the proposals for which it 
can secure acceptance in the Council. In distinction to border controls where the 
Commission‟s position contributed to de-bordering, in the case of free movement of people 
its discourse is conductive to the reconstruction of internal borders in the Union. At the 
same time, some of the internal borders are reconstructed following a pattern very similar 
to the one discussed in section 3.4. They are a result of the established way of how the EU 
functions. Below I examine both of these instances as they are articulated through the 
silences and contradictions in the Commission discourse. 
 
4.5.1. Contradictions in Commission discourse  
The fundamental contradiction in Commission discourse that leads to a 
reconstruction of internal borders in the EU is between the interpretation that can be given 
to its stated aims on the free movement of people and some other articulations on the 
matter. According to the White Paper on Completing the Internal Market, one of the main 
goals is to ensure: “that the market is flexible so that resources, both of people and 
materials, and of capital and investment, flow into the areas of greatest economic 
advantage.”137 Therefore, as the former Commissioner responsible for social policy Flynn 
declared: “The challenge for the Union is to break down the remaining barriers to complete 
free movement and to create real European mobility.”138 These, as well as the major 
Commission terms that configure borders, which I discussed earlier (European 
employment/ labour market or Community-wide labour market) imply that as a result of 
integration efforts a common employment area will emerge. Importantly, these 
formulations suggest that the envisaged free movement will encompass all people in the 
territory of the EC/EU. This means that differentiations, such as nationality or income 
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eventually should not matter and everyone should enjoy the right to seek employment or 
circulate for other reasons anywhere in the Union without facing lengthy and tricky legal 
and administrative obstacles. As we saw in the previous chapter, the Commission has 
regarded the creation of such a Community-wide market as one that functions as equivalent 
to a national market.
139
  
However, as I already pointed out in section 4.3., in other instances, Commission 
documents articulate free movement of people in a different way. For example, a few pages 
later in the same White Paper is declared that: “The Commission … considers that 
Community citizens should be free to engage in their professions throughout the 
Community, if they so wish, without the obligation to adhere to formalities which, in the 
final analysis, could serve to discourage such movement.”140 Thus, there is a clear 
ambiguity in Commission discourse on the issue of who should benefit from the free 
movement of people. The inclusive articulations in the founding documents and 
formulations imply that overall the anticipated end result is an EU in which all the different 
categories of people are allowed to move freely. Such a conclusion is supported by the 
trend in Commission documents discussed in section on 4.3. to promote expanding and 
more inclusive interpretations of the beneficiaries of the right to free movement of 
people.
141
 However, if that is the case, the above reference to Community citizens 
contradicts the achievement of free movement of people.  
This contradiction has led to a reconstruction of internal identity and functional 
borders in the EU, which is evident in the discourse of the Commission. The border 
transformation affects both EU citizens and TCNs but the Commission‟s contribution for 
                                               
139 See footnote 41 of Chapter Three on p. 94 in this thesis.  
140 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final, 14.06.1985, p. 27 (emphasis 
added). For other articulations in Commission documents that make it clear that free movement in the EU 
refers only to EU nationals see for example European Commission, Follow- up to the Recommendations of 
the High Panel on the Free Movement of Persons, COM (1998) 403 final, 01.07.1998, p. 1a; Padraig Flynn, 
Free Movement of People in Europe – Equality between Nationals and non-Nationals in Social Security, 
SPEECH/94/122, 10.11.1994, p. 3; European Commission, An Action Plan for the Free Movement of 
Workers, COM (97) 586 final, 12.11.1997, p. 3; European Commission, Green Paper – Education- Training 
– Research. The Obstacles to Transnational Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996, p. 10 
141 Another example of this trend in Commission discourse is its promotion of the idea for ensuring benefit 
entitlement for unemployed EU nationals undergoing training in another EU member state. For an illustration 
of this see European Commission, Green Paper – Education- Training – Research. The Obstacles to 
Transnational Mobility, COM (96) 462 final, 2.10.1996, p. 16 and p. 26 in particular   
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each of the two categories of people has been different. The recreation of internal EU 
borders for Union nationals is a result of the absence of social welfare provisions at EU 
level due to the sensitivities of the member states on this matter. Hence, in a similar way to 
the reconstruction of internal borders on border controls, on the issue of free movement of 
EU citizens any recreation of internal borders in Commission discourse is a result of 
established patterns of integration, which the Commission is not in a position to overcome. 
Therefore, the reconstruction of this particular internal border is reproduced and reemerges 
through intertextuality in Commission discourse, rather than being actively created by it. 
One example of such reproduction that creates a contradiction in the Commission 
discourse is the possibility to restrict the free movement in the Union for some EU 
nationals. According to the Commission: “At present, the Community provisions on social 
security do not yet apply to all persons moving or staying within the European Union or the 
European Economic Area.”142 The document specifies that those not covered by 
Community provisions are persons not covered or no longer covered by a national social 
security scheme and who are not or are no longer considered members of the family of 
economically active or non-active persons.
143
 This is an obstacle to the free movement of 
people because as the next example makes clear, residence in another member state for 
periods longer than six months depends on sufficient social security provisions. Therefore, 
people lacking it can potentially be excluded from exercising their right to free movement 
in the EU. This issue is of great importance given the capacity of welfare states to mediate 
matters of inclusion and exclusion.
144
 As some scholars argue, welfare provisions and 
social assistance without a doubt are some of the crucial “instruments for controlling 
improving or limiting the free movement of people.”145 
In this context, the major example of reconstruction of the internal borders in the 
EU for the free movement of Union nationals is the current requirements for residence in 
                                               
142 European Commission, The Community Provisions on Social Security – Your Rights when Moving within 
the European Union (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2005), p. 9 
143 Ibid. 
144 See for example Stefano Bartolini, Restructuring Europe – Centre Formation, System Building and 
Political Structuring between the Nation-State and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005) 
145 Ceyhan, Crowley, King cited in Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and the Securitization of Migration‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 38: 5 (2000), pp. 751-777, p. 759  
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another member state. As was shown above, with the adoption of the Treaty of the EU and 
the introduction of Union citizenship, there has been a significant increase in the categories 
of EU-nationals that are entitled to free movement, with pensioners or students acquiring 
this right together with economically active individuals. Furthermore, according to a 
proposal for a Council Directive, subsequently adopted in March 2003:
146
 “The 
Commission‟s intention is that the movement of citizens between Member States should be 
on much the same basis as when citizens change their residence or job within their own 
Member State.”147 Despite that, if the aim is to allow all citizens of the member states to 
move freely within the Union, there is still a category of people that the documents of the 
Commission make clear will not be able to benefit from this right. According to a 
Commission proposal for a Directive from 2001: “Persons exercising the right to free 
movement should not … become an unreasonable burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State during an initial period of residence; it is therefore planned to retain a system 
whereby the exercise of the right of residence for Union citizens for periods in excess of six 
months remains subject to the requirement that such citizens be engaged in a gainful 
activity or, in the case of those not engaged in gainful activity, that they have sufficient 
resources and comprehensive sickness insurance in the host Member State …”148 
Furthermore: “Prior to acquisition of the right of permanent residence, it is a matter for the 
host Member State to decide whether it will extend social assistance provision or sickness 
insurance coverage to persons not engaged in gainful economic activity, or maintenance 
grants to Union citizens coming to study on their territory.”149 
                                               
146 See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=164059, accessed on 23.11.2008 
147 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals who are Long-Term Residents, COM (2001) 127 final, 13.03.2001, p. 3 
148 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of 
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the 
Member States, COM (2001) 257 final, 29.06.2001, Preamble, point 9. Similar requirement of having 
sickness insurance and sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the social assistance systems of the 
host member state for EU nationals exercising their right to free movement is articulated in European 
Commission, Report on the Implementation of Directives 90/364, 90/365 and 93/96 (Right of Residence), 
COM (1999) 127 final, 17.03.1999, p. 5  
149 European Commission, Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the Right of 
Citizens of the Union and Their Family Members to Move and Reside Freely within the Territory of the 
Member States, COM (2001) 257 final, 29.06.2001, Preamble, point 19  
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Thus, these documents articulate people who do not have sufficient resources or 
comprehensive sickness insurance as a category of EU nationals that can face restrictions 
on their right of free movement in the Union for periods exceeding six months. Arguably, 
this is only one issue that remains to be resolved, so that a complete freedom of movement 
for EU citizens is attained. In that respect, significant progress towards de-bordering has 
been made in the course of European integration on this matter. Nevertheless, as the above 
analysis shows, currently there is still an important category of EU nationals that face 
restrictions on their free movement in the Union. Therefore, I regard the above articulations 
as a clear contradiction to the overall goal of creating an area of free movement that other 
Commission documents referred to above promote. This is the first way in which 
Commission articulations reproduce limitations in current EU legislation that contribute to 
the reconstruction of internal borders in the Union. Such a reading of the configuration of 
borders in this discourse is supported by the arguments of other studies that find that: “the 
poor are indirectly excluded from the privilege of their free movement rights and excluded 
from the privileges granted by the EU status.”150 This is because such people will rely on 
social assistance and currently in the EU there is no system under which they can receive it 
in another member state different from their own.
151
 
There is another way in which these enunciations recreate internal divisions in the 
EU. As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, they talk about “host member state”, thus 
bringing back the issue of the “building blocks” of the Community. This undermines the 
perception of the existence of a common area and instead underscores the internal divisions 
that still exist and which are marked by internal, national, borders. In distinction to border 
controls, where Commission articulations contribute to the reconstruction primarily of 
territorial borders, in the free movement of people, the enunciations on EU nationals 
concern mainly functional borders. 
                                               
150 Sergio Carrera, „What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?‟, European 
Law Journal, 11: 6 (2005),  pp. 699-721, p. 705 
151 See Elspeth Guild, „The Legal Framework‟ in David Cesarani, Mary Fulbrook (eds), Citizenship, 
Nationality and Migration in Europe (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 30-53, p. 35 and  Hans-Werner Sinn, 
„EU Enlargement, Migration and New Constitution‟, Economic Studies, 50: 4 (2004),  pp. 685-707, p. 700 
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Although there are still some Commission articulations on free movement of EU 
citizens that contribute to the construction of internal borders, these, as we have seen, apply 
to decreasing categories of people and situations. On the free movement of TCNs, however, 
the dominant principle in the EU so far has been the restriction of their freedom of 
circulation for work purposes. This has led to the establishment of distinctive categories of 
people in relation to their rights of free movement in the EU, which is in contradiction with 
the aims of creating a frontier-free area. Again, this is reproduced in Commission discourse. 
For example, the Green Paper on Economic Migration talks about “Preference for 
the domestic market”.152 Under the goals of the SEA this should imply the inclusion of all 
TCNs. Nevertheless, in the document the Commission employs the Council‟s more 
restrictive definition, according to which: “Member States will consider requests for 
admission to their territories for the purpose of employment only where vacancies in a 
Member State cannot be filled by national and Community manpower or by non-
Community manpower lawfully resident on a permanent basis in that Member State and 
already forming part of the Member State’s regular labour market.”153 As a result, different 
categories of people in relation to their ability to move within the EU for employment 
purposes are constructed. The references to “national” and “Community” manpower 
establish these as the two categories of people that can benefit of a right of free movement 
in the EU. These two types are in effect juxtaposed to two other kinds of people: TCNs in 
general and the long-term resident TCNs. The latter two, apparently do not enjoy a right to 
move freely in the EU for employment purposes because the Community preference 
principle only allows them to take up employment in their member state of residence. Such 
articulations contribute, to the emergence of new identities. Therefore, they lead to the 
reconstruction of internal identity borders in the EU, through the establishment of different 
types of people under the EU law. Furthermore, in accordance with the differentiation of 
internal borders outlined in section 2.2.1. and in distinction to the above national internal 
borders, this internal border emerges as a result of the promotion of the idea of an 
integrated Europe and therefore, exists beyond the national borders of the member states.  
                                               
152 European Commission, Green Paper on an EU Approach to Managing Economic Migration, COM (2004) 
811 final, 11.01.2005, p. 6 
153 Council Resolution of 20 June 1994 cited in Ibid (emphasis in the original) 
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At the same time, the definition of Community preference contributes to the 
construction of national internal functional borders between the EU member states through 
its provision that only non-Community long-term resident in the member state in question 
can attempt to fill a particular position on this member state‟s labour market. As already 
discussed, this brings back the importance of the Union‟s constitutive entities, the member 
states, through putting the accent on them. Therefore, references to “the member states” and 
the meaning given to the Community principle in Commission documents on free 
movement of people are contradicting the goals of the SEA. They are working against the 
successful achievement of the formulated targets required for the establishment of an area 
for free movement of people in the EU. 
In recent years, however, the Commission has adopted some documents that 
challenge this principle of restricting the free movement of TCNs. For example, the Green 
Paper on Economic Migration explores whether the Community Preference principle 
should be granted to TCNs already present in a member state.
154
 This can be interpreted as 
an attempt of the Commission to overcome Council objections to allowing TCNs to move 
freely for labour purposes. This attempt of the Commission is further illustrated by the 
proposals on the rights of long-term residents and on the conditions of entry and residence 
of TCNs for work purposes. According to the former: “The Commission considers that full 
integration also entails the right for long-term residents to reside in other Member States 
…”155 Therefore, the proposal provides that: “A long-term resident may exercise the right 
of residence in the territory of Member States other than the one which granted him the 
status, for a period exceeding three months …”.156 The latter, does not make a distinction 
between the type of economic activity because it deals with the conditions of entry and 
                                               
154 Ibid. 
155 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive Concerning the Status of Third-Country 
Nationals who are Long-Term Residents, COM (2001) 127 final, 13.03.2001, p. 8 (emphasis added)  
156 Ibid., p. 36 (emphasis added). As I pointed out earlier in the chapter, this proposal has already been 
adopted by the Council. See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=196320, 
accessed on 23.11.2008. For the opinions of the Council see 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/07/253&format=HTML&aged=1&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/08/205&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en; 
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/08/250&format=HTML&aged=0&language=
EN&guiLanguage=en, all accessed on 23.11.2008 
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residence of (all) TCNs for the purpose of paid employment and self-employed activities.
157
 
That is why according to Guild, this attempt by the Commission was characterised by a 
uniform approach that applies to all types of economic activity. However, it did not manage 
to secure acceptance and had to be withdrawn.
158
 
Despite this setback in 2007 the Commission adopted another proposal that 
provides TCNs with the possibility to move within the EU for work purposes after fulfilling 
certain criteria. According to the proposal on the conditions of entry and residence of TCNs 
for highly-qualified work: “After two years of legal residence in the first Member State as 
holder of an EU Blue Card, the person concerned … shall be allowed to move to a Member 
State other than the first Member State for the purpose of highly qualified employment 
…”159 The articulation of highly-skilled TCNs as the category that is envisaged to benefit 
from freer movement in the EU is in synch with the perception of the Self analysed above. 
Given the open acknowledgement in Commission discourse that the EU will require 
increased volumes of legal migration, it is over highly-skilled TCNs that it is most likely 
for the EU decision-making institutions to be able to reach an agreement. Such 
interpretation concurs with the argument of Guild who also points out that in this second 
attempt to promote greater freedom of movement in the EU for TCNs, the Commission has 
adopted a more piece-meal approach. It has abandoned the earlier more comprehensive 
method and has divided the issue into sectors.
160
 
In this respect the Commission Blue Card initiative is a very good example of it 
successfully
161
 employing cultivated spillover and acting as a policy entrepreneur by trying 
to find ways for securing the adoption of its preferred position. This Commission 
articulation clearly breaks with the principle of restricting the movement of TCNs and 
                                               
157 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
Third-Country nationals for the Purpose of Paid Employment and Self-Employed Economic Activities, COM 
(2001) 386 final, 11.07.2001 
158 Elspeth Guild, „EU Policy on Labour Migration – a first Look at the Commission‟s Blue Card Initiative‟, 
CEPS Policy Brief, num. 145, November 2007, p. 1 
159 European Commission, Proposal for a Council Directive on the Conditions of Entry and Residence of 
Third-Country Nationals for the Purposes of Highly Qualified Employment, COM (2007) 637 final, 
23.10.2007, Article 19, point 1 
160 Elspeth Guild, „EU Policy on Labour Migration – a first Look at the Commission‟s Blue Card Initiative‟, 
CEPS Policy Brief, num. 145, November 2007, p. 1 
161 As pointed out above, footnote 38, the proposal was recently adopted by the Council. 
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instead advances a position that is much closer to the de-bordering aims of the SEA. 
Nevertheless, all Commission proposals discussed here contribute to the transcendence of 
the two main types of internal borders only partially. Therefore, they still configure borders 
ambiguously. On the one hand the references to “member states” in these proposals persist, 
thus recreating national internal borders. On the other hand, internal borders beyond the 
national borders of the member states are constructed because this discourse leads to border 
transcendence only at the expense of creating distinctions between different types of TCNs 
(long-term vs. not long-term; highly-qualified vs. low skilled). As a consequence, 
functional and identity internal border in the EU will only be reconstructed again instead of 
being abolished completely. 
Despite that, the challenge that these Commission articulations pose to the 
established principles shows a different contribution of the Commission in the 
reconfiguration of internal EU borders in comparison to these examined in section 3.4. 
While on border controls, as I argued, Commission discourse has by and large followed the 
established solutions, which through intertextuality are reproduced in its discourse, on the 
issue of free movement of TCNs for work purposes, the Commission has managed to 
advance a position that is different from the established pattern. This puts in the position of 
setting up the trend rather than following it, which are distinctively different roles. 
 
4.5.2. Absences from Commission discourse  
As with the previous sections, the absences from Commission discourse on free 
movement of people can be classified as related to EU citizens and TNCs. These silences 
lead to the reconstruction of internal borders in the Union due to the Commission inability 
to overcome objections from the member states. If the aim is to establish a common area of 
free movement, certain conditions should be put in place. However, currently, not all of 
them are reflected in Commission discourse on the issue. Therefore, the silence on certain 
issues means that for the time being at least they will not be enacted in the EU. This makes 
it impossible to fulfil completely the goal of creating a space within which people can move 
freely. 
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The first major silence in Commission discourse on free movement of people is 
related to the position on the role of member states on migration of TCNs. For example, 
according to Franco Frattini, Commission proposals on migration: “fully respect the 
division of power with Member States which will remain solely responsible for the actual 
numbers of labour migrants admitted onto their territories.”162 Commissioner Vitorino 
declares that: “the establishment of common conditions for the majority of Member States, 
will facilitate the admission and the integration of those migrants who are needed to take up 
jobs in the country concerned.”163 These articulations make the acknowledgement that 
member states will retain their primary position on legal migration, which contributes to the 
reconstruction of the national internal EU borders. Therefore, if the aim is to establish an 
area of free movement of people, the Commission should articulate a position that enables 
the transcendence of any internal dividing lines that may persist. An example of a 
Commission articulation that clearly does not leave any space for member states 
reconstructing internal borders is the Commission position on how the area without internal 
frontiers is to be achieved. As I explained in the previous chapter, on this matter, the 
Commission has argued that it is necessary to go beyond simply easing border controls and 
instead abolish internal frontier controls altogether.
164
 At present the Commission has not 
articulated such a radical position on some important aspects of the free movement of 
people. 
For example, the so-called “EU Blue Card” initiative is still based on the condition 
that the TCN spends a required amount of time in his/ her first member state.
165
 Thus, the 
starting position is still not that highly-qualified TCNs (which as we have already seen the 
EU is keen to attract) should face no internal obstacles altogether. Such articulation is 
missing from the Commission discourse. This is an important silence in Commission 
                                               
162 Franco Frattini, Enhanced Mobility, Vigorous Integration Strategy and Zero Tolerance on Illegal 
Employment: a Dynamic Approach to European Integration Policies, SPEECH/07/526, 13.09.2007, p. 3  
163 Antonio Vitorino, Migratory Flows and the European Labour Market: towards a Community Immigration 
Policy, SPEECH/01/334, 9.07.2001, p. 5 (emphasis added) 
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discourse, which obstructs the creation of a common zone for free movement of people and 
instead contributes to the reconstruction of internal EU borders. This provision does not 
completely eliminate one of the reasons identified by Commission discourse as contributing 
to the lesser attractiveness of the EU for highly qualified workers in comparison to other 
leading economies. It does not comprehensively transcend the lack of a cross-border 
dimension of national immigration policies of the member states, which hinders the 
possibility to move to another member state for work purposes and obstructs the efficient 
use of the labour force in the EU.
166
  
It is as a result of Commission reluctance or inability to address this silence in its 
discourse that some articulations leave TCNs out of the picture. For example, in its Paper 
on the Internal Market it is made clear that: “the Commission intends to make the necessary 
proposals which will eliminate the last obstacles standing in the way of the free movement 
and residence of migrant Community workers.”167 This, however, is a clear silence on the 
question of the regime of movement of TCNs. As we have seen in the previous section, 
such silences also lead to contradictions in Commission discourse. As a result, not all 
internal borders are abolished and in certain cases internal obstacles to freedom of 
movement of people continue to exist. 
A further example of Commission silence on the issue of free movement of people 
is its articulations on free movement of labour from the member states that joined in 2004 
and 2007. Despite all of the rhetoric that encourages and welcomes the opening of the 
labour markets of the “old” member states to the “new” ones, currently the Commission 
discourse is silent on actively promoting a more inclusive arrangement for the movement of 
workers from the new member states. During the Enlargement it was established that: 
“nationals of the new Member States who are legally working with a contract of 12 months 
or over in a current Member State at the time of accession of their country to the EU will 
benefit from the right to free access to the labour market of that Member State.”168 During 
                                               
166 Jose Manuel Barroso, Opening Remarks of President Barroso – Legal Immigration, SPEECH/07/650, 
23.10.2007, p. 2   
167 European Commission, Completing the Internal Market, COM (85) 310 final, 14.06.1985, p. 27 (emphasis 
added) 
168 European Commission, Free Movement of Workers – Achieving the Full Benefits and Potential, COM 
(2002) 694 final, 11.12.2002, p. 5 (emphasis added) 
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my examination of Commission discourse on free movement of people I did not come 
across any Commission articulation trying to promote a more inclusive right for at least 
these nationals of the “new” member states that are already working in an “old” member 
state. If the Commission is keen on encouraging freer movement for workers from the 
“new” member states, one could expect articulations promoting the idea of allowing free 
movement to the whole EU for these workers. In other words, the Commission should have 
supported the position of giving already existing migrants from acceding states access not 
only to the labour market of their current member states of residence but also to the entire 
EU. Such a position is much more in unison with the other Commission articulations on 
this matter and fits much better the goal of creating a common area for the movement of 
people. Therefore, I regard this as an important silence in Commission discourse that 
contributes to prolonging existing obstacles to the movement of some EU citizens within 
the Union. As such, it leads to the reconstruction of functional internal borders in the EU, 
rather than to their abolition. 
Thus, there are a number of ways in which Commission discourse on the issue of 
free movement of people contributes to the actual reconstruction of existing internal EU 
borders. These are a result of two main articulations that contradict the de-bordering trend. 
Firstly, internal borders are reconstructed by establishing different categories of people that 
still face obstacles when they want to relocate within the Union. Secondly, the continuing 
references to “member states” make it impossible to perceive the area as a whole and 
instead reinforce previously existing divisions. Furthermore, given the assumed efforts to 
establish a common zone for free movement of people, it is surprising that at times the 
Commission has been silent on issues that can contribute to internal border transcendence. 
These are best exemplified by the current provisions for highly qualified TCNs and for 
already residing workers from the “new” member states to move within the EU for work 
purposes. 
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4.6. Summary 
All in all, Commission proposals such as the mobility partnerships, the status of 
long-term TCN residents, the efforts towards overcoming existing practical difficulties for 
the free movement of people show that the Commission is willing and trying to further the 
creation of a common space for the movement of people in the EU. Furthermore, this is 
achieved by utilising the neo-functionalist logic of gradually expanding the fields for 
common action primarily through cultivated spillover. This Commission discourse has had 
clear advancements on improving the freedom of movement of people, which implies a 
decreased significance of internal borders. Nevertheless, it still configures borders 
ambiguously. As the chapter has shown, there is strong evidence that Commission 
discourse contributes not only to de-bordering but also to the reconstruction of borders. 
This is apparent in the trends in Commission articulations towards the construction of the 
EU‟s external border and the reconstruction of internal Union borders. The detailed 
analysis has shown that these result in the construction/ reconstruction of both, identity and 
functional borders. The external borders are created through the articulation of various 
legal, administrative, and practical measures in Commission documents as well as through 
advancing particular understandings of “EU” and “Europe”. Internal borders are recreated 
in two main ways. Firstly, in cases when current proposals cannot go far enough in the 
provisions for establishing a common European labour market. As the last section has 
shown, currently Commission articulations show that it is unable or unwilling to overcome 
the position of member states on a number of issues related to free movement of people. 
This is very similar to the reconstruction of internal borders in the field of border controls. 
Secondly, internal borders are also reconstructed when the Commission has been much 
more pro-active and has advanced more radical provisions for the free movement of TCNs. 
Nevertheless, as I argued this has been at the expense of establishing new dividing lines 
between some categories of people. This still makes the Commission discourse ambiguous 
and indicates the limits to de-bordering for supranational institutions. In the field of the 
reconstruction of internal EU borders, this is a result primarily of the intricacies of 
decision-making and the on-going struggles between the various institutions involved in the 
process of passing the acquis, which forces the Commission to act tactically and to consider 
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carefully how its proposals will be accepted by the other EU bodies. This limits in 
important ways the ability of the Commission to have its preferred readings accepted as EU 
law. As far as the external Union border is concerned, Commission discourse points to the 
need to create a common identity, which invariably depends on the articulation of an 
“Other”. This, in turn, leads to the establishment of a border. The articulation of identity 
borders is even more pronounced in Commission discourse on social policy, which I 
examine in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
SOCIAL POLICY – CONFIGURATION OF IDENTITY BORDERS 
 
 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter I examined the configuration of borders in the Commission 
discourse on free movement of people. I argued that although overall the Commission 
promotes decreased salience of borders in the EU for both EU citizens and TCNs, its 
articulations still configure borders ambiguously because at the same time they contribute 
to the emergence of external boundaries and to the reconstruction of some important 
divisions in the EU. This trend of ambiguous border configurations in the Commission 
discourse is even more pronounced in the field of social policy, which I examine in detail in 
this chapter. In this issue area, in distinction to the previously examined policy areas, 
Commission articulations configure predominantly identity borders. Furthermore, they are 
actively engaged in promoting a specific vision of the organisation of social matters in the 
Union, which is an important contributor to the reconstruction of the internal EU borders in 
this field.  
I consider social policy issues paramount for configuration of borders, which is 
evident from the role these matters have played during the creation of welfare nation-states 
in Europe. Despite that, as the Literature Review section in Chapter Two has shown, this is 
not an area that has been extensively studied in relation to the construction of EU borders.
1
 
Therefore, one of the contributions of this chapter is to rectify this situation by pointing out 
the important repercussion that articulations on social policy have on EU borders. Given the 
topic of this thesis the focus is on the configurations in the discourse of the European 
Commission. In order to do this, I have divided the chapter into four main parts. The first 
                                               
1 An important exception in this trend is Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare – European Integration 
and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). This study 
provides a comprehensive investigation into the problematic relationship between the opening pressures 
associated with European integration and the closure foundations of the nation-based welfare state. 
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one provides a brief overview of the development of the Commission discourse on social 
policy, focusing specifically on how the developments under the social dimension made it 
feasible to assert the European Model of Society (EMoS) and European Social Model 
(ESM). These are the two most important bordering articulations in the Commission 
discourse in the area of social policy. Building on this, in the second part I elaborate on the 
integrative effects these articulations imply, which contribute to the emergence of a 
common space in the EU. In the third and the fourth sections, however, I present the critical 
reading of these border configurations. The former looks into the construction of the EU‟s 
external borders, while the latter – at the reconstruction of internal borders in the Union 
through this Commission discourse.  
 
 
5.2. Overview of Commission Discourse on Social Policy 
The founding Treaties of the EC and the EU unequivocally state that one of the 
main aims of European integration is to improve the living and working conditions in the 
member states and to ensure social (as well as economic) progress in these countries.
2
 
Therefore, from the outset the integration process has had not only economic but also social 
aspects.
3
 This is what enables George to argue that: “There has always been a social 
dimension to the European Community.”4 This dimension received a renewed importance 
after the signing of the SEA because the achievement of a frontier-free area in the member 
states would not be complete without measures in the social field.
5
 Such assertions clearly 
indicate that social policy, as I argued in Chapter Two, displays the characteristics of 
functional spillover. This has meant that: “the economic objectives of the EC pushed it in 
                                               
2 See the Preambles of the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, p. 11 and the Treaty on 
European Union 
3 However, as Scharpf has argued, the design of the European integration process has led to an asymmetrical 
relationship between economic and social issues, in which the latter have remained primarily a national 
prerogative that had to increasingly comply with the Europeanised requirements of the former. See Fritz 
Scharpf, „The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity‟, Journal of Common Market 
Studies, 40: 4 (2002), pp. 645-670 
4 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 203 
5 For such a claim see for example European Commission, Programme of the Commission for 1991, 
DOC/91/1, 23.01.1991, p. 3; point 13 
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the direction of also taking over some of the responsibilities for social policy from the 
member states.”6 This was due to the worry that in the light of increased economic 
integration there was a need for matching developments in the social area because 
otherwise, there could be adversary economic and social effects
7
 (such as social dumping
8
 
or distorted competition), thus impeding the achievement of the integration objectives 
stated in the founding Treaty and its amendments. This functional spillover is even more 
plausible as an explanation of the developments in the field of social policy given the 
general reluctance of member states to delegate responsibilities in this area to the 
supranational level. As Cram points out, such delegation has only happened if it was 
directly related to the functioning of the internal market.
9
 Therefore, it is hardly surprising 
that at the time of and after the adoption of the SEA, the Commission was very active in 
promoting its vision of the social dimension.
10
 The new Commission President Jacques 
Delors launched in the second half of the 1980s an ambitious initiative aimed at 
establishing the political and institutional space for the actions in the social field.
11
 The 
achievement of its aims was further facilitated by the increased powers of the Commission 
in the social policy field under the SEA.
12
  
                                               
6 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community (2nd ed.) (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1991), p. 216 
7 For statements to that effect in European Commission documents see for example Padraig Flynn, The 
Development of European Level Social Dialogue, SPEECH/96/200, 23.07.1996, p.3; Padraig Flynn, The 
Social Chapter – Cost or Benefit?, SPEECH/96/223, 26.09.1996, p. 2; Padraig Flynn, European Social 
Policy, SPEECH/98/140, 25.06.1998, p. 3; Padraig Flynn, Anti-Discrimination – the Way Forward, 
SPEECH/98/282, 04.12.1998, p. 4 
8 The term “social dumping” refers to a situation in which policies or practices in one country are lowered as a 
result of alterations of social practices or institutions in another country. This definition is from Jens Albert, 
Guy Standing, „Social Dumping, Catch-up, or Convergence? Europe in a Comparative Global Context‟, 
Journal of European Social Policy, 10: 2 (2000), pp. 99-119, p. 99 
9 Laura Cram, „Calling the Tune without Paying the Piper? Social Policy Regulation: the Role of the 
European Commission in the European Community Social Policy‟, Policy and Politics, 21: 2 (1993), pp. 135-
146, p. 136  
10 See for example, Linda Hantrais, Social Policy in the European Union (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1995), 
esp. pp. 6-15; Laura Cram, „Calling the Tune without Paying the Piper? Social Policy Regulation: the Role of 
the European Commission in the European Community Social Policy‟, Policy and Politics, 21: 2 (1993), pp. 
135-146; Gerda Falkner, „The EU‟s Social Dimension‟ in Michelle Cini (ed.), European Union Politics 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 264-277; the Chapter on Social Policy in Desmond Dinan, Ever 
Closer Union – an Introduction to European Integration (3rd ed.) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 
11 Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare – European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social 
Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 117  
12 For a general outline of the developments in this area see for example Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union 
– an Introduction to European Integration (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), esp. Ch. 14 and Gerda 
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Lange defines the “social dimension” as comprising: “all those policies, or 
proposed policies, for the EC and its member states that provide or would provide rights, 
opportunities, benefits, or protections to actual, potential, or former participants in the 
labour market.”13 According to him there were two main positions on the appropriate 
regulatory role of the Community – firstly, the supporters of a minimalist, decentralised, 
hands-off approach advocated limiting the Community-level legislation and giving more 
space to member states. Secondly, the social protectionists argued in favour of greater 
scope of Community responsibilities, which would entail a move towards harmonisation of 
national standards.
14
 As I argued in Chapter Two, the position of the Commission within 
the institutional structure of the EU binds it to advocate the second of the above positions 
because it implies greater powers for the supranational level.  
In the period after the signing of the SEA, this position seemed to have attained a 
leading role and had some important successes in the social dimension. However, as 
Ferrera states: “Delors‟ ambitions regarding the social dimension were basically defeated 
by the 1992 constitutional revision.”15 This was marked by a shift not only in the actions 
undertaken in the social policy field but also in the prevailing articulations. This is easily 
spotted in the discourse of the European Commission on the issue. While before early 
1990s the references are to “the social dimension” and “the EMoS”, after 1993 “the ESM” 
becomes the most commonly used term. Despite the differences in the policies envisaged 
and advocated by each of them, in respect of the topic of this chapter, these formulations 
                                                                                                                                               
Falkner, „The EU‟s Social Dimension‟ in Michelle Cini (ed.), European Union Politics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2003), pp. 264-277. Cram presents a very interesting account of how the Commission has 
facilitated and utilised the developments in the area of social policy in Laura Cram, „Calling the Tune without 
Paying the Piper? Social Policy Regulation: the Role of the European Commission in the European 
Community Social Policy‟, Policy and Politics, 21: 2 (1993), pp. 135-146   
13 Peter Lange, „The Politics of the Social Dimension‟ in Alberta Sbragia (ed.), Euro-Politics – Institutions 
and Policymaking in the „New‟ European Community (Washington: Brookings, 1992), pp. 225-256, pp. 229-
230  
14 Ibid., pp. 230-231. Other scholars have made a distinction between a positive integration (up-ward 
harmonisation) and negative integration (down-ward harmonisation) in Colin Hay, Matthew Watson, Daniel 
Wincott, „Globalization, European Integration and the Persistence of European Social Models‟, Working 
Paper 3/99, POLSIS, University of Birmingham, p. 7 or in Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare – 
European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 116 
15 Maurizio Ferrera, The Boundaries of Welfare – European Integration and the New Spatial Politics of Social 
Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 117 
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have some crucial underlying similarities. The representations they make directly affect the 
establishment, abolition and reconstruction of EU borders. Furthermore, as the discussion 
below shows the relevant articulations configure borders in the same way. Therefore, the 
analysis of the configuration of borders in the Commission social policy discourse will 
focus on critically examining the articulations on the “social dimension”, the “EMoS” and 
the “ESM”, which in the next three sections of the chapter are regarded as variations of the 
same discourse, rather than as two distinctive discourses.
16
 In the following parts of the 
chapter I have aimed to provide examples of the employment of both, the EMoS and the 
ESM in the Commission discourse, in order to demonstrate this overlap in the configuration 
of borders. This part provides a background for the following analysis by outlining the 
main themes articulated in the documents of the European Commission, highlighting their 
differences and presenting the way the Commission discourse has evolved.  
 
5.2.1. The European Model of Society 
In the years after the SEA the EMoS constituted one of the focal points of the social 
dimension of the integration project. According to Delors: “… the social dimension is first 
and foremost the creation of jobs and solidarity.”17 where the latter is defined as economic 
and social cohesion founded on the concept of equal opportunities for all parts of the 
Community.
18
 The main aim at the time was: “… to create a core of social rights applicable 
throughout the Community.”19 This aim presupposes harmonisation at EU level and is 
reflected in the content of the major documents in the social area adopted – the Community 
Charter of Fundamental Social Rights for Workers,
20
 the Action Plan for the 
                                               
16 The main difference between the EMoS and the ESM on one hand and the social dimension on the other 
hand is their different emphasis. In that respect, the former two refer to “European” and deal with models of 
society. The ESM, however, leaves more scope for Commission action because this formulation implies that 
there is greater scope for policy intervention.    
17 Jacques Delors, Press Conference on the Prospects for the European Council in Madrid, SPEECH/89/48, 
23.06.1989, p. 1  
18 Jacques Delors, Press Conference before the Maastricht European Council, SPEECH/91/135, 05.12.1991, 
p. 1 
19 European Commission Press Release, Programme of the Commission for 1991, DOC/91/1, 23.01.1991, p. 3 
20 The Commission‟s drafts on the Charter are European Commission Communication, Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 248 final, 30.05.1989 and European Commission, Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 471 final, 02.10.1989  
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Implementation of the Charter,
21
 and the Agreement on Social Policy adopted by eleven 
member states at Maastricht.
22
  
There are two important themes emerging from these documents, which represent 
the bulk of the Commission thinking on social policy issues and as such constitute the 
framework of the social dimension. Firstly, the efforts are predominantly oriented towards 
the establishment of an agreed upon set of basic social rights (freedom of movement, 
employment and remuneration, improvement of living and working conditions, social 
protection, freedom of association and collective bargaining, vocational training, equal 
treatment of men and women, information, consultation and participation of workers, health 
protection and safety at the workplace, protection of children, adolescents, the elderly and 
disabled persons).
23
 Secondly, there are two main tools envisaged for the implementation of 
workers‟ rights – legislative measures or encouraging the two sides of the industry to 
conclude collective agreements at national, regional, sectoral or company level.
24
 These 
two themes are a result of the general trend established in the social sphere in the Western 
part of the European continent in the post-World War Two period. Furthermore, they 
indicate a predisposition towards developing harmonised legislation at the EU level, which 
shows a stronger manifestation of elements related to positive integration and social 
protectionism. 
However, there is one more recurring theme in the Commission social policy 
discourse in this period, the idea that the EMoS has to be reexamined, reformulated.
25
 This 
                                               
21 European Commission, Action Programme Relating to the Implementation of the Community Charter of 
Basic Social Rights for Workers, COM (89) 568 final, 29.11.1989 
22 The Social Policy Protocol annexed to the Treaty Establishing the European Union 
23 See for example, the Commission‟s drafts on the Charter, European Commission, Community Charter of 
Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 248 final, 30.05.1989 and European Commission, Community Charter 
of Fundamental Social Rights, COM (89) 471 final, 02.10.1989  
24 Ibid. 
25 See for example Jacques Delors and Clisthene, Our Europe – the Community and National Development 
(London: Verso, 1992), p. 158; Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Irish Management Institute Conference, 
SPEECH/93/45, 30.04.1993; Padraig Flynn, The Challenges Facing the Community on Employment, 
SPEECH/93/86, 09.07.1993; Padraig Flynn, Green Paper Seminar, SPEECH/94/59, 28.05.1994, p. 2; Padraig 
Flynn, Social Policy and Employment – Friends or Foes, SPEECH/95/278, 11.12.1995, p. 2. This theme does 
not disappear from the later discourses, where it is expressed through the idea of the need for modernising the 
ESM. For examples of this see Anna Diamantopoulou, The European Employment Strategy and Social 
Model, SPEECH/01/29, 29.01.2001, p. 2; Anna Diamantopoulou, Employment and Social Policy and 
Enlargement, SPEECH/00/176, 11.05.2000, p. 2; Anna Diamantopoulou, The Modernisation of the European 
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was partially due to the fact that in 1993 the EU‟s social program was coming to an end and 
it was becoming difficult to agree on its future direction.
26
 However, this was coupled with 
the growing perception of a rapidly changing environment, posing new challenges. The 
changing discourse of the Commission aimed at providing a way for better addressing the 
challenges of the early 1990s (the structural and technological changes in production, 
leading to new employment and unemployment patterns, pressure on the welfare state, 
change in the role of education, workplace relationships, and intergenerational 
inequalities
27
). The perception of these challenges triggered thinking about the ways of 
facing them, which is reflected in shifts of the Commission social policy discourse. This is 
well summarised by the former Commissioner responsible for Social Affairs Padraig Flynn: 
“… the debate about the future of European social policy goes much wider than the specific 
needs of those in work … the complex and changing relationship between economic and 
social policy requires us to take a broader view of the challenges we face and the possible 
solutions to be adopted. It is no longer possible – or productive – to focus too narrowly on 
specific questions such as labour law.”28 The first Commission documents that emerged 
from this process were the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment,
29
 
the Green Paper on Social Policy
30
 and the White Paper on Social Policy.
31
 To a large 
extent these Papers were groundbreaking because they initiated the fleshing out of a new 
emphasis in the social policy field. In distinction to the previous thinking, they put the 
interrelationship between economic and social policies at the forefront of the discussions 
                                                                                                                                               
Social Model and the Forthcoming Stockholm Summit, SPEECH/01/113, 09.03.2001; Anna Diamantopoulou, 
European Social Policy: Revising the Challenge of Modernisation, SPEECH/01/170, 10.04.2001  
26 Padraig Flynn, The Development of European Level Social Dialogue, SPEECH/96/200, 23.07.1996, p. 2; 
European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 final, 
17.11.1993, p. 6; Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, SPEECH/95/2, 
18.01.1995, p. 1 
27 Summarised on the basis of European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for 
the Union, COM (93) 551 final, 17.11.1993, p. 32. For other summaries of the challenges see for example 
Pagraig Flynn, The Next Phase of European Social Policy – the Implications for Business, SPEECH/94/101, 
20.09.1994, p. 1; Padraig Flynn, Green Paper Seminar, SPEECH/94/59, 28.05.1994, p. 2  
28 Padraig Flynn, Green Paper Seminar, SPEECH/94/59, 28.05.1994, p. 2 
29 European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment – the Challenges and Ways Forward into 
the 21st Century – White Paper, COM (93) 700 final, 5.12.1993 
30 European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 
final, 17.11.1993  
31 European Commission, European Social Policy – a Way Forward for the Union. A White Paper, COM (94) 
333 final, 27.07.1994 
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and as a result, they triggered a move towards looking at the two policy areas as two parts 
of a whole. A good illustration of the way in which this is done is the definition of the term 
“social policy” in the Green Paper on Social Policy, where: “… it is taken to mean the full 
range of policies in the social sphere including labour market policies.”32 Such a 
perception, especially after the successful adoption of these Papers by the other EU 
decision-making institutions,
33
 provided a link between the three Papers. It also led to the 
consistent reference to the social and economic policies not as competing with each other 
but as complementary, as “two sides of the same coin”.34 
At the same time another important shift in the Commission social policy discourse 
occurred – gradually, the references to EMoS are replaced by references to ESM. For 
example, in his speech to the United Nations (UN) Summit in Copenhagen in March 1995, 
Commission President Jacques Santer talked about „”the European Model of Society”35, 
while although in a speech a year later he used again the “European Model of Society”, he 
also referred to the “European Social Model”.36 In a similar vein, the White Paper on 
Growth, Competitiveness and Employment talks about a “Model of European Society”37, 
while the Green and White Papers on Social Policy use the term ESM.
38
 From the late 
1990s, the term ESM becomes the one employed overwhelmingly in the Commission 
discourse. Nevertheless, since the late 1990s in some specific policy areas, such as services 
                                               
32 European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 
final, 17.11.1993, p. 6, in footnote 1. For other statements linking these policies see for example Padraig 
Flynn, White Paper on Social Policy, SPEECH/94/118, 26.10.1994, p. 2   
33 The White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment was passed with Resolutions of the 
European Parliament and the Council in 1997-1998, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=102660, accessed on 07.05.2009; and the 
White Paper on European Social Policy was passed by a Resolution of the European Parliament in the first 
half of 1995, see http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=101312, accessed on 
07.05.2009   
34 See for example Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Irish Institute of European Affairs, SPEECH/96/17, 
19.01.1996, p. 1; Peter Balazs, Cohesion Policy: European Solidarity in Practice, SPEECH/04/290, 
08.06.2004, p. 4 
35 Jacques Santer, United Nations Summit for Social Development, SPEECH/95/30, 12.03.1995, p. 1 
36 Jacques Santer, Speech at the Opening of the European Social Forum, SPEECH/96/75, 28.03.1996, p. 2 
37 European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment – the Challenges and Ways Forward into 
the 21st Century – White Paper, COM (93) 700 final, 5.12.1993, p. 15 
38 See for example European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for the Union, 
COM (93) 551 final, 17.11.1993, p. 33 and p. 70; European Commission, European Social Policy – a Way 
Forward for the Union. A White Paper, COM (94) 333 final, 27.07.1994, p. 2 
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of general and general economic interest EMoS comes back.
39
 There it denotes the 
provision of public services on economic basis. In a way, the different terms encapsulate 
the shift that occurred during this time in the accents in the social policy discourse – from 
work and solidarity, which used to be central concepts, to modern views that have to go 
beyond these issues.
40
 This transformation also signals a change from a more social 
protectionist approach in the EC‟s social policy to a more decentralised one. In the next 
section I present how the Commission discourse articulated these shifts.  
 
5.2.2. European Social Model 
The trend that started in the early 1990s with the White and Green Papers was 
confirmed in the following years with the adoption of the Medium Term Social Action 
Programme for the period 1995-1997;
41
 the Title on Employment in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam; the European Employment Strategy; the Lisbon Council Conclusions on 
Employment and Social Policy
42
 and the subsequent Social Policy Agenda.
43
 The line of 
thinking promoted by these documents is that social policy should be conceived in a 
broader sense and “not limited only to labour market issues or the defense of the rights of 
those in employment” (as was the case prior to the early 1990s). Instead: “A real European 
Social Policy must also look to the problems of the unemployed, the socially excluded, the 
disabled and other disadvantaged groups in society, and the growing problems faced by our 
welfare states.”44 Thus, the most important shift and difference in the Commission 
discourse is that although the issues included in the EMoS are still dealt with, new 
problems and accents are emerging in the ESM. Therefore, it can be concluded that over 
time, the shifts in the Commission social policy discourse have led to widening the scope of 
                                               
39 See for example European Commission, Green Paper on Services of General Interest, COM (2003) 270 
final, 21.05.2003, esp. p. 3.  
40 Jacques Santer, Speech at the Opening of the European Social Forum, SPEECH/96/75, 28.03.1996, p. 2 
41 European Commission, Medium Term Social Action Programme 1995-1997, COM (95) 134 final, 
12.04.1995. It was passed with a Resolution of the European Parliament in January 1996, see 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=100166, accessed on 07.05.2009  
42 Available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/summits/lis1_en.htm, accessed on 22.04.2008 
43 European Commission, Social Policy Agenda, COM (2000) 379 final, 28.06.2000. It was approved by the 
Nice European Council Meeting, see for example 
http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=157362, accessed on 07.05.2009  
44 Both quotations are from Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Plenary Session of the European Parliament, 
SPEECH/95/2, 18.01.1995, p. 2 
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issues dealt with under the social dimension, thus modifying the meaning of the EU social 
policy. 
In the ESM the main approach for addressing the challenges identified is the 
adoption and promotion of “active labour market and social policies”.45 These policies 
require restructuring of the public spending, so that there are funds available for financing 
not only the social safety-net (for supporting the unemployed, disabled or elderly) but also 
a sufficient amount of money for the running of various kinds of programmes (educational, 
vocational, or re-training). The aim is to enable people out of work to develop their skills 
and improve their productivity, thus enhancing their competitiveness on the labour market 
and bettering their chances of finding work. This approach is further reinforced by efforts 
to restructure the tax systems in the EU, so that it provides increased incentives for various 
types of people, such as women and the elderly to stay, return or become employed, rather 
than rely on the social benefits provided. These efforts are complemented by measures 
aimed at providing good macroeconomic, legal or infrastructural conditions for business. 
The overarching idea is that a combination of these courses of action will lead to economic 
growth, which will be translated into higher levels of employment and increased overall 
standards of living, thus achieving the strategic goal of the EU becoming: “… the most 
competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy capable of sustainable economic 
growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion.”46 Thus, one of the leading 
themes of the social policy discourse is that it is a productive factor.
47
 
In comparison to the ways envisaged for achieving the EC/EU social policy aims 
there are some important changes evident in the Commission discourse. Although the main 
ways for fulfilling them in the period until the early 1990s, such as a legislative approach, 
financial support through the structural funds and negotiations between employers and 
unions are still promoted, new instruments are emerging as well. These include the 
adoption of new programmes, mainstreaming and the so-called Open Method of 
                                               
45 One of the earliest usages of this idea is in the European Commission, Green Paper – European Social 
Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 final, 17.11.1993, see for example p. 18  
46 The Lisbon European Council (23 and 24 March 2000) Presidency Conclusions, available at 
http://www.ena.lu/, accessed on 09.05.2009  
47 European Commission, Social Policy Agenda, COM (2000) 379, 28.06.2000, p. 5 
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Coordination (OMC).
48
 The OMC was first applied under the European Employment 
Strategy and was later used in the Social Policy Agenda in the area of social inclusion. It 
involves fixing guidelines on Union level and agreeing upon timetables for achieving short, 
medium, and long-term goals; establishing qualitative and quantitative indicators and 
benchmarks; translating the European guidelines into national and regional policies; 
periodic monitoring, evaluation and peer review organised as a mutual learning process.
49
 
Commissioner Diamantopoulou characterises the OMC as: “A clear example of subsidiarity 
in action.”50 However, arguably, it is evidence for the prevailing of intergovernmentalist 
thinking in the fields of employment and social policies because it does not have any 
legally binding provisions, and therefore, it does not contribute towards social policy 
integration in the EU through harmonisation, which would be the aim of the supporters of 
supranationalism.
51
 Therefore, developments in the social field in the period after the early-
to-mid 1990s are better characterised as negative integration, closer to the lowest common 
denominator, which is promoting a more decentralised and hands-off approach. 
However, despite these differences in the Commission social policy discourse, there 
are also continuations in the Commission articulations, which contain very important 
bordering configurations, such as the articulation of very similar “Others” or the 
construction of the social space in the EC/EU as a unified one. In that respect, one of the 
most striking continuities between the articulations of the EMoS and the ESM is their 
                                               
48 Enlisted in Anna Diamantopoulou, Presentation of the Social Policy Agenda to the European Parliament, 
SPEECH/00/324, 21.09.2000, p. 2 and Anna Diamantopoulou, The Social Policy Agenda: Europe at Work for 
Trade Unions, SPEECH/01/114, 09.03.2001, p. 4.  
49 For some of the existing studies analysing the OMC see James Mosher, David Trubek, „Alternative 
Approaches to Governance in the EU: EU Social Policy and the European Employment Strategy‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 41: 1 (2003), pp. 63-88; Mary Daly, „EU Social Policy after Lisbon‟, Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 44: 3 (2006), pp. 461-481; Nick Adnett, „Modernising the European Social Model‟, 
Journal of Common Market Studies, 39: 2 (2001), pp. 353-364; Martin Heidenreich, Gabriele Bischoff, „The 
Open Method of Co-ordination: a Way to the Europeanization of Social and Employment Policies?‟, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 46: 3 (2008), pp. 497-532 
50 Anna Diamantopoulou, European Social Policy: Rising to the Challenge of Modernisation, 
SPEECH/01/170, 10.04.2001, p. 4 
51 As Commissioner Flynn indicates in his speech to the EU Committee of the American Chambers of 
Commerce, this issue is of importance because there has been quite a disagreement between various fractions 
on how the EU social dimension should proceed with some seeing legislation as the only active way forward, 
while others thinking of it as adding to the regulatory burden and diminishing Europe‟s capacity to adopt to 
changing realities. This is from Padraig Flynn, The Development of European Level Social Dialogue, 
SPEECH/96/200, 23.07.1996, p. 2 
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insistence that there is a unique way of organising social life in Europe. This idea was 
initially expressed through the EMoS. According to the then President of the Commission 
Delors: “… there is a European model of society to which the great majority of Europeans 
are committed. Everyone agrees that we must adapt it … Nevertheless, most people want to 
retain its spirit and its political foundations.”52 As early as 1986 Delors proclaimed that this 
model has deep roots in the European civilization, where: “… people feel that a society 
should not be allowed to crush the individual; but individuality should not be taken so far 
as to undermine society.”53 In a similar way, in 2002, the Deputy Director General of DG 
for Employment and Social Affairs claimed that the way of life in Europe is: “… different 
from what you find elsewhere in the world”,54 which is a result of the fact that in the social 
field, there are values shared by Europeans (quest for economic prosperity, democracy, 
participation, search for consensus, solidarity with the weakest members of society, equal 
opportunities for all and so on). These are the principles that Lönnroth defines as the 
ESM.
55
 This Model, according to the former Commission President Prodi: “… gives the 
EU distinctive social features and it sets us apart internationally.”56 
So, the underlying theme of both articulations is that European societies are 
organised in a distinctive way. Furthermore, besides the difference in the terminology used 
in the two periods to denote this distinctiveness, at the same time it is referred to as a 
“model” in both of them. This choice of wording is important because it implies that the 
social systems that belong to this model will display certain characteristics and therefore, it 
should be relatively easy to differentiate between the societies and countries that have these 
characteristics and those that do not. This in turn means that there should be a clear border 
between these two categories. As the analysis below shows the borders configured are 
                                               
52 Jacques Delors and Clisthene, Our Europe – the Community and National Development (London: Verso, 
1992), pp. 157-158 
53 European Commission, Commission President Calls for Continued Effort to Adjust European Economic 
Structures without Abandoning the „European Model‟, IP/86/281, 05.06.1986, p. 2. For another good 
definition of the main characteristics of the EMoS see Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Irish Management 
Institute Conference, SPEECH/93/45, 30.04.1993, p. 2    
54 Juhani Lönnroth, The European Social Model of the Future, a speech delivered at the EU Conference 
organised by the Ecumenical EU – Office of Sweden, Brussels, 15.11.2002, p. 3 
55 Ibid. 
56 Romano Prodi, Economic Growth vs Social Policies: a False Dilemma, SPEECH/02/537, 05.11.2002, p. 2 
(emphasis added)  
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overwhelmingly identity borders. Nevertheless, given the fact that in today‟s world 
societies are organised along the clearly demarcated territorial borderlines of a specific 
state, these identity borders are bound to be manifested on a particular territory. It is 
therefore this reference to a model in the Commission discourse on social policy that 
clearly relates the articulations in the social dimension, the EMoS and the ESM, to 
construction, reconstruction and decreased salience of EU borders. These are the tendencies 
I aim to uncover through a detailed examination of the Commission discourse, starting with 
the trend that leads to the construction of a common space, and hence, decreased 
significance of internal EU borders. 
 
 
5.3. De-bordering Tendencies in Commission Social Policy Discourse  
The references to an EMoS and an ESM in Commission discourse on social 
policy lead to the construction of a common social space in the EU, which implies the 
undermining of existing borders between the member states. This is done in two main ways 
– through promoting mobility and through constructing a common European identity. In 
comparison to other policy areas (i.e. free movement of people) the promotion of mobility 
is not as pronounced in the field of social policy. There it is the configuration of identity 
borders that is predominant and which I therefore examine in greater detail. The 
Commission discourse constructs common identity in the EU firstly through downplaying 
the differences between the social orders of the Union‟s members and secondly through 
using inclusive words, such as the pronouns “our”, “ours”, “we”. These point to the 
existence of common historical traditions, civilization, experiences, thinking, perceptions, 
or current challenges and allow the identification of contemporary undertakings as 
“common action” or “joint endeavour”. All of the above configure borders because they 
contribute to the undermining of the divisions between the member states of the EU. This 
part examines these tendencies in the Commission discourse and also looks into how 
inclusive rhetoric was applied towards the candidate countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe during the latest Enlargement. 
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5.3.1. De-bordering through promoting mobility and freedom  
The integrative nature of the EU project implies that its ultimate aim is to create a 
common area between the member states. This necessitates decreasing the significance of 
the existing borders. As the previous section has shown, in the area of social policy, this is 
done through the discourses of the social dimension of the European integration. The first 
important way in which it contributes to the undermining of existing internal borders is 
through establishing greater mobility and freedom in the EC/EU. This trend can be traced 
in the Commission social policy discourse, although it is not as pronounced as in other 
policy areas (i.e. free movement of people). 
 As I pointed out above, traditionally the social dimension has been justified as 
trying to: “facilitate the free movement of labour and to support thereby the creation of a 
single market.”57 Therefore, from its inception the rationale for the existence of social 
policy has been to facilitate the achievement of the EC‟s economic aims – the creation of 
the single market. This tendency is continued in the period after the SEA when the 
Commission documents assert the necessity to have certain social policy measures in order 
to have an EC/EU, in which: “decent standards transcend borders alongside capital, goods, 
services and people.” 58  For: “The Single Market has changed the conditions which shape 
economic and social policies. Failure of economic and social performance … in one 
Member State or region, affects the growth potential of the whole.”59 Thus: “the social 
dimension … must move ahead at the same time as the economic dimension.”60  
These articulations of the European Commission clearly undermine existing 
borders between the member states. Furthermore, in distinction to the other important de-
bordering line in this Commission discourse, this is done through making the case in favour 
of increased mobility and freedom in the EU, which is a result of the connection made 
between the social policy issues and the internal market. Therefore, in this case de-
                                               
57 Juhani Lönnroth, The European Social Model of the Future, a speech delivered at the EU Conference 
organised by the Ecumenical EU – Office of Sweden, Brussels, 15.11.2002, p. 5 
58 Padraig Flynn, The Social Chapter – Cost or Benefit, SPEECH/96/223, 26.09.1996, p. 2 
59 Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Social Policy Forum, SPEECH/98/140, 25.06.1998, p. 3. See also Padraig 
Flynn, European Social Policy, SPEECH/98/140, 25.06.1998, p. 3; Joaquin Almunia, A European Economic 
and Social Model for the 21st Century, SPEECH/07/253, 25.04.2007, p. 4 
60 European Commission, Programme of the Commission for 1991, DOC/91/1, 23.01.1991, p. 1 
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bordering is articulated through functional spillover. There are two main ways in which this 
is achieved, by: “a basic set of „minimum standards‟ for the workplace and beyond … 
guaranteed by law (EU and national), for all people living in Europe and a set of principles, 
institutions, policy guidelines and policy follow-up agreed at EU level, in order to help 
Member States to reform employment policies, pension policies, anti-poverty policies and 
healthcare policies.”61 The envisaged benefits of the increased visibility of the Union in 
employment and social issues are to: “improve coordination of economic, employment and 
social policies, ensuring that all EU citizens share in the fruits of growth [;] help to drive 
better conditions for business and our economies generally and … change people‟s 
perception of the EU for the better”.62 However, in distinction to the Commission 
discourses in other policy areas (such as free movement of people), there are no direct 
references to the fact that the measures undertaken will increase mobility and freedom. 
Instead, the most pronounced way in which this discourse undermines internal borders is its 
contribution towards the establishment of a common European identity between the 
member states.  
 
5.3.2. Downplaying the differences between the social orders in the Member 
States of the EU 
There is a growing body of academic literature that points to the existence of 
different social models in contemporary EU. These are a result of the different 
redistributive and social protection policies in different countries. Scholars have identified 
several models, which (although variations in the classification and labeling exist) usually 
are referred to as Anglo-Saxon (neo-liberal), Continental, Scandinavian (Nordic), and 
Southern.
63
 Despite this, the EMoS and the ESM refer to a European model, which implies 
                                               
61 Anna Diamantopoulou, Future perspectives for the European Social Model, SPEECH/03/419, 17.09.2003, 
p. 3 
62 Ibid. 
63 For a good overview of the existing literature on the typology of welfare states and an outline of the main 
characteristics of the different types of welfare states see Wilhelmus Antonius Arts, John Gelissen, „Three 
Worlds of Welfare capitalism or More? A State-of-the-Art Report‟, Journal of European Social Policy, 12: 2 
(2002), pp. 137-158; Bernhard Ebbinghaus, „Does a European Social Model Exist and Can it Survive?‟ in 
Gerhard Huemer, Michael Mesch, Franz Traxler (eds), The Role of Employer Association and Labour Unions 
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that whatever the differences between the existing models, the commonalities between 
them are more important. I will illustrate this point with several quotations from 
Commission officials. In 1996 Commissioner Flynn argued: “Yes, there is a tremendous 
diversity within the spectrum of those systems. In the Scandinavian Countries, social 
protection is a right enjoyed equally by all citizens. In Germany, Austria, Belgium, Holland 
and Luxembourg, benefits are mostly earnings-related … But what I am saying is that one 
thing stands out: the universal nature and the scope of the social support that European 
Union governments offer their citizens.”64 In the same year the former Commission 
President Jacques Santer when talking about the Commission‟s objectives in the 
Intergovernmental Conference states that their first objective is the promotion of the ESM 
and goes on to say that: “… over and above our historical and cultural diversity, we do have 
– from Portugal in the south to Finland in the north – certain shared ways of organizing our 
societies.”65  
Such articulations lead to decreasing the importance of the division between EU 
member states. The technique employed by the Commission in its discourse is to start by 
acknowledging the fact that the social systems in the EU have distinctive characteristics. 
However, the articulations that follow after this concession claim that there is an overriding 
similarity. This effectively undermines the border between the different EU members 
because it unequivocally puts the emphasis on what is common. This in turn leads to 
including all countries in the EU as belonging to, being included in the same category 
(denoted as either EMoS or ESM). Arguably, there is an important rhetorical move that 
considerably contributes to this downplaying of the existing differences in the social 
systems in the member states and the consequent diminishment of the significance of the 
internal border. As the above two examples indicate, the overwhelming majority of 
statements making this claim about the underlying similarity between the EU‟s members 
                                                                                                                                               
in the EMU – Institutional Requirements for European Economic Policies (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999), pp. 12-
26  
64 Padraig Flynn, Perspectives on European Employment and Social Policy, SPEECH/96/110, 06.05.1996, p. 
3 
65 Jacques Santer, Speech at the Opening of the European Social Forum, SPEECH/96/75, 28.03.1996, p. 2 
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firstly talk about the differences but finish with what is shared, thus contributing to the 
undermining of the borders implied by the existing diversity.
66
   
There are two main ways in which the Commission discourse makes the case in 
favour of the underlying commonality, which leads to undermining the existing borders in 
the EU. The first one is the reference to shared values, which are the basis on which the 
Union is founded. It is through these common values, which all member states cherish
67
 
that unity in diversity is achieved. As the former Commission President Prodi declares: “… 
European integration has always been about people of diverse cultures and languages 
coming together on the basis of shared values, and acquiring a shared sense of identity.”68 
In the social field: “… the values of society include the idea of mutual solidarity and 
responsibility, and the need for a safety-net to catch the less fortunate member of society, 
be it in terms of income support, or of health care.”69 
The second way is through the claim that in the social field, as well as in the other 
fields related to the construction of the internal market, the Community/ Union is facing 
challenges, which “are unlikely to be met by any single European State acting alone.”70 
Therefore, the Commission maintains that there are common objectives, which warrant the 
efforts to overcome any existing differences and acting together. For example, in 1995 (at 
the time when the shift between EMoS and ESM was occurring) Commissioner Flynn 
argued: “Europe has tremendous diversity in its systems of social protection, industrial 
relations and rights, care, education, and training. But the objectives are essentially 
common. And European social policy has tended, rightly, to emphasise the commonality or 
convergence of those objectives. That isn‟t sterile harmonization. It‟s building on our 
                                               
66 A rare example of reversing this order of representation, where the mutual adaptation between the member 
states is talked about first and the European diversity – second, is European Commission, Green Paper – 
European Social Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 final, 17.11.1993, p.33, where it is stated: 
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construction of Europe will have to be unique because it must build on the diversity of European cultures …”  
67 See for example the speech by Lönnroth and the values he refers to, as referenced in footnote 55 above in 
this chapter. 
68 Romano Prodi, Europe in the 21st Century, SPEECH99/218, 18.12.1999, p. 2 (emphasis in the original) 
69 Leon Brittan, Europe: the Next Steps, SPEECH/93/61, 27.05.1993, pp. 3-4 
70 European Commission, Green Paper – European Social Policy – Options for the Union, COM (93) 551 
final, 17.11.1993, p. 33 
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common interests and strengthening the social dimension of the Union.”71 Therefore, the 
Commission discourse continuously points that: “… we need to concentrate on what unites 
us rather than on what divides us.”72 
These two kinds of ways in which the underlying commonalty in the EU is argued 
are contributing to the decreased importance of borders in the EU because they supply both 
rational and ideational reasons for supporting the efforts for the undermining of borders. 
The argument that there are common challenges that require common actions provide the 
logical, reasonable line of the Commission justification, while the references towards the 
existence of common values work on the ideational front by promoting the emergence of a 
European mentality in the population of the EU. Furthermore, these two lines are in 
interrelation with each other, where one of them is reinforcing the other and vice versa. As 
post-structuralist scholars have argued, the existence of a common threat promotes the 
establishment of a common identity
73
 while the stronger the identification with the EU, the 
more various facts will be looked at from the perspective of the Union, thus requiring 
responses at the EU-level. In general, the end result of this de-bordering trend is the 
establishment of a feeling of “we” on the territory in question. Such references will clearly 
signal a move towards inclusion and therefore, diminishing the visibility of borders. The 
discourse of the European Commission on the social dimension through its choice of 
wording obviously contributes to achieving exactly this result.  
 
5.3.3. Usage of inclusive words  
This de-bordering trend is further reinforced by the usage of words, which imply 
inclusion and belonging to the EU and promote identification with it. These are best 
exemplified by pronouns like “us”, “we”, or “our” and the labeling of some of the 
envisaged measures, which I present below. 
                                               
71 Padraig Flynn, Social Policy and Employment, Friends or Foes?, SPEECH/95/278, 11.12.1995, p. 2 
(emphasis added)  
72 Padraig Flynn, The Issues as the Amsterdam Summit Approaches, SPEECH/97/88, 18.04.1997, p. 6 
73 See for example William E. Connolly, Identity/ Difference – Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox 
(London: Cornell University Press, 1994) 
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The Preamble of the White Paper on Growth, Competitiveness and Employment 
reads: “This major challenge confronts us all. That is why we are arguing, first and 
foremost, the need to press on with building a unified Europe which will increase our 
strength through cooperation and through the benefits of a large area without frontiers of 
any kind”.74 Various Commission officials in their speeches also use these inclusive 
pronouns. For example, the Commissioner for Economic and Monetary Affairs maintains: 
“The issue at stake is not which model we prefer, but rather how efficient that model might 
be for delivering growth, jobs and equality of opportunity to citizens, taking into account 
the new challenges and the rapid changes that we are facing”75; and a speech by the former 
Commissioner responsible for Employment and Social Affairs Diamantopoulou on the 
ESM is full of such references: “Our social models have been centre stage in Europe‟s 
continued economic and social progress.”; “… the major contrast remains between Europe 
and the US … Which serves to distinguish us as societies. But which hardly puts us at an 
economic disadvantage”; “Our first European breakthrough on these issues came back in 
1997”.76 Although much more rare, this trend was present even at the time of the adoption 
of the SEA. For example, Delors argued: “… we should not let deregulation form a barrier 
to the necessary dialogue between unions and employers. “We must not abandon the 
European model, which has deep roots. …””77 
Besides these most commonly used pronouns that denote the sameness of the 
EU‟s member states, sometimes other pronouns are also used to show the belonging of the 
population of the Union to its unique way of social organisation. Nevertheless, the meaning 
constructed by such pronouns is still the same. The suggestion is that there exists a 
common social space in the EU, which in turn presupposes the decreased salience of 
internal borders. For example, the Commissioner responsible for Employment, Social 
                                               
74 European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment – the Challenges and Ways Forward into 
the 21st Century – White Paper, COM (93) 700 final, 5.12.1993, Preamble (emphasis added) 
75 Joaquin Almunia, A European Economic and Social Model for the 21st Century, SPEECH/07/253, 
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76 Anna Diamantopoulou, Europe‟s Social Model – Building for the Future, SPEECH/02/360, 29.08.2002, 
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77 European Commission, Commission President Calls for Continued Effort to Adjust European Economic 
Structures without Abandoning the „European Model‟, IP/86/281, 05.06.1986, p. 2 (emphasis added) 
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Affairs and Equal Opportunities Vladimir Špidla declares that: “European citizens remain 
attached to their social model, which is based on inclusion …”78 
This emergence of a “we-feeling” is further promoted in the social policy 
discourse of the European Commission through the way undertakings are called. Although 
Commission documents usually acknowledge that action at Union level is not always the 
best way forward, the case is nevertheless made that there are occasions when the current 
institutional provisions are unsatisfactory
79
 or when measures at the supranational level 
have added value and thus have to be pursued.
80
 Thus, arguably, in concurrence with the 
trend uncovered in Chapter Three the Commission still uses any chances it sees feasible to 
promote further integration at EU level. Many of the names given to the major instruments 
used in achieving the objectives of the EU social policy imply inclusion. This is done 
through coordination of undertakings at different cross-border levels; through the 
development of common strategies, common priorities, and common programmes; through 
adoption of legislation at the supranational level; through consultation, exchange of 
information and dialogue between the actors involved.
81
 This inclusiveness is further 
reinforced by the nature of the integration process itself. In distinction to other unification 
policies in different geographical locations and during different historical periods, the 
process of European integration is presented as one, in which decisions are negotiated 
between free and equal partners. The following statement of Commissioner 
Diamantopoulou exemplifies this: “These common policies, again, are not a matter of one 
or more countries dictating to others. They are a matter of sovereign states deciding to 
pursue common objectives for common benefit.”82  
                                               
78 Vladimir Špidla, Closing Speech on Poverty and Social Exclusion, SPEECH/06/609, 17.10.2006, p. 3 
(emphasis added) 
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82 Anna Diamantopoulou, The European Social Model and Enlargement, SPEECH/00/235, 23.06.2000, p. 3 
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All in all, these articulations reveal another important way in which through its 
discourse the Commission undermines the borders between the member states in the social 
field. The implication of using inclusive words, such as the pronouns “we”, “our”, “us” and 
the labeling of EU-level actions as “joint” or “common”, is that a feeling of belonging and 
identification with the Union is promoted. Furthermore, as the last citation shows, this is 
further reinforced by the argument that the process of European integration is one based on 
voluntary association. Under it each member state can still exercise free will, and decisions 
are not based on force, where one, a group of states or the supranational institutions make 
decisions on behalf of the rest of the members. This is very important because it indicates 
firstly that whatever decision is taken it is for the good of everyone, and secondly, that in 
principle the option of not participating is still viable. Therefore, the participation in the 
policies on the social field signifies a conscious, rational decision that this is the best course 
of action and identification with all the other participants. As I explained in the previous 
section, this is what provides the ground on which the claims for the existence of an EMoS 
and ESM are made. Once their existence is asserted, it becomes possible for participants in 
the integration process (such as the Commission) to use different types of inclusive words 
in its discourse, which closes the circle. Therefore, these two main techniques used in the 
Commission discourse on the social dimension mutually reinforce each other and together 
lead to constructing a common social space in the EU, which is a border-free area. This is 
how the Commission social policy discourse undermines internal EU borders. Another field 
that in its rhetoric displays the same tendencies is the discourse of the Commission on the 
ESM in relation to Enlargement.  
 
5.3.4. The Commission European Social Model discourse in relation to 
Enlargement 
Before the end of the Cold War, the countries of the Communist block had a 
distinctive social model, which underwent a thorough change in the 1990s. Given that this 
was during the same period when the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
were preparing for a full EU membership, it could be expected that they would move 
 199 
towards greater convergence of their social policies with those of the EU.
83
 Furthermore, it 
could be expected that such a development will be strongly supported and promoted by the 
EU and indeed the rhetoric of the European Commission shows such tendencies.  
For example, in various speeches Commissioner Diamantopoulou maintains that 
the social dimension is an essential part of the Enlargement process. According to her: “The 
social dimension of the EU and the acquis in which it is expressed is an essential 
component: of building the institutions of democracy and civil society; of making markets 
work sustainably, and of creating the capacity for engagement in political, economic and 
monetary union.”84 The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, as I said above from the outset 
the EC/EU has had social as well as economic aims. Secondly, the evolution of the 
Community social policy (as exemplified by the developments in the Commission 
discourse on the social dimension shown in the previous section) has led to an alignment 
between economic, employment and social policies. Commissioner Diamantopoulou refers 
to these as: “Our famous triangle.”85 Therefore: “The social model is central to the Union‟s 
continued economic progress and to enlargement”86 and “… social policy and the social 
acquis are not an optional extra – they are a fundamental part of the EU‟s legislative base 
and they are fundamental to building a comprehensive and inclusive knowledge 
economy.”87 Hence: “… the social dimension is a basic element of the process of 
enlargement, not a casualty of the process.”88 According to her: “The challenge for the 
candidate countries is twofold: they have to adjust to the existing situation in the EU, as 
                                               
83 For good reviews of the organisation and developments in the field of social policy in the former 
Communist Countries, see Bob Deacon, „East European Welfare States: the Impact of the Policies of 
Globalization‟, Journal of European Social Policy, 10: 2 (2000), pp. 146-161; Nick Manning, „Diversity and 
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84 Anna Diamantopoulou, The European Employment Strategy and Social Model, SPEECH/01/29, 
29.01.2001, p. 8 
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SPEECH/01/212, 19.03.2001, p. 3 
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well as adapt to a changing landscape ... To secure all this, candidate countries need the 
European social model.”89 
There are two very important conclusions that can be drawn from these 
articulations. Firstly, during the Enlargement process, the social dimension should have 
been just as important as the other policy areas. In other words, the candidate countries 
should make the same efforts in this field as in the sphere of economy or democracy before 
the full EU membership becomes a fact. Secondly, presumably during the time of accession 
into the Union, the convergence with the old member states on the social issues should be 
at the same level as that of the other two areas enlisted above. In order to achieve this, 
during the process of Enlargement, some Commission documents summarise the main 
focus of the efforts as promoting education and training reform, tax-benefit reform, efforts 
to strengthen the employment services, social partnerships and social dialogue in the 
applicant countries.
90
 It is easy to spot the overlap between these priorities and the efforts 
for reforming the EU‟s social dimension itself. Therefore, overall, the rhetoric on the 
priorities for change in the old and new member states are broadly in line with each other. 
Hence, the overall result of the Enlargement process in the social sphere is expected to be 
the gradual inclusion of the applicant countries into the ESM, which should more or less be 
accomplished before full membership becomes a fact. This means that the new member 
states will become part of the organisation of social life in the EU, thus the border that used 
to separate the Western and Eastern European societies will no longer be relevant. In this 
way the rhetoric of the European Commission on this specific aspect of the social 
dimension again provides evidence that it promotes the undermining of existing internal 
borders and leads to de-bordering and the creation of a common space this time 
encompassing old and new member states. 
However, it is highly debatable whether the EU institutions, including the 
Commission were indeed successful in accomplishing this aim of including the new 
member states into the ESM. As I will demonstrate in the section on the construction of 
internal borders by the discourse of the Commission there is another way of interpreting 
                                               
89 Ibid. 
90 These are based on Anna Diamantopoulou, The European Employment Strategy and Social Model, 
SPEECH/01/29, 29.01.2001, pp. 4-5 
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how its discourse configures borders in the EU. Before I do this, I will analyse the 
construction of the external borders of the EU by the social policy discourse of the 
European Commission. 
 
 
5.4. The Construction of the EU’s External Border through Articulations of 
the “Self” and the “Other” in Commission Discourse on the Social Dimension  
As we have seen in the previous part, the articulations on the EMoS and the ESM 
promote the emergence of a new identity as a result of the undermining of the borders in 
the social field between the member states. Nevertheless, a reading of the same documents 
also displays an opposite trend in the Commission discourse on social policy. As in the 
previous chapters, internal decrease in the significance of EU borders is inevitably 
accompanied by the emergence of new dividing lines at the outer edges of the EU. Given 
that the Commission articulations in the field of social policy configure overwhelmingly 
identity borders, the construction of the external EU border is a result of the articulation of 
“Others”. So, in order to be able to demarcate the external borders inscribed in the 
discourse on the EMoS and the ESM, I demonstrate which are the Self and the Others 
emerging from the documents of the Commission. This will help me to “locate” the border 
configured through articulating what belongs to the European Models and what does not. 
As I explained in Chapter Two, from a discourse theoretical perspective, the 
construction of the “Other” is crucial because it constitutes the binary opposition on which 
knowledge is constructed. For the purposes of this research, the “Othering” articulations are 
indispensable for analysing construction of the EU‟s external (as well as internal) border 
because it is through them that it becomes evident what does not belong to the EMoS/ 
ESM. By defining what is outside, the external Union border is drawn and the identity of 
the „inside‟ is further clarified. There are two main types of “Others” emerging from the 
European Commission social policy discourse. On the one hand these are other (economic) 
world leaders, countries such as Japan and the United States (US). On the other hand, these 
are the relatively newly booming economies, such as the Asia-Pacific or China. According 
to the articulations of the European Commission both types of “Others” are organised on 
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different social principles than the EC/EU. The analysis of which social principles are 
emphasised by the Commission articulations will also contribute to further (indirect) 
definition of the Self, thus showing how the EC/EU‟s external border is constructed. 
The first main “Other”91 emerging from the Commission discourse on social 
policy are the relatively newly booming economies of the Asia-Pacific and China. After the 
signing of the SEA, their articulation as the “Other” is most clearly identified in the 
beginning of the 1990s. The references to them in the Commission discourse single them 
out as posing a threat to the economy of the EU. For example, in 1993 Commissioner Flynn 
refers to low wage economies as one of the main challenges the Union faces: “… there is 
the huge shift in global comparative advantage away from the high wage producers towards 
the lower wage economies of the Pacific Rim and elsewhere …”92 More recently, similar 
concerns are represented through references to globalisation, which is identified as one of 
the major challenges to EU competitiveness in the 21
st
 century.
93
 This shift to a reference to 
globalisation can be partially attributed to the fact that in recent years the lower wages of 
the new EU member states have been an issue of significant debate. As my analysis of the 
Commission discourse on free movement of people from the “new” member states in 
Chapter Four shows, this in itself is also an issue that leads to important configurations of 
borders in the EU.  
The Commission references to globalisation as a challenge can be illustrated with 
the following statement: “… competitiveness must be increased in order to meet the 
challenge of globalization which … is … prompting a massive increase in the supply of 
labour. We all know that we cannot compete with the emerging economies on labour 
costs.”94 The last sentence indicates that the EU acknowledges that it is not in a position to 
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done according to any particular principle, such as their importance, time of articulation, etc. I have used the 
words “first” and “second” only to enumerate and distinguish between the two.    
92 Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Irish Management Institute Conference, SPEECH/93/45, 30.04.1993, p. 2. For 
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Worldwide – the European Union‟s Contribution, SPEECH/94/28, 29.03.1994, p. 3  
93 For references to globalisation as one of the major challenges to competitiveness see Vladimir Špidla, 
Closing Speech on Poverty and Social Exclusion, SPEECH/06/609, 17.10.2006, p. 2 and Vladimir Špidla, A 
European Economic and Social Model for the 21st Century, SPEECH/07/253, 25.04.2007, p. 2 
94 Vladimir Špidla, Boosting Productivity and Creating Better Jobs, SPEECH/06/598, 16.10.2006, p. 2 
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compete with these countries in terms of labour costs and has identified as a way forward 
increasing its own productivity instead. For example, in 1993 Padraig Flynn argued: “When 
examining the reasons for our decline in competitiveness, I think it is important not to fall 
into the trap of focusing purely on comparative labour costs or issues of social protection 
… Let‟s be honest about this. There is no way we can compete with the Pacific Rim by 
lowering wages and reducing levels of social protection to standards reminiscent of the 19
th
 
century. This is not only not possible but it is not desirable. The difference in hourly wage 
levels between Germany and China is 25 to 1. We should not feel threatened by this … But 
it does mean that we have to adapt and learn to stay ahead of the competition by other 
means, especially by focusing on that real test of competitiveness – productivity.”95 The 
ways for achieving this is through Research and Development, improvement of 
management skills and investment in skills training.
96
  
Twelve years later, there are no real changes in the way the appropriate responses 
are articulated in Commission documents: “… the competitive threat to Europe does not 
simply stem from bringing into productive use a huge pool of hitherto unskilled, untapped 
rural labour. That ignores the huge strides forward that the Chinese, Indians and others are 
making in education and R&D. That makes new competition more broad based with even 
more implications. Yes, we now face a huge competitive challenge in labour intensive 
industries … but in future, in every sector, we will face strong competition unless we 
manage to keep a lead in research and innovation.”97 The important change manifested in 
this passage is the expectation that in future all sectors of the EU‟s economy are likely to 
face fierce economic competition if the Union does not manage to adequately address the 
challenge through maintaining high levels of productivity. 
Thus, these articulations of low wage economies construct them as the “Other” 
because they unequivocally convey the message that these countries are posing a threat to 
the economic performance of the EU. Hence, they are putting at risk the well-being of the 
Union‟s citizens and business. Also, these articulations have important moral connotations. 
They convey the message that endorsing the social standards of the above countries is 
                                               
95 Padraig Flynn, The Challenges Facing the Community on Employment, SPEECH/93/86, 09.07.1993, p. 2 
96 Identified in ibid. 
97 Peter Mandelson, A Modern Social Agenda for Europe, SPEECH/05/381, 23.06.2005, p. 3 
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totally unacceptable because it represents a backward move that will wipe out significant 
achievements of the EU societies. These articulations inevitably contribute to the 
establishment of a perception that these countries are rivals to the EU and have a social 
organisation inferior to that of the EU, which in turn constructs a border between them and 
the Union – an external border for the latter. In summary, the main way the discourse of the 
Commission constructs low wage economies as the “Other” is through explicit references 
to threat and the suggestion of moral superiority for the EMoS/ ESM. Furthermore, as I 
explain in greater detail below, these articulations also promote the identity of the EU as a 
highly productive economy. These are somewhat different from the emphasis in the 
discourse constructing world economic leaders as the “Other”. 
The latter are the second main “Other” emerging from the Commission social 
policy discourse. The most numerous references in the last 20 years are to the US, followed 
by Japan. As early as 1986 Commission President Delors argued that the economic 
difficulties in the Community – slow growth, widespread unemployment, and aging 
population are: “constantly being compared with the much more successful performance of 
the United States and Japan over recent years.”98 Further evidence for this is the continuous 
comparison of various macroeconomic performance indicators of the US and Japan with 
these of the EC/EU.
99
 Thus, there is a clear line of continuation in the discourse of the 
Commission since the SEA. 
However, there is one important “Other” that has disappeared from the discourse. 
Before 1989 the EMoS was perceived as the third way of societal organisation, opposed 
simultaneously to both the US‟ neo-liberal model and the Soviet‟s social-regulated 
                                               
98 European Commission, Commission President Calls for Continued Effort to Adjust European Economic 
Structures without Abandoning the „European Model‟, IP/86/281, 05.06.1986, p. 1 
99 See for example, European Commission, Growth, Competitiveness, Employment – the Challenges and 
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markets.
100
 This is illustrated by the claim of Commissioner Flynn that the EC/EU has 
steered unique course between excessive paternalism and excessive liberalism.
101
 After 
1989, however, there is only one opponent left. As Padraig Flynn declares: “The collapse of 
Communism has consolidated the world predominance of political democracy and the 
market economy, but it has also ushered in a new era of socio-economic competition and 
cooperation in which there will be winners and losers.”102 In that respect, during the Cold 
War there were two main “Others” to the EMoS, while after its end, the US‟ neo-liberal 
model remained its sole most important competitor. 
Therefore, although as mentioned above, Japan is a country with which the 
EC/EU is constantly comparing itself, it is hardly surprising that after the collapse of 
Communism, the US and its neo-liberal model is the most pronounced “Other” emerging 
from the Commission social policy discourse.
103
 According to Jepsen and Pascual, one of 
the assumptions of the EMoS discourse is the superiority of the European model over the 
American one. The US serves as a negative example for European policy-makers, which 
sets the boundaries within which differences are constructed.
104
 The “Other-ing” of the US 
in this discourse is articulated in an interrelated double move, which shows the negative 
sides of the socio-economic organisation of the Other and reaffirms the Self‟s superiority. 
According to Commissioner Flynn: “There is much public discussion about the 
relative virtues of the North American, Japanese and European socio-economic models. 
Europe certainly has a lot to learn from the United States and Japan … but the truth is that 
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there is no model there to follow.”105 The overall verdict of the experts is that the socio-
economic models in the US and Japan have some important competitive advantages 
because they allow for lower production costs and social spending as well as greater 
flexibility for employers. These in turn are contributing to the better macroeconomic 
performances of the two countries in comparison to the EU. However, as the documents of 
the European Commission make clear, there are important disadvantages of the American 
socio-economic system. 
Perhaps the most important disadvantage of the neo-liberal model articulated by 
the Commission documents, is that it has: “… severe social consequences, as demonstrated 
in the US.”106 According to a report by the US Council of Competitiveness: “… the real 
income of the average American family has remained flat for two decades … the US infant 
mortality rate is among the highest in the world, and … America‟s schoolchildren rank the 
last among the big industrial nations in their grasp of science and mathematics. And while 
America‟s postgraduate education remain among the world‟s finest, the cost has risen by at 
least a third in real terms since 1980, far outpacing the average family‟s capacity to pay for 
it.”107 Furthermore, although living standards in the US are higher than even in the richest 
EU member states, this is due not to greater American efficiency or productivity but to the 
longer working hours and most importantly to the higher proportion of working age 
population being in work in the US.
108
 Also, although the US has created more jobs in the 
1990s in comparison to the EU, this has not tackled the issue of the so-called “working 
poor”109 and the resulting social exclusion.110 
Therefore, these articulations point to a situation where although the US does 
have good macroeconomic indicators for productivity and employment these do not 
translate into increased living standards for the overwhelming part of the population. On the 
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106 Padraig Flynn, Social Policy and Employment - Friends or Foes?, SPEECH/ 95/278, 11.12.1995, p. 5 
107 Quoted in Ibid. 
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contrary, there are: “Extremely wide income disparities.”111 This is crucial in light of the 
Commission social policy discourse. As we have seen in the Lisbon Council Conclusions, 
for the EMoS and the ESM creating a cohesive society, which does not have big income 
distribution gaps is a major focal point. Commissioner Flynn summarises this stance in the 
following way: “… if Europe is to become more competitive, European Society as a who le 
must become more productive. The health of European society and the prosperity of 
European economy demand the maximum productivity, the optimum contribution from all. 
But society as a whole cannot achieve maximum productiveness if, in the process, it 
becomes increasingly divided, between the rich who get richer and the poor who get poorer, 
between those who forge ahead and those who are left behind. In the mix between 
economic and social policy, the basic premise of social justice which underpins all our 
societies must not be abandoned.”112 This clearly juxtaposes the US to the EU. 
Since the data on the US shows that big social disparity is exactly what is 
happening there, it should come as no surprise that various Commission documents warn 
against an all out emulation of the US neo-liberalism despite its economic successes. For 
example, Commissioner Flynn urges: “… let‟s not go back to the 19th century, or imitate 
the Americans. It just isn‟t desirable either in terms of long run competitiveness or social 
justice.”113 And Commissioner Diamantopoulou states that: “Europe should not attempt to 
ape the US in all things. I too believe that we should hold on to our distinct social beliefs, to 
ensure that „market economy‟ does not mean „market society‟.”114 The reason for these 
statements is that the Commission discourse on the social models in the EC/EU promotes 
the idea that they ensure: “… a healthy balance between economic growth and social 
cohesion. And we have seen all too clearly from other countries, including the United 
States, the results of not having adequate social policies.”115 
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These statements clearly indicate that the discourse of the European Commission 
rebuffs: “… robustly those …, whose definition of competitiveness, finds it possible to 
situate economic health in a social wasteland”116 and does not endorse “the narrow, selfish 
view of social policy”117 What is even more important in terms of the topic of this study, 
these articulations construct the US as the prime example of an actor that has adopted such 
socio-economic organisation and in this respect it is the “Other” for the EU. Furthermore, 
as Jepsen and Pascual, referred to above argue, the discourse of the Commission suggests 
that the situation in the Union is better than that in the US. In this respect, the Commission 
discourse on the social models creates a distinct identity of the EU and clearly sets it apart 
from the main players that are most like the Self, thus, constructing the external border of 
the Union. 
The general way in which this is conveyed is along the lines that: “The European 
way of life is based on a different social philosophy from that of the USA. A less 
individualistic and more collectivist model of society.”118 And that: “… a weak, de-
regulated or low-cost social protection and safeguards system does not bring economic 
advantage.”119 For example, according to the critics of the ESM, EU member states spend 
too much on social policy in comparison to the US, which affects their competitiveness. 
However, European Commission documents make clear that overall: “… the US devotes 
exactly the same proportion of its economic output to health, pensions, social protection, 
labour market measures, child care, and so … as does Denmark ... And the other EU 
countries within 1 or 2 per cent of the US, either way.”120  
The key difference, however, is the way in which this is done – while some 
countries tax social transfers, other countries, such as the US, impose mandatory private 
social spending obligations on their workers and employers.
121
 Thus, “The difference 
between the European model and the American model is that, for us in Europe, social 
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policy is a permanent concern of the state.”122 The US‟ neo-liberal system, on the other 
hand, has effectively led to a situation, where higher wage employees receive far better 
social protection than the low-wage employees or the unemployed. It is this low social 
spending on a large proportion of the American population that has led to increased income 
disparities and the resulting different life opportunities for the various social groups. Or as 
Commissioner Flynn argues: “While all income groups in the US saw real incomes rising 
between 1960 and 1980, it was clear from 1980 onwards that the distribution of income 
growth was starting to tilt. The top earners began to gain at the expense of the lowest 
earners. Wages amongst low skilled workers are still dropping, while those of workers with 
good educational qualifications and relevant skills are going up. And the result is the rise of 
working poor and the long-term damage caused by undertrained workforce.”123 
Thus, from a European perspective there is “another side” to America‟s success 
story and it is: “… that working people in America have not shared equally in the economic 
boom.”124 In the EU, however, according to the Commission discourse: “… we do not want 
the social exclusion and division we see in the US … We do not believe that cohesion can 
only be bought at the expense of economic competitiveness. On the contrary, we believe 
that cohesion, if achieved by the right means, positively enhances competitiveness The 
alternative to cohesion – increasing social exclusion – comes with a heavy economic price 
tag: higher public spending, not just on welfare bills, but on dealing with the damage. 
Poverty-related illness, drug addiction and crime push up expenditure on health care, 
policing, prisons and rehabilitation.”125 When this is taken into account, despite differences 
between the EU Member States‟s social systems: “… the major contrast remains between 
Europe and the US. Not in levels of expenditure, but in terms of who gets what across 
society as a whole. There is a choice being made in these different approaches. But not a 
choice between high and low costs. It is a choice between access and equality or ability to 
pay. A choice between a more, or less, uneven distribution of income, opportunities and life 
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chances. With Europe‟s more egalitarian public policies, on the one hand, and the US 
private regimes – both mandatory and voluntary – on the other. Which serves to distinguish 
us as societies. But which hardly puts us at an economic disadvantage. Rather the 
contrary.”126  
Thus, the discourse of the Commission articulates the US‟ neo-liberal model as 
the “Other” – this model is qualitatively distinct from the European one because it fails to 
ensure equality in opportunities for success within the society. Therefore, this discourse 
clearly draws a dividing line between the EU and the US, thus constructing a very 
important external border for the Union. Furthermore, the documents of the European 
Commission openly state that the situation in the EU is better, thus articulating the 
superiority of the ESM over the American one: “So the real policy issue is not the level of 
spending. But the distribution of the benefits across different groups in society. And the 
efficiency of the delivery systems. And, on both accounts we know that the European 
social model performs much better than the US. Indeed, all too often, the US demonstrates 
the real hidden costs of not having effective and equitable social policies.”127 The EU 
superiority is a result of: “… a real social advantage, with the benefits of our social systems 
being more evenly shared across our populations, and with fewer social problems in 
consequence.”128 This superiority is further strengthened by claims that in different 
economic areas or in different periods the EU is performing better than the US. For 
example, according to Commissioner Flynn: “As a whole we‟re doing better than the US in 
terms of global trade. Profit shares are higher in Europe than in the US.”129 or: “… the US 
economy is in worse difficulties than the EU at the present time. With a serious loss of jobs, 
and significant increases in unemployment.”130   
Thus, the examination of the discourse of the European Commission on social 
policy shows that currently the most significant “Other” articulated, in terms of world 
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economic leaders, is the US. The most important division drawn between the US and the 
EU lies in the different ways in which their systems of social protection work and the 
resulting income redistribution within the respective society. In distinction to the low wage 
“Other”, the difference with world economic leaders is expressed not along the lines of 
threat but mainly through claims of moral superiority that emphasises the negative 
characteristics of the opponent‟s socio-economic system. Thus, the Commission discourse 
identifies the system of social protection, which is one of the central features of the EMoS/ 
ESM, in the EU member states as one of the core elements creating the EU identity. 
Furthermore, the superiority of this system over others is consistently upheld, thus creating 
a unifying focal point at which the pride of being European can be expressed.
131
 This 
continuous reference to the moral superiority of the system in the EU in this field is in stark 
contrast with the articulations contributing to the construction of the external EU identity 
border in the area of free movement of people. As my analysis in the previous chapter has 
shown, there the articulations lack such connotations and instead convey the message that 
the EU has to unequivocally catch up.  
Furthermore, the “Other-ing” in the Commission discourse also allows 
summarising the two main features of the EU socio-economic system as its very high 
productivity and the relatively equal income distribution. It is along these two main lines 
that the articulations of the “Other” converge with those of the Self, which work towards 
the construction of a specific European identity, thus further reinforcing the creation of a 
distinctive external border of the Union. 
Given the fact that the European integration process has always been first and 
foremost concerned with the economic sphere it should come as no surprise that one of the 
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dominant self-representations that emerge from the discourses of the European Commission 
is of the EC/EU as an economic world leader and as the world‟s biggest and most 
successful economic block. In the words of Commissioner Flynn: “We are the largest, most 
productive entity in the world …”132 This is further evident from the continuous references 
of different Commission documents to statistical data that point in this direction. For 
example, the Green Paper on Social Policy reads: “The Community is one of the most 
prosperous areas of the world. While it contains only 7% of the world‟s working age 
population, it produces some 30% of world‟s GDP and 45% of world trade in manufactured 
goods.”133 These figures, although slightly adjusted in recent years, as well as other data 
showing the good economic performance of the EU, are repeated in the speeches of the 
officials of the Commission.
134
 Overall, these clearly indicate that the EU sees itself as a 
world leader. Furthermore, although there is a line in the Commission discourse that 
acknowledges that in the last decades the Union has experienced economic difficulties with 
social repercussions in terms of tackling unemployment and growth,
135
 its belief in its 
ability of overcoming the current difficulties is nevertheless still strongly present. The best 
evidence of this is the new strategic goal set at the Lisbon European Council – in the next 
decade to make the Union: “… the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based 
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economy in the world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs 
and greater social cohesion.”136 
This reference to greater social cohesion brings back into the focus the ESM. It is 
in concurrence with the articulations on the US examined above and indicates the 
commitment to continue to pursue improved economic performance in the EU not despite 
but through efforts for solving existing social problems. The Green Paper on Social Policy 
reads that: “… with the disappearance of a two-block world strategic system … world 
strategic competition and cooperation will be increasingly based on success in 
socioeconomic development, involving different and to some extent, competing forms of 
capitalism”.137 Thus, if I want to interpret what is the nature of the EU that is constructed 
by the Commission discourse, I have to identify the form of capitalism developed in the 
Union. 
According to the discourse of the European Commission, the societies in all 
member states are built on the belief that there should be a balance between extreme 
individuality and extreme state involvement. The former will lead to greater gaps in the 
income distribution thus triggering atomisation, which can eventually cause societal 
dissolution. At the same time the latter can “suffocate” the individual leading among other 
things to loss of economic competitiveness. According to Commissioner Flynn: “We have 
steered a unique course in the world, between excessive liberalism – which risks social 
fragmentation; and excessive paternalism – which stifles initiative and innovation.”138 This 
has resulted in the establishment of a particular form of capitalism on the territory of the 
EC/EU, which is exemplified by its specific tax and benefits systems or the involvement of 
the social partners. This is one of the features that emerge from the Commission discourse 
as forming the EC/EU‟s as a community. 
The other most important characteristic that defines the European integration 
project and helps giving it a meaning is, as we have seen in this part, the economic 
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performance of the EC/EU. It is on its economic success that the power and influence of the 
EC/EU are based and it has allowed the Community to become one of the leading actors on 
the contemporary world stage.  
However, as became evident during the overview of the Commission discourse on 
social policy, there is a strong line that attributes the success in the EC/EU economic 
performance to the social model that exists there, thus reaffirming its centrality to the 
identity of the Union. According to Commissioner Flynn: “Social Policy is an integral part 
of the competitive formula. There will not be a competitive Europe without a vibrant social 
policy.”139 Commissioner Diamantopoulou also argues: “Our social models have been 
centre stage in our continued economic and social progress.”140 This is due to the fact that 
according to the Commission articulations, as the comparisons with the US above have 
shown, the ESM makes economic sense because a failure of social policies is costly for 
both governments and societies.
141
 This provides the rationale for promoting stronger social 
policies because “A major part of social expenditure – on health and education, for example 
– is a direct investment in human resources. As important as any investment in machinery 
or infrastructure”,142 thus indicating that: “… the capital of workers – human resource 
capital – [is] increasingly seen to be as important as physical capital.”143 Therefore, in a 
nut-shell, the self-perception of the EU, emerging from the documents of the European 
Commission is as one of the world leaders, which is based on its strong economic 
performance, which in its turn is a result of the existence of a specific mode of social 
organisation in the societies that form the Union. This self-perception, however, constructs 
the external EU border because it contributes to its constitution as an organisation that has 
certain specific features that define its community. In turn this creates it as a distinctive and 
unified entity. However, such unifying perception is not the only way in which issues under 
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the social dimension are articulated. As I show in the section below, some Commission 
articulations contribute to the reconstruction of internal borders inside the EU. 
 
 
5.5. The Construction of an Internal Border in the EU through Commission 
Social Policy Discourse 
 In the context of the social models in the EU, the construction of internal EU 
borders through the discourse of the European Commission relates to the way social issues 
were tackled during the Eastern Enlargement process and the references to the UK that can 
be interpreted as constructing it as an internal “Other”.  
 
5.5.1. Britain as the Internal “Other” in the EU 
Generally, the UK represents a special case when it comes to the EMoS/ ESM 
because, like America, its social model is neo-liberal. As the discussion so far has shown, 
the Commission articulations indicate that its idea of how social life should be organised 
strongly opposes the neo-liberal model. Instead, its vision advocates greater involvement in 
social issues for the state and the supranational level in the EU context. In the past this has 
led to British opting-out of EU-level legislation on social policy, which represents a 
tangible manifestation of the existence of an internal border between the UK and the rest of 
the EU on this particular issue. Although it joined the Social Chapter in the Treaty of 
Amsterdam in 1997, the trend of Britain disagreeing with the rest of the EU on social 
policy issues is still present. For example, in the beginning of the new millennium, the 
Directive on Information and Consultation of workers raised: “considerable concern and 
worry … in the UK”144 and in the summer of 2005, the UK expressed its opposition to the 
proposed legislation at EU level for the number of hours a week that a worker is allowed to 
do. This constitutes the discursive background within which the articulations of the 
Commission operate. My argument is that despite its efforts to the contrary, due to the 
different visions of the UK and the Commission, Commission social policy discourse 
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constructs the UK as the “Other” thus recreating the existing division between the UK and 
the rest of the EU. This leads to an inconsistency in the Commission discourse, which is 
articulated through linking the UK with the “US” and “deregulators”, which both emerge 
from the Commission social policy discourse as “Others”. 
In concurrence with the de-bordering trend under the first reading some 
articulations of the Commission indicate its desire to overcome the internal border between 
the UK and the other member states on social policy issues. This is enunciated through a 
two-step process. Firstly, the Commission has referred to the British position as a serious 
issue because it obstructs the integration process.
145
 This is because “there are two different 
legal bases for the pursuit of social policy at European level … one [that] applies across the 
Union and is based on the social provisions of the Treaty of Rome … and the other applies 
to 14 Member States and is based on the Agreement on Social Policy.”146 Secondly, the 
Commission has clearly shown that it is in favour of discontinuation of this situation: “My 
plea – here today – for an end to a separate social chapter simply reflects what has in recent 
years informed the whole European Social policy”; “I hope the UK will come to recognize 
that having two legal frameworks for social legislation is what threatens jobs, puts workers‟ 
confidence and security at risk and weakens competitiveness.”147 This clearly indicates that 
the Commission supports taking the internal EU borders down, which importantly should 
be done through accepting the developments at EU level. 
The promotion of the establishment of a common social space in the EU and the 
inclusion of the UK in it are further advanced by some Commission articulations, which 
emphasise that the UK belongs to the ESM. Most often this is done by acknowledging the 
diversity of the social systems of the member states, a technique, which I looked at in the 
section on de-bordering. As I argued there, the inclusiveness is implied by the insistence on 
the existence of common underlying values and aims, which supersede these differences in 
the detail. The following statement is a good illustration of this in the case of the UK: “The 
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way in which these values are implemented in the Member States of the European Union, 
with their different traditions, varies … For example, the United Kingdom has the National 
Health Service, whereas Germany has a system of insurance funds …but the basic common 
direction of all systems is clear.”148 However, there are other articulations that can be 
interpreted along the line that the UK represents a special case in the EU, thus contradicting 
the claim that a common social space exists in the EU. 
The first way in which the inconsistency is articulated is through linking the UK 
and the US. Thus, despite the above claims about Britain‟s belonging to the ESM, from the 
discourse of the Commission it also emerges as a state that has macroeconomic indicators 
similar to the US: “… when we look at both income inequality and literacy inequality, we 
find that the Nordics – Denmark, Sweden, Norway – are at one end of the spectrum, in both 
cases. And that the US, and unfortunately the UK too, are at the other end.”149; “… US 
workers work 5 to 10 per cent longer hours per year than European. Even longer than the 
British!”150 Thus, these documents link the UK with the US through establishing a clear 
resemblance between them. As the previous section showed the US is constructed as one of 
the main “Others” of the EU. Therefore, the link of the UK with it contributes to  the 
exclusion of the UK from the EU, rather than to its inclusion, hence constructing an internal 
border in the Union.  
This perception of ambiguous belonging of the UK to the ESM is further reinforced 
by the frequent reminder in Commission documents that the UK is a part of the integration 
project and faces the same challenges as the other member states: “Over the next decade, 
Europe, including Britain, faces a fundamental choice of directions about its response to 
intensifying global competition.”151; “That is the core of the European employment and 
social policy, for the UK and Europe, in the next decade.”152 These have: “… been a test of 
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the UK‟s ability to address both its own identity in Europe, and its own … performance, in 
European terms.”153 These statements promote a European identity for the UK. However, 
the fact that these reminders are constantly necessary
154
 implies that in Britain, the 
identification with the EU is not that strong, that the British often feel apart, rather than a 
part of the EU. Thus, although they are members of the EU, this indicates that there is an 
important dividing line between them and the rest of the Union on social policy issues, 
which points towards the existence of an internal EU border. This can be illustrated by the 
fact, admitted openly by Commissioner Flynn that in the UK there is: “… sometimes bitter, 
and essentially sham, battle which surrounds any mention of “Europe”, and, especially, the 
“S” word”155 and that the British tabloid press (perhaps more that the national press in any 
other member state) is notorious for its: “… spread of fear and loathing of the Union”.156  
The latter leads to the question what, if anything makes the UK different? As I said 
earlier, in distinction to the socio-economic models on the continental part of the EU, the 
British one is neo-liberal. Therefore, it can be expected that in comparison to other 
European social models, the predisposition on social issues in the UK has been towards less 
intervention, deregulation, or lower social spending. Currently this predisposition is a result 
of the policies of the Conservative governments that ruled the country for almost two 
decades after 1979. This incline has meant that (especially when the Conservative party 
was in power) the UK was finding it difficult to come to terms with the philosophy 
underpinning EMoS/ ESM. This distinction is reflected in the Commission discourse, 
which can be well exemplified by the following quotation of Commissioner Flynn: “Lady 
Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the UK, used to say that she didn‟t know what 
society was. I know.”157 It clearly points to the contradictory positions of the two 
politicians, thus putting them on the opposing sides of the dividing line. These positions are 
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informed by the different philosophies they hold. For the EU Commissioner: “People and 
their skills, enterprise and confidence, as consumers, investors and workers, are both the 
future of our economies, and of its bedrock, families and society. The economy has to be 
strong. The values of the market are necessary for enterprise and business. But for citizens, 
for people, it‟s more complex. Human values are more than – and different from – market 
values.”158 As we have seen earlier, various Commission documents promote the idea that a 
very important part of these citizens‟ values are the social models in the EU, which stand in 
favour of solidarity and equality. These, however, require active redistributive policies. It is 
exactly this kind of policies that Margaret Thatcher was opposing and in turn, this has led 
her to proclaim that she did not know what society is. 
This differentiation between citizens values and market values is again reminiscent 
to a line in the Commission discourse on US‟ “Other”. Taking this into account, however, 
allows drawing more parallels between the socio-economic systems of the US and the UK. 
This further contradicts the claim of the UK‟s belonging to the ESM and constructs it 
instead as “Other”, just as the US is, and in this way – establishes an internal border in the 
EU. Further evidence in support of such argument is that according to the documents of the 
European Commission, some important positive and negative aspects of British economic 
performance are closer to these of the US. For example, in terms of its achievements under 
the European Employment Strategy: “The UK in many ways is a very positive role model, 
although there is an issue of balance with respect to employment and social policies. In our 
work on labour markets within the Employment strategy … we see that the UK performs 
well in terms of a number of traditional flexibility criteria. And it has shown an impressive 
capacity to respond to change, especially regarding new technologies. Nevertheless, there 
remains work to be done … there is lack of social partnership, at a time when we envisage 
an enhanced role for the social partners at both European and national level …”159  
The second main inconsistency in the Commission discourse on social policy that 
contributes to the emergence of an internal border between the UK and the rest of the 
member states is the articulation of those in favour of deregulation as “Other”. According 
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to the Commission, there are clear dangers in deregulation: “… we must avoid … drifting 
back to the policies and practices that failed to deliver in the past – like wholesale market 
de-regulation. Not only did they not work, they proved counter-productive. Creating social 
strife and conflict. Slowing the process of reform and progress. Failing to address the real 
labour market problems we face.”160; “… deregulators … offer us the low pay, low 
productivity route.”161 Instead, the Commission promotes the rationale for the existence of 
social policy at Union level and is at pains to emphasise and reassure that its aim is not to 
regulate at any price and that it only does so when there is a necessity for that: “Our [EU] 
economic objectives cannot be achieved without the social dimension.” and this is because: 
“When business goes beyond national borders, I believe there is a need for social rights and 
principles to go beyond these borders too.”162 This is what makes legislation and regulation 
at European level important: “The Union has to exist for every situation where the citizen‟s 
interest is better served by acting together than by acting separately ... The Commission is 
convinced that we must act less in order to act better. But on the other hand, … it will not 
baulk at taking steps whenever it firmly believes that a contribution from the Union is 
needed if a question of common interest has to be addressed.”163 
However, according to the discourse of the Commission, this position is not 
supported by Britain: “We are all familiar with the UK problem which is relatively easy to 
understand. It combines a general skepticism about the merit of any action at European 
level with a very specific allergy to regulation in the social field since in the last 15 years 
the Conservative Government has been pushing policy which goes in the completely 
opposite direction.”164 More generally, similar concerns are expressed in the following 
way: “There are those of you who believe that we don‟t need any legislation in the social 
field at European level and that the answer lies even in de-regulation. Others, no doubt 
                                               
160 Anna Diamantopoulou, Growth, Employment and Enlargement; the Challenges for Europe, 
SPEECH/01/514, 08.11.2001, p. 2 
161 Padraig Flynn, Social Policy and the Economy, SPEECH/97/35, 11.02.1997, p.4 
162 Both quotations are from Padraig Flynn, The Development of European Level Social Dialogue, 
SPEECH/96/200, 23.07.1996, p.3 
163 Jacques Santer, Speech to the European Parliament, SPEECH/96/260, 22.10.1996, p. 1. For other 
examples of how the Commission justifies the EU-level legislation see Padraig Flynn, The Social Chapter – 
Cost or Benefit?, SPEECH/96/223, 26.09.1996, p. 5; European Commission, Facts about the „Social 
Chapter‟, MEMO/97/13, p. 2 
164 Padraig Flynn, Speech at the Irish Institute of European Affairs, SPEECH/96/17, 19.01.1996, p. 1 
 221 
elsewhere, believe that the answer lies in more legislation …”165 What is interesting about 
this quotation is the reference to the location of people holding the opposing positions. In 
the first case – “those of you”, implying the people the Commissioner was delivering the 
speech to, while in the second case – “no doubt elsewhere” – implies that the people 
supporting this position are not present at the place of the speech. Given that it was 
delivered in Dublin, a capital of a country usually classified as belonging, just as the UK, to 
the neo-liberal social model,
166
 it can be extrapolated that the countries with this model are 
in favour of less EU regulation. Thus, the discourse of the Commission clearly articulates 
deregulators as “Others” (because they pose a danger) and establishes a link between them 
and the UK, which results in excluding the latter from the ESM and in constructing an 
internal border in the EU. I classify this border as existing beyond the national borders of 
the member states because it is articulated on the assumption of the existence of an EMoS/ 
ESM encompassing a common social space across the EU. It is the failure of only one 
member to adhere to the principles of these models that brings the internal border into 
existence.    
 
5.5.2. The construction of an internal EU border through the process of Eastern 
Enlargement  
The second main way in which the discourse of the European Commission on 
social policy has contributed to the construction of an internal border in the EU is the 
manner in which the process of Eastern Enlargement of the EU was conducted. As I have 
shown in the section on de-bordering above, the Commission has articulated a position that 
the applicant states should become a part of the social dimension and not only of the 
economic and monetary union and that a belonging to the ESM is not a negotiable issue. 
This implies an equivocal disappearance of the internal borders on social policy issues 
between “old” and “new” member states through the inclusion of the latter into the ESM. 
The extent to which this position was successfully promoted in practice during the 
accession process, however, is much more problematic, which makes possible the argument 
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that rather than contributing to the abolition of internal borders, the discourse of the 
Commission on Enlargement has contributed to the establishment of an internal EU border 
between “old” and “new” member states on social policy issues. This is a result of one 
major flaw of the Enlargement process – the fact that its design allowed social issues by 
and large to be attributed secondary importance. The foundations of this situation were laid 
down in Copenhagen in 1993. According to the Presidency Conclusions of this summit, the 
former Communist countries that wish to join the EU have to satisfy only economic and 
political conditions and should adhere to the aims of political, economic and monetary 
union.
167
 This clearly leaves out considerations about the inclusion of the candidate 
countries into the ESM. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the discourse of the 
European Commission, following this general trend, has also been silent on social issues, 
thus failing “to drive through a European vision of social policy …”168. Thus, the design of 
the Enlargement process left out significant engagement with social policy issues, which 
meant that the Commission discourse despite the rhetorical claim about its importance did 
not attach to it significant importance in some of its articulations. 
The following examples illustrate these points. According to a memorandum of 
the European Commission, in the second half of the 1990s, the PHARE program was 
reoriented to focus only on preparing the participating countries for EU membership. From 
1998 around 30 per cent of the assistance was directed towards institution building: “which 
includes the strengthening of democratic institutions, public administration to ensure public 
services are ready to apply the acquis … Initially this support will focus on priority areas 
such as finance, agriculture, environment, justice and home affairs.”169 Thus, social policy 
issues are obviously left out of the main focus of the EU‟s efforts. Furthermore, even when 
attempts were made in this direction, the overall result could not be evaluated as 
satisfactory in the area of social issues. This was a result of the fact that as the assessment 
of the Interim Report of the Commission on the effects of the program concludes there is: 
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“a tendency for the Commission to contract out expertise in the transition process … 
thereby losing grip on the substance and impact of the programmes.”170 Despite the fact 
that this clearly signals a danger for the successful inclusion of the “new” member states 
into the ESM, this is not effectively accounted for and acted upon. This is evident in the 
fact that according to the former Commissioner responsible for the Enlargement, Gűnter 
Verheugen: “The candidate countries have to make really determined efforts to bring in 
reforms, primarily administrative and judicial reform but also structural reform of their 
economy. I would also draw particular attention to the importance the Commission attaches 
to the position of the Roma in a number of candidate countries”,171 thus again sticking to 
the main areas mapped out by the Copenhagen criteria and not mentioning anything about 
the social aspects of the process and the challenges it is facing. 
Overall, these examples clearly indicate that despite the claim of some 
Commission documents that social policy is as important as the economic and political 
aspects of the Enlargement process, within the Commission discourse there is also a 
significant silence on the matter. This has arguably resulted in attaching less importance to 
this aspect of the accession, which means that there was less pressure exercised on the 
candidate countries to comply with the main features of the ESM. Such a position can be 
further illustrated with the efforts undertaken by the EU in the field of border controls in 
order to ensure the “new” member states‟ inclusion in Schengen. In this policy area, in 
distinction to the lack of real pressure on social policy issues, there have been a lot of 
efforts ranging from exchange of know how and actual practices to financial assistance.
172
 
The culmination of these efforts, in a way, is the SIS II, which is described as: 
“indispensable so that the new Member States can connect to the system and the Schengen 
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area without internal border control can be extended, after a positive Schengen evaluation, 
to the territory of these Member States.”173 Thus, in border controls much more clear 
criteria and benchmarks were developed and the aim has clearly been a formal inclusion 
into the EU space. 
The lack of such focused efforts and formal ways of inclusion into the ESM, 
however, has created conditions for excluding the “new” EU members from it altogether, 
which will unequivocally create an internal border in the EU. Such a tendency has already 
been clearly manifested – a report on the reform of the European Social Models, 
commissioned by the European Commission refers to only the social models of the “old” 
member states.
174
 What is remarkable is the fact that it was prepared in 2005, long after the 
decision to enlarge (and therefore include the “new” member states into the ESM) was 
taken. This is a clear manifestation of uncertainty on whether the “new” member states are 
a full-fledged part of the ESM.
175
 Therefore, arguably the articulations in the Commission 
social policy discourse have contributed to a construction of an internal EU border. They 
have not managed to promote the necessary measures that can ensure the achievement in 
practice of the goal of including the “new” member states into the ESM. Instead, they have 
reproduced the silence established with the Copenhagen criteria, which facilitates the 
creation of an internal division in the EU. 
This danger of excluding the former Communist countries from the ESM even 
after their full membership in the EU as a result of the ineffective arrangement of social 
policy issues during the Enlargement process becomes even bigger when one considers the 
fact that as former Communist countries, the majority of the “new” member states have 
very different experiences in comparison to the rest of the EU. This further increases the 
necessity of the existence of a minimum degree of unity at least at the level of basic 
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principles. The lack of such unity will clearly show inconsistency with the Commission 
claims that despite the diversity in the social arrangements in the member states, there is 
overarching commonality of values. As I demonstrated in the section on de-bordering this 
argument constitutes the bulk of the Commission discourse on the existence of a uniquely 
European way of social organisation.  
Despite this importance of ensuring such unity, the articulations in the 
Commission documents show an important inconsistency, which can be interpreted as 
contributing to further exacerbating the already existing tendency towards the construction 
of an internal border on social issues between “old” and “new” member states. This is the 
discrepancy between the main trend in developing EU cooperation and integration on social 
policy issues and the main tools used during the Enlargement process for ensuring the 
incorporation of the candidate countries into the social models in the EU. While the former 
indicate a move towards limiting Community-level legislation (as the first section of the 
Chapter has shown), there is a tendency in the Commission discourse on Enlargement to 
not pay sufficient attention to this. For example, although as I said above some documents 
mention that the candidate countries have been actively involved in the Lisbon objective 
and working methods since 2003 when they were included in the structural indicators,
176
 
the documents that talk about the progress of the applicant countries towards meeting the 
Enlargement requirements usually only refer to the achievements towards adopting the 
existing Community legislation in the social field.
177
 The danger is that given the important 
role that member states play in the social policy field, such emphasis on adopting only the 
acquis will not be sufficient to ensure effective participation of the “new” EU members into 
the future development of the EU social policy, thus excluding them from it. This will 
result in establishing an internal border in the EU. 
Therefore, the main ways in which the discourse of the European Commission 
contributes to the construction of internal borders in the EU is through inconsistencies and 
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silences in its articulations. In both cases examined in this section, there is an evident trend 
to contradict the de-bordering tendencies in the discourse of the Commission on social 
policy. In the case of the UK this is manifested through articulations that link the country 
with the US and “deregulators”, both of which emerge from the Commission discourse as 
“Others”. In the case of Eastern Enlargement, this is a result of the flaws of the process, 
which has meant that in some important instances the Commission has been silent on social 
policy issues. Importantly, as the above analysis shows, the Commission is not the EU 
institution that has taken the lead in establishing the conditions that enable the emergence 
of the internal dividing lines. Instead, the Commission articulations are bound by the wider 
discursive contexts established by individual member states‟ undertakings and positions 
(the case of the UK) or the Council (the Copenhagen criteria). However, due to the 
Commission‟s inability to successfully overcome the existing arrangements, in both cases 
the existing contradictions and silences have obstructed the successful de-bordering of the 
EU social space and have instead contributed to the construction of an internal border in the 
Union. 
 
 
5.6. Summary  
This chapter has looked into the main ways in which the Commission social 
policy discourse configures borders. The detailed analysis has shown that it not only 
undermines existing borders between the EU member states but also contributes to the 
construction and reconstruction of the Union‟s internal and external borders. Despite the 
existence of a line in the Commission discourse that contributes to the abolition of internal 
EU borders through references to increased mobility, the main way in which a common 
social space in the EU is established is through articulations of common values. These 
downplay existing differences between the member states‟ social arrangements and 
construct common identity. The last section, however, has shown that there are some 
important inconsistencies and silences in the discourse of the European Commission. 
Contrary to its claims in favour of establishment of a common social space in the EU, these 
in fact construct internal borders in the Union. This ambiguity in the Commission 
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discourse, however, is different from the one in the previous chapter. There it arose as a 
result of the efforts of the Commission to secure greater coverage of free movement of 
people amidst opposition from the member states. This meant that the Commission was 
driven to articulate specific categories of people (TCNs or EU nationals) who will be 
covered by the freedom of movement provisions in the acquis. In the field of social policy, 
the ambiguity is a result of different factors. Firstly, in the case of Eastern Enlargement it is 
due to the Commission being the implementer of the Council decisions. This has meant that 
its discourse reproduced the mismatch in the statements contained in some documents and a 
silence on these issues in other. This endangers the successful inclusion of the “new” 
member states into the ESM. Secondly, in the case of the UK this is done through linking it 
with “the US” and “de-regulators”, which emerge from the discourse of the Commission as 
“Others”, thus constructing Britain as an internal “Other”. Thus, in this case it is a result of 
a particular understanding of the ESM by the Commission and its (sometimes unsuccessful) 
strive to secure the adherence to it of all member states. The discourse of the Commission 
also articulates external “Others”, particularly the US and low wage economies, which 
constructs the external border of the Union through defining the main characteristics of the 
European model of socio-economic arrangement and identifying the geographical areas that 
adhere to them. These emerging external borders of the Union in recent years have been put 
under the limelight due to the increased internal and external demands for it to define its 
relations with its immediate “outside”. These have given rise to another string of 
ambiguous border configurations by the Commission, which I examine in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
 
THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY – AN AMBIGUOUS 
CONFIGURATION OF EUROPEAN BORDERS
1
 
 
 
6.1. Introduction 
So far I have examined policy areas that focused primarily on issues internal to the 
EU. In the last empirical chapter of the study, I turn my attention to a policy area that is 
dealing with the exterior of the Union, the ENP. Given this, it configures slightly different 
borders. Although the articulations still construct EU borders, because of the external 
nature of this policy, the bordering configurations are also directly related to the 
construction and reconstruction of European borders. This renders the distinction between 
de-bordering, construction and reconstruction of EU‟s borders irrelevant at times because 
their focus is on the inside of the Union. Thus, in this chapter the analysis is structured 
primarily around the configuration of territorial/ identity borders rather than the categories 
employed in the other chapters.  Time-wise, the ENP is the youngest of the policies 
included in the research and in distinction to the rest of the issues examined in the thesis it 
was not directly boosted by the SEA. Instead, it is more directly related to the emergence of 
the third pillar within the Treaty of the EU in 1992. As such, there are a number of reasons 
that make it an interesting case study for this research. Firstly, as an external policy field, it 
provides an illustration of the border configurations in Commission discourse on such 
matters. Secondly, this is an area that similarly to border controls is clearly related to 
borders. Thirdly, it is of interest due to the wide controversies in recent years surrounding 
the issue of the EU‟s external borders, both inside and outside (in the neighbouring 
countries) the Union. These make it paramount to examine the configuration of borders in 
this policy area through the Commission discourse in order to provide a comprehensive 
                                               
1 A slightly different version of this chapter was published in Geopolitics. See Valentina Kostadinova, „The 
Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders‟, Geopolitics, 14: 2 (2009), pp. 235-255. 
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account of the problem. My major argument is that similar to the configurations of borders 
in the other policy areas examined so far, the Commission discourse on the ENP is 
ambiguous. Therefore, instead of unequivocally preventing the emergence of new dividing 
lines between the EU and its neighbours, some of the Commission articulations create the 
perception that significant differences exist between them, thus recreating divisions in 
Europe. In order to make this argument, the chapter proceeds as follows. The first section 
provides an outline of the ENP, explains the powers of the Commission in this policy area 
and presents the major articulations that configure borders. The second section looks at how 
the speeches of Commission officials and its ENP-related policy proposals articulate the 
achievement of the envisaged common area. In the third section I show how this discourse 
contributes to the emergence of territorial and identity borders of the EU. The fourth 
section examines how, contrary to the policy‟s stated aims, the Commission ENP discourse 
facilitates the emergence of divisions in Europe.  
 
 
6.2. Development of the ENP and Main Commission Articulations that 
Configure Borders 
 From its inception, the ENP was directly related to border configuration.
2
 It was 
shaped in the early 2000s when the Eastern Enlargement of the EU was looming and there 
was an on-going debate about the future of the external borders of the Union. In effect, the 
advance of the ENP was the response to these developments. The policy first started to take 
shape in early 2002 with efforts towards the “Wider Europe” initiative, which was 
particularly aimed towards Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. The Copenhagen 
                                               
2 Despite that relation between the ENP and borders the vast majority of academic research on this policy is 
not explicitly employing the concept of borders. See for example Fraser Cameron, Rosa Balfour, „The 
European Neighbourhood Policy as a Conflict Prevention Tool‟, European Policy Centre, Issue Paper No. 47, 
June 2006; Michaela Dodini, Marco Fantini, „The EU Neighbourhood Policy: Implications for Economic 
Growth and Stability‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44: 3 (2006), pp. 507-532; Elisabeth Johansson-
Nogues, „A Ring of Friends? The Implications of the European Neighbourhood Policy for the Mediterranean‟, 
Mediterranean Politics, 9: 2 (2004), pp. 240-247; Ivailo Gatev, The EU’s Neighbourhood Policy towards 
Ukraine, paper presented at the European Foreign Policy Conference, held at London School of Economics, 
2-3 July 2004; Heather Grabbe, „How the EU should help its Neighbours?, Centre for European Reform, June 
2004. For a more thorough review of the relevant research on this issue see Valentina Kostadinova, „The 
Commission, ENP and Construction of Borders‟, Geopolitics, 14: 2 (2009), pp. 235-255, pp. 237-238   
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European Council formally adopted the initiative in December 2002 but on the insistence of 
the Southern EU members also included the non-member states on the shores of the 
Mediterranean Sea. The number of ENP countries rose further in June 2004 when the 
Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia also became official European 
Union partners in this policy. In the meantime, Russia and Algeria had declined 
participation and instead insisted on developing its relations with the EU on a separate 
track.
3
 The European Commission formally initiated the ENP in March 2003 with its 
Communication on the “Wider Europe Neighbourhood”.4  
The main aim of this policy, as summarised by the Commissioner responsible for 
External Relations and the ENP Benita Ferrero-Waldner is “… to expand the zone of 
prosperity, stability and security …” beyond the borders of the EU.5 The roots of this aim 
go back to the European Security Strategy, which outlines as major security threats to the 
EU in the post-Cold War era terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, 
regional conflicts, state failure, and organised crime.
6
 Thus, one of the conclusions of the 
Security Strategy is that the “… internal threat to our security has an important external 
dimension: cross-border trafficking in drugs, women, illegal immigrants and weapons … 
Such criminal activities are often associated with weak or failing states.”7 As a result, a key 
strategic objective for addressing these threats is for the countries on the borders of the EU 
to be well-governed, because: “Neighbours who are engaged in violent conflict, weak states 
where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth 
on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”8  
Immediately after the end of the Cold War the tool for achieving stability in the 
EU‟s neighbourhood was the accession of some of the former Communist countries into the 
                                               
3 This summary is based on Karen Smith, „The Outsiders: the European Neighbourhood Policy‟, International 
Affairs, 81: 4 (2005), pp. 757-773, p. 759.  Another source that provides an overview of the evolution of the 
ENP is Elizabeth Johansson-Nogues, „The EU and its Neighbourhood: an Overview‟ in Katja Weber, Michael 
Smith, Michael Baun (eds), Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery? (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 21-35 
4 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003 
5 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Neighbourhood Policy, SPEECH/06/149, 07.03.2006, p. 2   
6 In „A Secure Europe in a Better World – European Security Strategy‟, available at 
http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, accessed on 21.08.2006, pp. 3-4 
7 Ibid., p. 4 
8  Ibid., p. 7 
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EU, which was done through the Enlargement policy. As a result, borders have been 
transformed and as the Literature Review in Chapter Two showed, it prompted a debate 
about how the Union‟s relations with its neighbours are best conceived of. However, more 
recent speeches of high-ranking EU officials and EU documents show that gradually a 
position that the Union cannot enlarge “ad finitum” is becoming ever more pronounced. 
This has also prompted the above-mentioned on-going debate about the limits of the EU.
9
 
Thus, since the early 2000s the ENP became the new tool for dealing with these issues. 
Despite the fact that this policy does not envisage full EU membership for the partner 
countries, and therefore, is in some respects a departure from the logic of Enlargement, in 
other ways it is a continuation of it. Paramount in that respect is that the ENP just as the 
Enlargement envisages addressing the security threats for the EU by engaging with its 
neighbours. The overall aims of the Action Plans are concurring with the Copenhagen 
criteria and their implementation is reminiscent of the accession negotiations of the 1990s. 
Therefore, the ENP, just as the Enlargement, can achieve its aims by transforming the 
borders between the EU and its neighbours through diminishing the visibility of the 
dividing line.
10
  
However, the European Security Strategy demonstrates that the overriding logic of 
the ENP is that the world outside the borders of the EU is disordered. Furthermore, because 
the disorder of this world is threatening to destroy the ordered world inside the EU, it must 
undertake due action so that it can protect itself from the outside dangers. The envisaged 
way of doing this is to neutralise the risks arising from the disorder through the spread of 
the EU‟s order. This line of thinking, as I demonstrate below has crucial implications that 
                                               
9  See for example European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 5; Romano Prodi, A Wider 
Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619, 05.12.2002; Eneko Landaburu, From 
Neighbourhood to Integration Policy: are There any Alternatives to Enlargement? held at CEPS Conference 
“Revitalizing Europe”, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/060223_el_ceps_en.pdf, accessed on 
21.08.2006; Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Neighbourhood Policy, SPEECH/06/149, 07.03.2006   
10 Nevertheless, the inclusion that will be achieved if the aims of the ENP are met will be of different nature 
since the partner countries are not envisaged to become full EU members. This prompts a peculiar tension 
between inclusion and exclusion in the ENP. Examples of studies that have pointed out the inclusion-
exclusion tension are Stephan Stetter, „Theorizing the European Neighbourhood Policy: Debordering and 
Rebordering in the Mediterranean‟, EUI Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, Working Paper 
RSCAS No. 34, 2005 and James Wesley Scott, „The EU and „Wider Europe‟: Towards an Alternative 
Geopolitics of Regional Cooperation?‟, Geopolitics, 10: 3 (2005), pp. 429- 454  
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lead to an ambiguous configuration of EU and European borders because it obstructs the 
successful diminishment of the visibility of the border between the EU and its 
neighbourhood.
11
 
This reasoning has also inspired the particular way in which the ENP functions. In 
order to achieve the goal of establishing an ever-closer relationship with the 
Neighbourhood countries, the EU and each partner country reach agreement on reform 
objectives across a wide range of fields within certain “common” areas such as cooperation 
on political and security issues, economic and trade matters, mobility, and so on. Crucially, 
in support of the partner‟s own efforts towards the fulfillment of these goals, the EU 
provides financial and technical assistance. This arrangement advances a perception of the 
relationship that although at pains to emphasise the equality between the parties, still retains 
the dynamic of a senior (EU) – junior (partner-country) hierarchy. From the EU side the 
actual establishment of the relationship with the partner-country (or Territory in the case of 
Palestine) proceeds in two stages. Firstly, the Commission prepares a Report that assesses 
the political and economic situation and the institutional aspects of the possibility to have a 
relationship with this entity. Once the Council adopts it, an individually negotiated Action 
Plan is agreed with the partner. The Action Plans define the agenda of political and 
economic reforms by means of short and medium-term (3-5 years) priorities. A sub-
committee formed by the EU and the specific country monitor the implementation of the 
mutual commitments and objectives of the Action Plan. Starting from 2006, the 
Commission regularly publishes its reports on the progress achieved.
12
  
Thus, in this policy area the Commission is mainly the implementer of decisions 
taken by the Council. This is an important difference to the major role the Commission has 
in the other policy areas included in this study, where its primary function, as we saw, is to 
initiate legislation. Thus, in the ENP, the Commission is the channel through which the 
negotiating, signing and monitoring of the implementation of the Action Plans are 
                                               
11 A study that engages in-depth with this ambiguity and its causes is Ruben Zaiotti, „Of Friends and Fences: 
Europe‟s Neighbourhood Policy and the Gated Community Syndrome‟, Journal of European Integration, 29: 
2 (2007), pp. 143-162  
12 This summary of the way the ENP functions is based on http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/howitworks_en.htm, 
accessed 11.05.2009  
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conducted. However, this leaves open the question of what the role of the Commission is 
and how as an institution it configures borders in the ENP. This question is crucial, given 
that, as I argued in Chapter Two, when the external borders of the Union are concerned, the 
Commission can be expected to promote the construction of borders. The discussion in 
Chapter Three provided one example of how the Commission has contributed to the 
construction and reconstruction of EU‟s external borders, thus offering valuable empirical 
material in support of Neo-functionalists‟ anticipation of Commission promotion of the 
emergence of EU‟s external borders.  
However, in the field of border controls one can argue that the Commission has had 
a very limited ability to advance successfully a position promoting lesser visibility of 
borders, given the decision-making structure and the preferences of the member states. 
Arguably this is not the case with the ENP. Although the preferences of the member states 
and the decision-making process are still unfavourable for the Commission, the successful 
achievement of the main aims of the ENP presupposes altering borders. This should be a 
fertile ground on which the Commission could (if that was its goal) advance a stance that 
blurs the distinction between the EU and its neighbourhood by utilising the prerogatives it 
is charged with in the third pillar. Despite that, as the analysis below shows, the 
Commission discourse on the ENP does not contain an indication that it has tried to do this. 
Instead, as far as the configuration of EU borders is concerned, just as in the case of border 
controls, the Commission discourse endorses and reproduces the assumptions on which 
articulations are based. In doing this, contrary to the aims of the ENP, the Commission 
configures borders ambiguously, thus contributing to border construction and 
reconstruction instead of preventing their emergence.  
The Commission can base a more radical stance building on the two core 
articulations of what the aim of the ENP is. Its “Wider Europe” Communication, on which 
the policy is founded, maintains that in order to successfully respond to the challenges the 
EU currently faces, it has to: “avoid drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote 
stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union”13 and to: “aim to 
                                               
13 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 4 (emphasis in the original) 
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develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a „ring of friends‟ – with 
whom the EU enjoys close, peaceful and co-operative relations.”14 These aims require that 
the visibility of current borders that mark the divisions between the EU and its neighbours 
be altered through enhanced relations with the neighbourhood countries.
15
 Thus, although 
these two formulations acknowledge that borders will not disappear, they envisage much 
closer cooperation, which in turn should blur the distinction between the EU and its 
neighbours, thus significantly reducing the visibility of the dividing line. Hence, these are 
the main articulations that configure borders. In turn, the Commission can utilise these clear 
policy aims in an effort to advancea more radical position that promotes increased and 
eased interaction between the EU and its neighbourhood. As I show in the next section, on 
the surface Commission articulations show a trend that contributes to the establishment of 
this common zone, thus implying an alteration in the current visibility of borders.  
 
 
6.3. The Trend towards De-bordering in the Commission ENP Discourse 
The trend in Commission ENP discourse towards decreasing the salience of the 
external EU borders is evident in articulations that configure identity, functional and 
territorial borders. These express the current thinking on how the aims of the ENP can be 
achieved in practice. The key formulations that enunciate it are well summarised in the 
Commission ENP Strategy Paper. Therefore, in the table below, I display these 
formulations as well as the incentives and the policy tools through which the EU envisages 
the implementation of the ENP‟s Action Plans.16 
 
Table 6.1: Wording of the Commission Incentives and Policy Tools for the 
Implementation of the ENP: 
AREA WORDING OF THE POLICY ACTIONS 
Political dialogue Further development of a shared responsibility between the 
two parties for security and stability in the region 
                                               
14 Ibid. (emphasis in the original) 
15 Ibid. (emphasis in the original) 
16 A good summary of the areas covered in the Action Plans is also available in European Commission, 
Beyond Enlargement: Commission Shifts European Neighbourhood Policy into Higher Gear, IP/04/632, 
12.05.2004. 
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Economic and Social 
Development Policy 
 prospect of a stake in the EU internal market based 
on legislative approximation;  
 participation in a number of EU programmes; 
improved interconnection and physical links with the EU;  
 reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade; 
 increased market integration 
 increased economic integration with the EU 
Trade and Internal Market  legislative and regulatory approximation for 
stimulation of trade and economic integration; 
 greater market opening according to the WTO 
principles; 
 administrative co-operation; 
 gradual elimination of non-tariff barriers to trade; 
 convergence with the Union‟s law and regulatory 
structures; 
 free trade in services as a goal; 
Justice and Home Affairs The parties working together for border control management 
and facilitation of the legitimate movements 
Connecting the 
Neighbourhood 
 
Energy  Improved access to the EU energy market; 
 Improved energy network connections between the 
two parties; 
 Legal and regulatory convergence; 
 Gradual convergence of energy policies and the legal 
and regulatory environment; 
 Gradual involvement of the EU‟s neighbours into the 
EU‟s regulatory practices and bodies 
Transport  Step up aviation relations with neighbouring countries 
with the goal to open up markets and to co-operate on safety 
and security issues; 
 Improving the physical transport network; 
 Close coordination in drawing up investment plans 
for transport networks 
Environment Promoting regional cooperation between various 
neighbourhood countries 
Information Society Support of the EU‟s neighbours to take advantage of the 
Information society 
Research and Innovation Opening of the European Research Area to partner countries 
People-to-people, 
programmes and agencies 
 ENP will promote cultural, educational and general 
societal links between the EU and its neighbours; 
 Gradual opening of certain Community programmes 
in education, training and youth, research, environment, 
audio-visual, culture. (Tempus Plus is a proposal in that 
direction)  
   Source: Author‟s compilation based on European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy 
Paper, COM (2004) 373 final, 12.05. 2004, pp. 13-20 
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The measures envisaged in the Strategy Paper include a broad variety of 
undertakings that promote the inclusion of the EU‟s neighbours into different aspects of the 
policy areas in question. The idea is that over time, if successful, this will have very similar 
effects to those of European integration and the relationship between the two parties will 
resemble the relations the EU currently has with the countries of the EEA.
17
 Although the 
latter officially are not members of the EU, they participate in most of its policies. Thus, it 
is anticipated that the measures undertaken within the ENP will result in decreasing the 
salience of borders between the EU and its neighbouring states. This will be achieved 
through privileging inclusion at the expense of exclusion, which will lead to blurring the 
dividing line between the Union and its neighbourhood, thus leading to achieving the 
policy‟s aims and to unification of the continent. 
Furthermore, as I said above, these articulations configure identity, functional and 
territorial borders. From the above formulations and policy aims, the goal of promoting 
cultural, educational and general societal links between the EU and its neighbours has the 
greatest potential to contribute to the emergence of a feeling of common identity in the 
area. This is the case because the possibility of knowing each other will allow (in a positive 
scenario) people to discover that they are not all that different after all. Furthermore, 
forging links between institutions (cultural, educational and so on) will enable the transfer 
of practices, which in the medium to long-term in theory can also contribute to the 
perception of shared identity, which, in turn, will diminish the importance of current 
borders. Also, the approximation of legislation and the gradual convergence of practices 
and policies over time can have similar effects.
18
 As far as territorial and functional borders 
are concerned, the envisaged improved access to each other‟s markets in a number of areas 
(economic, research and education, movement of people) is a way of removing current 
                                               
17 EEA comprises the members of the EU and the European Free Trade Area (EFTA) (Norway, Switzerland, 
Lichtenstein, and Iceland) and was created in order to allow the EFTA countries to participate in the EU‟s 
single market.   
18 A contribution that explores the development of this side of the EU – Neighbourhood relations is Michelle 
Pace, „People-to-People: Education and Culture‟ in Katja Weber, Michael Smith, Michael Baun (eds), 
Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or Periphery? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
2007), pp. 156-175  
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physical, legal and administrative obstacles to mobility. If achieved in practice, the aim of 
establishing a common area between the EU and its neighbouring countries will start taking 
shape.        
These policy aims and the ways for achieving them are further reiterated in the 
articulations of Commission officials. For example, the Commissioner responsible for 
Fisheries and Maritime Affairs Joe Borg argues that: “… the ultimate goal for all partner 
countries … should be integration to the fullest possible degree. This includes participation 
in the Single Market …”,19 which the then Commissioner responsible for Enlargement 
Günter Verheugen defined as an extension of the “four freedoms” of movement – of goods, 
services, capital and labour as a long-term perspective of the ENP.
20
 The envisaged end 
result from the successful implementation of the ENP will be a “… move from „shallow‟ 
integration to deeper economic and regulatory integration”, which means approximating 
legislation, building regulatory frameworks, and strengthening administrative capacities.
21
 
This will come as a result of overcoming the predominance of trade and cross border 
exchanges in the relationship and including in it tools for overcoming non-tariff barriers 
through the establishment of common technical norms and standards, intellectual property 
rights, competition rules and consumer protection.
22
 The stake in the internal market, as 
well as the involvement in the EU programmes and the cooperation in transport and energy 
networks, according to Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, will offer EU‟s Eastern and 
Southern neighbours “… many of the benefits previously associated only with membership 
…”23 This prospect allows the ENP to be described as: “… a relationship that goes beyond 
cooperation to include closer political links and an element of economic integration.”24 
Such a depiction of the EU-Neighbourhood relationship bypasses the currently 
existing clear division between members and non-members. Instead, as the former 
                                               
19 European Commission, Enlargement and the European Neighbourhood Policy, SPEECH/04/247, 
13.05.2004, p. 3 
20 European Commission, The Neighbourhood Policy of the European Union: an Opportunity for Tunisia, 
SPEECH/ 04/33, 22.01.2004, p. 5   
21 The quotation and the non-tariff barriers are in Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The European Neighbourhood 
Policy: Bringing our Neighbours Closer, SPEECH/06/346, 06.06.2006, p. 3 
22 Ibid. 
23 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Neighbourhood Policy, SPEECH/06/149, 07.03.2006, p. 3 
24 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy: a Year of Progress, IP/05/1467, 24.11.2005, p. 1 
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Commission President Romano Prodi presents it, the ENP offers a chance for the 
neighbourhood countries to: “… share everything with the Union but institutions”.25 This 
suggests that instead of being left outside, the EU‟s neighbours still have a tangible 
perspective of being substantially included into the policies of the Union, although not 
having the membership prospect in the short and medium-term for the Eastern neighbours 
and even in the long-term for the Southern partners.
26
 The expectation is that the successful 
implementation of the policies envisaged in the Strategy Paper and outlined in the Action 
Plans will eventually result in the extension of an area of peace and stability to the 
neighbours of the EU. This will result in creating a zone that shares the EU‟s fundamental 
values and objectives
27
 (what the Wider Europe Communication terms “a ring of friends”). 
All of these will mean that the threats outlined in the European Security Strategy have been 
successfully overcome. 
In line with these aims, steps towards the achievement of greater integration 
between EU members and non-members at the external borders of the Union have already 
been undertaken. An example of this approach, according to the Commission, is the 
adoption of the New Neighbouhood Instrument for cross-border cooperation. It offers an 
opportunity to develop a single approach for cooperation across the external EU border. 
Therefore, the Instrument overcomes
28
 the separation between internal and external funding 
sources for regions and allows running single operations on both sides of the external EU 
borders.
29
 Such an approach had been impossible until recently due to the fact that EU 
                                               
25 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619, 06.12.2002, 
p. 6 
26 For the membership prospects of the neighbouring countries of the EU for example Ferrero-Waldner says 
that the ENP offers a privileged form of partnership now irrespective of the future nature of the two parties‟ 
relationship. See Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Neighbourhood Policy, SPEECH/06/149, 07.03.2006, p. 
3  
27 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final, 12.05. 
2004, p. 5. Pace examines the normative dimension of the ENP in the Mediterranean in Michelle Pace, „Norm 
Shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?‟, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs, 20: 4 (2007), pp. 659-675.  
28 The Proposal was adopted by the Council and passed by a Resolution of the European Parliament in the end 
of 2003. See http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=183992#356314, accessed on 
12.05.2009 
29 European Commission, Paving the Way for a New Neighbourhood Instrument, COM (2003) 393 final, 
1.07.2003. This Proposal is further developed in Commission‟s Proposal for Regulation Laying Down the 
General Provisions Establishing the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, COM (2004) 628 
 239 
regions had different funding sources from non-EU regions. This hampered the 
development of coordinated projects between regions from both sides of the external Union 
border, as a result of the divergent requirements for accepting a border project and the 
financial resources available. 
Another Commission document aimed at addressing some of the grievances of the 
Neighbourhood countries is the “Proposal laying down the rules for the local border traffic 
at the external borders of the Union”.30  It was adopted in tune with the understanding, 
evident in Commission documents establishing the ENP, that the borders of the enlarged 
Union will cut across areas that traditionally have had very close relations. Hence, in order 
to not cause such disruption and therefore to help achieve the goals of the ENP this 
proposal aims to facilitate the crossing of the external EU borders by locals of the bordering 
area of the neighbouring country. The proposal requires that local non-EU residents, 
defined as people inhabiting for at least the last six months an area that does not extend 
more than 30 kilometers, can cross multiple times the external borders of the EU and stay 
in the border area in the neighbouring member state up to seven consecutive days. The 
European Parliament and the Council have also adopted this proposal.
31
 Given the delays 
that some other proposals face, this indicates a convergence of the positions of the main 
decision-making bodies of the EU on the course of action in the ENP. 
Thus, it can be concluded that overall, the Commission discourse on the ENP 
presents the policy as an endeavour that will contribute to the deeper inclusion of the 
Neighbourhood countries into the EU policies. The measures envisaged in the ENP, as well 
as Commission documents already adopted reiterate this image of the policy. As a result, it 
is anticipated that the ENP will contribute towards reducing the difference between the EU 
(inside) and its neighbourhood (outside) in territorial, functional and identity terms. The 
neighbouring countries are going to be an integral part of the internal market (one day) and 
                                                                                                                                               
final, 29.09.2004. This second Proposal was also adopted with a Regulation by the Council and the European 
Parliament in October 2006. See Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council, Laying down 
General Provisions Establishing a European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument, (EC) No 
1638/2006, 24.10.2006, available at the Official Journal of the European Union, L 310/ 1 of 09.11.2006.  
30 European Commission, Proposal Laying Down Rules on Local Traffic at the External Land Borders of the 
Member States and Amending the Schengen Convention and the Common Consular Instructions, COM 
(2005) 56 final, 23.02.2005 
31 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=192571, accessed on 12.05.2009 
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hence, enjoy some (if not all) of the four freedoms of movement. Furthermore, the area 
covered by the ENP is referred to as a “common”, joint space in which all the inhabitants 
share the positives and the negatives. Therefore, the EU is expecting its neighbours to 
undertake fundamental and often painful reforms in the name of eradicating the existing 
dangers in this common space. This will decisively contribute to the enhancement of the 
well being of the whole region, thus creating a zone of mutual stability and prosperity. 
Furthermore, this common area can only be created if all its inhabitants share a common set 
of values, which are guiding the conduct of their internal and external affairs. All in all, 
even if it is a long-term aim, the representation of the policy that this discourse makes is 
that the ENP will eventually contribute substantially towards the decreased salience of the 
dividing lines in Europe by creating an area of inclusion. Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner 
offers a good summary of how this presentation of the Commission discourse on the ENP 
configures borders: “Borders … must work flexibly, as a facilitator of economic, social and 
cultural exchanges. They should … promote a network of interconnected interests, allowing 
exchanges and contacts to flourish. Borders are … about breaking down barriers between 
peoples and cultures.”32 
Despite this trend towards the construction of a common space at the outer Eastern 
and Southern edges of the EU through the Commission discourse, the same documents can 
be read in another way as well. This second reading will reveal a rather different 
configuration of the EU borders because it shows that beneath the inclusionary rhetoric 
there is an exclusionary dynamic going on. This contributes to the construction and 
reconstruction of borders between the EU and its neighbourhood. I demonstrate this 
argument in the next sections of the chapter. 
 
 
 
                                               
32 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, The European Neighbourhood Policy: Helping Ourselves through Helping our 
Neighbours, in a speech by Ferrero-Waldner held at the Conference of Foreign Affairs Committee Chairmen 
of EU member and candidate states available at 
http://ec/europa.eu/comm/external_relations/news/ferrero/2005/sp05_31-10-05.htm, accessed on 21.08.2006 
 241 
6.4. The Construction of Identity and Territorial EU Borders through the 
Commission ENP Discourse 
The articulations in the Commission ENP discourse construct both identity and 
territorial borders of the EU. The construction of the territorial borders is established 
through the current decisions of which countries in the EU neighbourhood have EU-
candidate status. The identity border is constructed as a result of articulations that indirectly 
create an understanding of the neighbouring countries as “the Other”.33 I elaborate on each 
of these points in this section.  
 
6.4.1. Commission ENP discourse as constructing the “Neighbourhood” as the 
“Other”   
The articulations in the Commission ENP discourse, contrary to the image 
presented above, can also be read as contributing to the establishment of a mindset in which 
there is a rigid distinction between the EU and the Neighbourhood. From this perspective, 
therefore, rather than leading to the establishment of a common space, the Commission 
ENP discourse configures new borders. This border configuration is a result of the logic of 
the founding documents of the policy. As I explained above, the premise of the actions 
undertaken under the ENP is that enhanced insecurity for the EU emanates from its 
Neighbourhood.
34
 However, this very thinking facilitates the emergence of a significant 
dividing line, which in the context of this study is classified as an identity border of the EU.  
As I argued in the previous chapters, the articulation of danger leads to the 
construction of visible external borders because danger enforces closure – both spatial and 
on the community that is threatened.
35
 As I pointed out above, as a policy the ENP 
originated in the European Security Strategy and its ultimate aim is to help the EU address 
the threats it currently faces. Therefore, Commission discourse on the ENP can be read as 
                                               
33 An article that explores the same problem, with a focus particularly on the Mediterranean, from a different 
angle is Michelle Pace, „Norm Shifting from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?‟, 
Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20: 4 (2007), pp. 659-675   
34 For the same statement see also Roberto Aliboni, „The Geopolitical Implications of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy‟, European Foreign Affairs Review, 10: 1 (2005) pp. 1-16, p. 1  
35 David Campbell, Writing Security – United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity (2 ed.) 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press 1998),  p. 73 
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contributing to the emergence of identity borders by advancing particular perceptions of 
who is “us” and who is “them”, or “the Other”. For example, when discussing European 
borders, Commissioner Rehn has maintained that: “The map of Europe is defined in the 
first place in the minds of Europeans. Geography sets the frame, but fundamentally it is 
values that make the borders.”36 Thus, in order to have a complete analysis of how 
Commission ENP discourse configures borders, it is necessary to interpret who is 
articulated as “us” and who emerges as “the Other” from this discourse and if it constructs a 
distinction between the EU and its neighbourhood countries.  
In order to assess this, I use Diez‟s summary of the different strategies for 
constructing us/ them distinction in various articulations: representation of the other as an 
existential threat (occurs when various types of issues are represented as a security threat); 
representation of the other as inferior; representation of the other as violating universal 
principles (occurs when the standards of the self are perceived to have universal validity 
and therefore, the other should be convinced to accept them); representation of the other as 
different.
37
 The first three contribute to the construction of salient borders because they 
sharpen the perception of the parties as distinct from each other.  
It is claimed that the cornerstone of the ENP is to enable the Union to maximise the 
opportunities offered by the 2004 Enlargement by enhancing the relations with the EU‟s 
new neighbours on the basis of shared values.
38
 According to the ENP Strategy Paper: “The 
privileged relationship with neighbours will build upon mutual commitment to common 
values principally within the fields of the rule of law, good governance, the respect for 
human rights, including minority rights, the promotion of good neighbourly relations, and 
the principle of market economy and sustainable development.”39 The officials of the 
                                               
36 Olli Rehn, EU Enlargement and the Western Balkans, SPEECH/ 06/85, 15.02.2006, p. 5 
37 Thomas Diez, „Constructing the Self and Changing Others: Reconsidering „Normative Power Europe‟‟, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 33: 3 (2005), pp. 613-636, p. 628 
38 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 4. The challenges and contradictions this 
has created for the EU foreign policy in the Mediterranean are explored in Michelle Pace, „Norm Shifting 
from EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?‟, Cambridge Review of International 
Affairs, 20: 4 (2007), pp. 659-675  
39 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper, COM (2004) 373 final, 12.05. 
2004, p. 3   
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Commission in their public appearances repeat this basic principle.
40
 The Commission 
Communication “Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with 
our Eastern and Southern Neighbours”, refers to the EU‟s Charter of Fundamental Rights 
when setting out the following values: respect for human rights and the rule of law; 
democracy.
41
 According to Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, the values that shape today‟s 
EU are good governance, the rule of law, respect for human rights and democracy. So, what 
is evident from all this, is that the “common values” that the ENP promotes are in fact the 
basic values on which the European Union is founded. However, as the measures envisaged 
to be undertaken in the Action Plans
42
 indicate, it is an exaggeration to say that at present 
the partner countries in the ENP are perceived as having successfully implemented these 
values in their social, economic, or legal systems. In fact, Commission documents on the 
ENP envisage several main directions in which the spread of the “common values” is 
promoted. These will be outlined here on the basis of the EU/ Ukraine and the EU/ Tunisia 
Action Plans. 
Both Action Plans present the following main areas as priorities for reform actions 
in Tunisia and Ukraine: democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
economic and social reform and development; trade, market and regulatory reform; 
cooperation in justice and home affairs; transport, energy, information society and 
environment; people-to-people contacts.
43
 There is a difference in the way the specific 
actions that need to be undertaken are worded between the two Action Plans. The 
Ukrainian one uses more extensively the aim of implementing reforms in political dialogue 
(democracy, rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms) in accordance with the 
“European standards”.44 The Tunisian Plan refers to the international and the UN legal 
                                               
40 See for example the speech by Commissioner Ferrero-Waldner, Europe’s Neighbours – Towards Closer 
Integration, SPEECH/05/253, 22.04.2005; Günter Verheugen, The Neighbourhood Policy of the European 
Union: an Opportunity for Tunisia, SPEECH/04/33, 22.01.2004  
41 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 4, in footnote 2 
42 For a sample of the provisions of the ENP Action Plans see EU/ Ukraine and EU/ Tunisia Action Plans 
available respectively at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, both accessed on 28.08.2006 
43 Ibid. 
44 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2006 
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framework on these issues.
45
 However, even in the Tunisian Acton Plan there is reference 
to the need to bring the national standards in line with the EU and international ones, 
although this is usually concerning more technical issues, such as industrial products or 
reform in the tax system.
46
 Furthermore, the introduction of the Tunisia/ EU Action Plan 
reads: “… with a view to bringing Tunisian economic, social, and science structures more 
into line with those of the Union. The process also advances and supports the 
approximation of Tunisian legislation, norms and standards with those of the Union in the 
areas covered by the plan.”47 Therefore, arguably EU officials (including the members of 
the Commission who develop the policy proposals and implement them once they are 
adopted) see the ENP above all as a good instrument for spreading throughout the EU‟s 
neighbouring countries these particular values.  
However, if the ENP partner countries do not share these values, they emerge from 
Commission discourse as the “Other” who should be taught the superior EU values and 
practices. Hence, the ENP in fact serves as a very good example for the latter three 
strategies for articulating the “Other”. The Action Plans of the Commission outline quite 
detailed measures necessary for each partner-country to undertake in order to bring its 
political or economic systems more in tune with those of the EU‟s. In turn, this will 
eventually enable the partners to enjoy the envisaged participation in the internal market of 
the EU. However, this clearly marks a border between us and them. This is the case 
because these actions imply that EU standards are in fact universal and the partner-
countries have to undertake certain actions in order to ensure their adherence to these 
values and norms. Even if the suggestion is not that these are universal, there is clearly the 
feeling that the EU‟s way for doing things is better and therefore it is necessary to ensure 
that the neighbouring countries will take it on board. In sum, a very likely effect of these 
articulations is that it will feed a mindset for both – EU citizens and citizens of the 
neighbouring countries that contributes to the emergence of an identity border between 
them. This will be a result of enunciations according to which from an EU citizen‟s point of 
                                               
45 http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, accessed on 28.08.2006 
46 Ibid., particularly the sections on Taxation and the medium term objectives on the technical rules, 
conformity evaluation standards and procedures in the EU harmonised sectors. 
47 Ibid. 
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view, the “Other” is the person outside the current external border of the Union either 
because this is the person who is very likely to pose some sort of (usually soft) security 
threat to the EU‟s way of life or because he/ she still needs to be included in the better 
system of the EU‟s values and norms. In this light the widely spread negative attitude of the 
EU population towards any possible inclusion of the Eastern neighbourhood countries as 
full members of the Union is hardly surprising since they are the “Other” who is posing a 
threat to us, who we should protect ourselves from.  
This construction of the Neighbourhood as the “Other” is of paramount importance. 
Although at some level all policies inevitably create “Others”, as the first reading of the 
Commission discourse on the ENP showed, the over-arching aim of this policy is exactly to 
prevent the emergence of divisions between the EU and its neighbourhood. Therefore, the 
fact that Commission documents construct the neighbours as the “Other” constitutes them 
as different, which results in continuous distancing of the EU from its partner-countries. 
This in turn subverts the policy altogether because it creates a paradoxical situation in 
which there is a contradiction between the asserted aims and the actions undertaken, which 
makes the former unachievable.
48
 As the articulations of the European Commission on the 
ENP discussed in the second reading show, they do not do anything to effectively alleviate 
this situation. On the contrary, these are good empirical examples of this paradoxical 
situation. Arguably, they are contributing to further deepening the already existing 
predispositions, which contributes to the establishment of a sharply defined identity border 
between the EU and its neighbourhood. This is effectively precluding the achievement of 
the policy‟s insisted on aims because it constitutes the construction of borders.  
 
6.4.2. The Commission ENP discourse as constructing the territorial border of the 
EU  
This tendency towards the construction of borders is further confirmed with other 
articulations of the Commission that can be read as contributing towards the emergence of 
important new territorial borders at the external EU edges. Again, this is despite the claim 
                                               
48 Another study that engages with these issues in the Mediterranean is Michelle Pace, „Norm Shifting from 
EMP to ENP: the EU as a Norm Entrepreneur in the South?‟, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 20: 
4 (2007), pp. 659-675  
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that the ENP is launched in order to avoid the creation of new dividing lines. Instead, the 
policy itself is an important dividing line, and hence, a border. The reason for this is simple. 
The mere decision over which countries participate in the ENP creates an important 
territorially fixed differentiation. This inevitably works towards creating different types of 
countries/ entities in respect of their relationship with the EU, and more their prospects for 
membership in the Union. This is a result of the fact emphasised by Prodi that the EU 
cannot go on enlarging forever, since this will bring the danger of watering down the 
European political project.  Hence, he maintains that: “We need a debate in Europe to 
decide where the limits of Europe lie.”49  
Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU stipulates that any European country may apply 
for membership and on this basis some Eastern European states have expressed a clear 
desire to join the Union. However, the Wider Europe Communication claims that in reality: 
“… any decision on further EU expansion awaits a debate on the ultimate geographic limits 
of the Union.”50 In fact, membership of the ENP can be read as an indication of where these 
ultimate geographical limits will lie. These articulations acquire even greater importance 
when another fact is taken into account - that the countries of the Western Balkans (or 
South Eastern Europe): Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania
51
 are dealt with in a separate 
framework. The really significant distinction between these two groups of states is their 
prospect for full EU membership.
52
 In this respect, while the Eastern European neighbours 
of the EU are offered a “privileged partnership” (which falls short of EU membership), the 
countries in the Western Balkans officially have an opportunity for EU membership. As 
Prodi asserts: “The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the 
unification of the continent, and we have held out this prospect to them. Although there is 
                                               
49 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619, 05.12.2002, 
p. 3 (emphasis in the original)  
50 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 5 
51 The list is taken from http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-western-balkans-relations/article-
129607, accessed on 05.09.2006 
52 See for example „Wider Europe‟ a document prepared jointly by Chris Patten and Javier Solana, available 
at http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf, accessed on 18.08.2006, point 2 
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still a long way to go, the Balkans belong to Europe. The process of integrating them will 
create a sort of bridge between enlargement and neighbourhood policy.”53  
Furthermore, the clear commitment of the EU to the accession into the Union of the 
countries of the Western Balkans is indicated by the organisation‟s documents and the 
speeches of its officials. For example, the current President of the European Commission 
Jose Manuel Barroso has declared: “… there can be no doubt about our joint objective: full 
EU membership for Croatia.”54; on the day of the official opening of their Stabilisation and 
Accession Agreement negotiations the Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn has 
maintained, in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina that: “Your country has a clear European 
perspective, which today becomes even more concrete and tangible.”55 The European 
perspective for the Western Balkans is also confirmed in a number of EU documents.
56
 The 
Commission was not the sole actor deciding over the issue of the integration of the Western 
Balkans. However, the instrument for implementing the EU‟s policy for its relations with 
this region is the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP). The prerogatives of the 
Commission of proposing and implementing policies within SAP make it an actor that has 
a significant contribution to the over-all decision-making process. Furthermore, as the 
above articulations indicate, in the Commission discourse there is no attempt of advancing 
an alternative vision (for example arguing for the necessity to accept the East European 
Neighbourhood countries) or of at least disagreeing with the current thinking on the issue of 
future Enlargement. Due to this silence in the Commission discourse on this issue it can be 
argued that it endorses these articulations and as a result contributes to the establishment of 
this particular territorial border at the external edges of the Union.    
                                               
53 Romano Prodi, A Wider Europe – a Proximity Policy as the Key to Stability, SPEECH/02/619, 05.12.2002, 
p. 3 (emphasis added) 
54 Jose Manuel Barroso, Leading by Example: Croatia’s Road to EU Membership, SPEECH/06/96, 
16.02.2006, p. 2 
55 Olli Rehn, Bosnia and Herzegovina: Moving Closer to Europe, SPEECH/05/732, 25.11.2005, p. 2 
56 See for example the Presidency Conclusions of the Thessaloniki European Council, June 2003, chapter V, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/constitution/futurum/documents/other/oth200603_en.pdf, accessed on 
21.09.2006, the Presidency conclusions of the European Councils in June and December 2004, available 
respectively at http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/81742.pdf and 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/83201.pdf, both accessed on 
02.10.2006, the Thessaloniki Agenda for the Western Balkans: Moving towards European Integration, 
available at http://www.stabilitypact.org/reg-conf/030621-thessaloniki/agenda.doc, accessed 02.10.2006 
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The different statuses indicate that at present, in distinction to the candidate states 
on the Balkans, the countries encompassed in the ENP are not thought of as possible full 
members of the EU. Hence, the Neighbourhood policy at present marks the border between 
the countries that have membership prospects and those that do not, thus constructing a new 
territorial border at the edges of the EU. This border, however, does not have only 
symbolical meaning. In fact belonging to the ENP or the Enlargement policy framework 
bears significant practical consequences not only in terms of the final objectives of the EU-
partner country relationship, but also in terms of what kinds of funds are available, specific 
conditions for participation (or access altogether) in certain policies and programmes of the 
EU, the prospective regime for the freedoms of movement at the moment or in short-term 
perspective. All of these issues are related to the question of the construction of borders 
through the Commission discourse because at present some of the measures envisaged for 
the candidate countries are not open to the Neighbourhood ones. The lack of articulations 
that envisage the establishment of a regime that allows for easy access of the 
Neighbourhood countries into the EU can be read as a silence of the Commission ENP 
discourse that hampers the establishment of a common space between the partners. 
Therefore, instead it constructs territorial borders. 
Thus, contrary to the policy‟s stated aims, the Commission articulations on the ENP 
contribute to the construction of new dividing lines through establishing both territorial and 
identity divisions at the outer edges of the EU. However, these have a bearing on European 
borders as well. This is an issue that is paramount in an external policy area for the EU and 
therefore, below I examine how the Commission ENP discourse configures European 
borders.  
 
 
6.5. The Construction of European Borders through the Commission ENP 
Discourse 
As I pointed out in previous sections of the chapter, one of the major reasons why 
the Commission discourse on the ENP on the surface appears to be contributing to the 
decreased significance of borders is because its stated aim is “to avoid drawing new 
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dividing lines in Europe”.57 Yet, as I argued above, many of the articulations of this 
Commission discourse contribute to the erection of important borders at the edges of the 
EU, both in terms of identity and territory. However, to the extent that at least some of 
these articulations relate to the issue of regulating divisions in Eastern Europe, they are 
directly involved in configuring borders on the continent. Furthermore, as a result of the 
erection of a visible external EU border, the constructed European border, contrary to the 
officially stated aims, is also salient and important. Hence, what is happening is a 
reconstruction of European borders, which is taking place for both territorial and identity 
boundaries.     
 
6.5.1. Commission ENP discourse as reconstructing European identity borders  
The first way in which the Commission ENP discourse can be regarded as 
contributing to the reconstruction of European borders is through a contradiction in its 
articulations. The aim of the ENP is to avoid drawing new dividing lines on the continent. 
However, as we saw in the previous section, some of the articulations do not effectively 
contribute to achieving it. Instead, they single out the Neighbourhood as a place that poses 
danger, thus creating juxtaposition between the EU and its outside. It results in establishing 
a mindset in which there is a rigid distinction between the inside and the outside and hence 
constructs salient borders. This contributes to the reconstruction of European borders 
because there already is a strong trend of equating the EU and Europe. Hence, there is a 
danger that even if something is geographically positioned in Europe, this may be lost due 
to the growing perception that since it is not in the EU, it also is not European.  
In that respect some Commission articulations not only are not inclusive but on the 
contrary, further this trend. Although under Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU Eastern 
European Neighbours satisfy the geographical criteria for membership in the Union, they 
are still included in the same policy framework as the Southern Mediterranean states. This 
may indicate that the former, just as the latter should not be considered “European”. For 
example, according to the “Wider Europe” document prepared jointly by Christopher 
                                               
57 European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for Relations with Our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 4 (emphasis in the original)  
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Patten and Javier Solana, geographically the EU‟s neighbours include: “… three main 
regional groupings: the Mediterranean …; the Western Balkans …; and Russia and the 
other eastern neighbours …”58 As was already shown, the countries from the other two 
groups, besides the Western Balkans, do not have any clear prospects for future 
membership. What is more, the countries from the Southern Mediterranean do not qualify 
for EU membership according to Article 49 of the Treaty of the EU.
59
 Hence, the inclusion 
of the “eastern neighbours” in the same policy framework as the Southern Mediterranean 
states may indicate that the former, just as the latter should not be considered “European”. 
In this context the absence of the word “European” from “Russia and the other eastern 
neighbours” acquires new meaning. It implies that the Eastern neighbours do not have the 
prospect for EU membership, because they, just as the Southern Mediterranean states are 
not European.  
The advancement of such understandings contributes to the reconstruction of 
European identity borders by establishing a particular meaning of what it is to be European. 
You have to comply with the various criteria and practices articulated by the Commission 
and other EU institutions, such as the Copenhagen criteria or the satisfaction of the Action 
Plans under the ENP. Also, and related to this, such understandings suggest particular 
readings of where Europe is. As I said above, increasingly Europe is perceived as being 
equivalent to the EU. Hence, anything that is not in the EU geographically is not in Europe 
as well. This last point is also related to the reconstruction of European territorial borders.  
 
6.5.2. Reconstruction of European territorial borders  
In practice the reconstruction of European territorial borders can be traced in the 
concrete policies undertaken under the ENP. These undertakings are the second way in 
                                               
58 Document prepared jointly by Chris Patten and Javier Solana, Wider Europe, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/_0130163334_001_en.pdf, accessed on 18.08.2006  
59 For example a Communication from the Commission stipulates: “In some cases the issue of prospective 
membership has already been resolved. Accession has been ruled out, for example, for the non-European 
Mediterranean partners.” See European Commission, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: a New Framework for 
Relations with Our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, COM (2003) 104 final, 11.03.2003, p. 5. An in-depth 
study of how the Mediterranean as a “region” is integrated in EU policy discourses and practices is provided 
in Michelle Pace, The Politics of Regional Identity – Meddling with the Mediterranean (London: Routledge, 
2006).   
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which contradictions within the Commission stated aims on the ENP are articulated. This is 
the case because measures under the ENP are simultaneously inextricably related to recent 
developments in the common EU immigration policy. As I showed in Chapter Three, in 
this field the Commission has failed to advance a position on the external EU borders, 
which is radically different from that of the Council and which in turn has facilitated the 
emergence of the so-called “fortress Europe”. This, however, clashes with the need to have 
a more inclusive regime for the nighbouring countries under the ENP. This creates a 
tension with regards to the movement of people at the common EU-partner country 
borders.
60
 
 For example, the Hague Programme in the section on the Partnership for European 
Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice reads: “A common immigration 
policy cannot confine itself to admission and return policies: successful management of 
migration flows must become an integral element and comprise a serious investment in 
relations with third countries”.61 The Communication also envisages specific 
recommendations for negotiating directives on visa facilitation with third countries in the 
context of the EC readmission policy.
62
 These articulations depict the Union‟s relations 
with third countries (especially the countries of origin and transition of migrant flows) as 
guided primarily from the aim of preventing migration flows from entering the EU. 
Importantly, in continuation of a trend we saw earlier on in the chapter, the Council quickly 
adopted this proposal in April 2006,
63
 which again, can be read as an indication of 
concurrence of the thinking in these institutions.  
Cooperation by the partner countries with EU policy will be rewarded with easing 
of the visa-application process for the country‟s own nationals. In tune with this is the 
position that: “… cooperation on the management of migration flows would need to be 
intensified … For most of these countries, the Commission has already programmed 
                                               
60 JHA in the ENP is analysed in John Occipinti, „Justice and Home Affairs: Immigration and Policing‟ in 
Katja Weber, Michael Smith, Michael Baun (eds), Governing Europe’s Neighbourhood: Partners or 
Periphery? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2007), pp. 114-133 
61 European Commission, The Hague Programme: Ten Priorities for Next Five Years The Partnership for 
European Renewal in the Field of Freedom, Security and Justice, COM (2005) 184 final, 10.05.2005  
62 Ibid. 
63 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=192847#377933, accessed on 
13.05.2009 
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assistance for establishing an adequate legislative framework, reinforcing their external 
borders and promoting institutional and administrative capacity for managing migration.”64 
This proposal was again swiftly adopted by the Council and the European Parliament
65
 and 
in relation to the ENP these policy priorities are evident in the Action Plans the EU has 
concluded with Tunisia and Ukraine.
66
 The latter explicitly requires the signing of a 
readmission agreement as a precondition for signing a visa facilitation agreement. From 
this it is evident that the majority of the JHA policy measures are in fact pushing towards 
the establishment of a visible border as a way for guaranteeing better security within the 
EU. This sharply contrasts with encouraging greater exchanges and flows between the EU 
and its Neighbourhood, which is one of the signs for achieving closer integration. 
In a similar vein, the specific conditions of the Communication for facilitating the 
local border traffic (discussed in section 6.3. above) stipulate that the total duration of the 
successive visits to a member state will not exceed three months for each six-month period. 
Local residents are entitled to the “L” visa for the purposes of local traffic, valid from one 
to five years. To obtain this visa the person needs a valid travel document; documents 
proving his/ her status of border resident and the existence of legitimate reasons for 
frequent border crossing, such as family links, social, cultural or economic motives. 
Evidence for sufficient funding in relation to the stay may also be required. These visas are 
not issued at the border. The cost for the visa is the same (unless the member state waves 
the fees) as the fee charged for issuing a short-term multiple-entry one. There may be 
specific facilitations at the border crossing points for the border residents in possession of 
the “L” visa.67  
                                               
64 European Commission, On the Development of a Common Policy on Illegal Immigration, Smuggling and 
Trafficking of Human Beings, External Borders and the Return of Illegal Residents, COM (2003) 323 final, 
3.06.2003 
65 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/detail_dossier_real.cfm?CL=en&DosId=183230#367217, accessed on 
13.05.2009 
66 See respectively EU/ Tunisia Action Plan 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/tunisia_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 4; EU/ Ukraine Action Plan 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/ukraine_enp_ap_final_en.pdf, p. 4, both accessed on 
28.08.2006 
67 All these provisions are from European Commission, Proposal Laying Down Rules on Local Traffic at the 
External Land Borders of the Member States and Amending the Schengen Convention and the Common 
Consular Instructions, COM (2005) 56 final, 23.02.2005 
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Overall, this proposal should manage to facilitate the contacts between the border 
areas. Furthermore, introducing this policy is a novel move by the EU, which can 
potentially problematise the traditional border practices at the limits of state territory. It 
does create a precedent in which specific categories of people from the EU‟s 
neighbourhood can travel to the Union under conditions different from those that have 
previously been applied. However, despite its novelty this undertaking is limited in its 
ability to solve the problem all together. There are several major reasons for that. Firstly, 
the zone defined as “border area” under this proposal encompasses a relatively narrow 
territory of 30 kilometers. It is quite likely that people with links with the new EU member 
states covered by the provisions of the proposal will live beyond this zone. Furthermore, 
although the visa can be issued for up to five years, the procedure for obtaining it (the 
required documents), as well as the necessary actions (in the majority of the cases it is most 
likely the local residents will need to undertake a fairly long journey to the closest consular 
or diplomatic mission of the EU member state, since no visas are issued at the border) are 
not doing enough to facilitate the process for the local residents. All of these problems stem 
from the fact that we live in a world of territorial states, a condition that even the EU cannot 
escape. Therefore, although the “local border traffic” proposal can be taken to serve as an 
example of the EU‟s policies, which abide by the obligations the Union has undertaken in 
its relations with third countries this is done with the view primarily of protecting its own 
interests. This means that the proposal does not provide for very generous concessions from 
the EU. The result of this, however, with the ENP aims in mind, is most likely to be a 
perception of the border as one not allowing for easy crossing by people or other kinds of 
flows, such as trade for example. In turn, this will make the exchanges harder and hence, 
will harden the achievement of the Neighbourhood policy‟s objectives.  
Hence, as we have seen, instead of working towards preventing the emergence of 
new dividing lines on the continent, as is the declared aim in the official documents of the 
European Neighbourhood Policy, aspects of the Commission discourse in fact effectively 
contribute to the construction and reconstruction of European and EU borders. Decisions 
over which countries will be included in each of the existing frameworks for the conduct of 
the EU‟s relations with third countries and the rhetoric of Commission officials regarding 
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each of these different frameworks, are actively establishing a particular mindset or 
thinking of these areas. This however, constructs new borders. I also showed that the 
discourse of Commission officials and the content of the documents the Commission signs 
with its ENP partners are related and influence the perception of what and where Europe is. 
Last, but not least, all of these articulations indirectly suggest that the “Other” for the EU is 
exactly the countries encompassed under the ENP. All of these points clearly demonstrate 
that the Commission discourse on the Neighbourhood policy relies on, utilises and further 
reinforces assumptions and practices that contribute to the emergence of salient borders. As 
a result of all this, there is a full set of both material and mental tools working towards the 
establishment of European and EU territorial and identity borders. These are further 
reinforced by the concrete policies undertaken as the examples on movement of people 
have shown.  
 
 
6.6. Summary 
Thus, the analysis of the Commission discourse on the ENP shows that despite the 
inclusionary aims and rhetoric on this issue, there is an underlying dynamic that precludes 
the achievement of the goal of greater integration between the EU and its Neighbourhood. 
Therefore, the Commission ENP discourse contributes to the construction of highly visible 
EU external borders and to the reconstruction of divisions in Europe. These are due to the 
advancement of a perception that because the Neighbourhood poses dangers to the EU it is 
in fact the “Other”, which in turn contributes to the establishment of identity borders. This 
trend is further reinforced by articulations, some of which have led to the undertaking of 
specific policy steps that establish visible obstacles to the free flow of goods or people, thus 
erecting a territorial border at the edges of the EU. 
The finding that the Commission ENP discourse, contrary to the declared aims, 
contributes to the construction of borders is further suggested by the lack of articulations 
that can be interpreted as contributing towards elevating these underlying trends that 
construct and reconstruct borders. Instead, as the analysis in the chapter shows, overall, 
there seems to be a general concurrence in the thinking of the Commission and other major 
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EU institutions, such as the Council. Such a situation, however, clearly illustrates the claim 
in Chapter Two that as far as external EU borders are concerned, supranational institutions, 
such as the Commission, are predisposed to construct and reconstruct external borders. This 
is also in tune with the findings in the Chapter on Border Controls, which also indicated 
that the Commission was not advancing radically different positions on the issue of the 
EU‟s external borders in comparison to the Council or the member states. However, if in 
Chapter Three this could be explained with a disadvantage in the position of the 
Commission within the decision-making process of the EU, the ENP, given its declared 
goals, presents a much more promising case for promoting lesser visibility of borders. 
Therefore, the ENP is a crucial case when it comes to demonstrating the simultaneity of the 
processes of de-bordering, rebordering and border construction under integration. 
Furthermore, the analysis of this chapter showed a different set of empirical examples of 
the Commission contribution to the emergence of EU‟s external borders, such as the 
articulation of particular “Other” or the implementation of policies that lead to the 
construction of salient borders.  
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
In this study, I set out to critically examine the integration-borders nexus by 
analysing the way borders are configured in the discourse of the European Commission. 
The main thrust of this project has been to demonstrate that although on the surface it is 
transcendence of borders that Commission documents emphasise, this is not the only 
configuration implied by these documents. Parallel with thee trend to de-bordering, new 
borders are constructed and old ones reconstructed by the Commission articulations. In 
doing this, I have contributed to the academic debates examining the ambiguous results on 
borders by the process of European integration by providing a detailed empirical 
examination of the simultaneous processes of border reconfigurations. Such a formulation 
indicates an understanding of borders as social constructs that emerge out of the numerous 
interactions that are taking place between different agents in a variety of locales. As a 
consequence, I have studied borders by examining discourses on borders. As I explained in 
Chapter Two, the term discourse has a wide meaning and refers to structured systems of 
signs that create knowledge about the world. I regard language as having a primary position 
because ultimately it is by communicating through language that the meaning of other signs 
becomes intelligible. Therefore, in order to examine how the European Commission 
discourses configure borders, I focused on interrogating the ways in which inclusion/ 
exclusion issues are settled. Building on that, I analysed whether these configurations lead 
only to border transcendence or have more ambiguous consequences. 
Given the wide variety of actors that contribute to the transformation of borders in 
the EU, I had to delimit the focus of the research. I concentrated on examining the ways in 
which the discourse of the European Commission configures borders. The main reason for 
choosing the Commission is its position within the institutional structure of the EU. As a 
supranational institution, it has a vested interest to aim to promote more integration, thus 
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ensuring the perseverance of the conditions that lead to border transformations. This also 
has the important advantage of allowing examination of the contribution to the 
configuration of borders of a unique type of international organisation, one that can under 
certain conditions and in particular circumstances impose legally binding decisions to the 
EU member states. Thus, the present study was able to provide rich empirical data on the 
specific ways in which the Commission has contributed to the construction and 
reconstruction of EU borders.  However, a focus on the Commission is worthwhile only if 
it is able to exercise independent influence over the process of integration. I have argued, in 
tune with the positions of Neo-functionalists that integration is best conceived of as a 
process. Therefore, it is a continuous, every day occurrence, in which the Commission is 
ideally placed to steer the developments. It can do this in policy areas in all the three pillars 
of the EU, although its effectiveness and the means it can use vary from issue area to issue 
area. In the policies under the first pillar, the major leverage of the Commission comes 
from it being the sole legislation initiator. This allows it to exercise considerable control not 
only over the exact wording of the policy proposals but also over issues such as the timing 
of a proposal or the choice of legal basis. For second and third pillar policies, the 
Commission is the main implementer, which means that it can significantly influence the 
way EU legislation is interpreted, thus impacting on its day-to-day implementation. 
Although the above clearly shows that I share some of the core assumptions and 
arguments of Neo-functionalism, my understanding of borders as social constructions has 
meant that I do not conceive of Commission discourse as having a single author. Instead, 
due to the complex interactions that occur between the various actors involved in the 
process of renegotiating inclusion/ exclusion issues in the EU, the Commission documents 
also reflect and reproduce the preferences and positions of other actors and institutions. 
This process of mutual influence between the parties involved means that in practice there 
are multiple authors behind the Commission discourse. Therefore, in the Commission 
documents, other influences besides the position of the Commission itself are present. 
Thus, the understanding of the Commission as an actor means that its officials, given their 
own interests can be expected to follow a particular line, which regarding the renegotiation 
of inclusion/ exclusion issues can be expected to be relatively cohesive. However, this does 
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not mean that the results of Commission undertakings expressed in its discourse will 
always be the ones its officials have articulated, which is a result of the Commission 
interactions with other parties involved in the renegotiations.  
In the empirical part of the study I examined how the discourse of the Commission 
configures European and EU borders in a number of policy areas (ENP, social policy, free 
movement of people and border controls) in the period from the adoption of the SEA to the 
time of writing. I chose the second half of the 1980s as the starting point of the 
investigation because it was a time when the integration project in the EU received a major 
boost with the decision to work towards the creation of the internal market, defined as “an 
area without internal frontiers”. Again, as in the case of the decision to focus the study on 
the Commission, such an undertaking provides very favourable conditions for examining 
the integration-borders nexus because it provides a fertile ground for border 
transformations. This ensures that there is rich empirical material on which to base the 
investigation. My major finding is that in each of the policy areas under investigation, the 
discourse of the Commission simultaneously with the process of border transcendence, 
contributes to the construction and reconstruction of borders. Thus, the ambiguous border 
constructions can be regarded as an underlying common trend in the configuration of 
borders by Commission discourse. In each of the policy areas I studied, Commission 
discourse at first glance leads to the establishment of a common space in the EU. In turn, 
this implies a decreased importance of internal borders. However, a critical examination of 
Commission discourse reveals ambiguous dynamics of which the present study provides 
rich empirical details. 
In the first three case studies, social policy, border controls and free movement of 
people, border transcendence builds upon the aims of developing a functioning internal 
market. As I pointed out, there is a continuous trend in Commission discourse to link the 
achievement of the single market with the necessity of undertaking various actions in the 
fields of social policy, border controls or free movement of people. This is evidence of the 
Commission employing functional spillover in its efforts towards promoting further 
integration. The concrete articulation that prompted a move towards the decreased 
significance of internal borders is the goal of “creating an area without internal frontiers”. 
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In the field of border controls after the 1999 Tampere Council was added another 
articulation that presupposes diminished importance of internal borders, the formulation of 
the aim of creating in the EU “an area of freedom, security and justice”. In social policy, 
the construction of a common area is conveyed through references to “a European Model of 
Society/ European Social Model”, which imply that despite any differences that may exist 
between the member states, there is nevertheless a stronger underlying commonality 
between them. As far as the ENP is concerned, one of the core ideas of the policy is to 
“avoid the emergence of new dividing lines” after the latest enlargement of the EU through 
“enhancing the relations” with the partner countries. Again, this creates the perception that 
this policy will diminish the salience of borders and contribute to the construction of a 
common space between the EU and its neighbouring countries. 
In the empirical chapters of the research, using the strategy of double reading, I 
interrogated these bordering articulations and showed that the ways in which they configure 
borders are not as straightforward as it seems initially. A critical engagement shows that in 
each and every case the efforts towards establishing common areas still lead to the 
emergence of borders both at the outer edges of the EU and within it.
1
 With the notable 
exception of the external borders of the Union in the field of border controls, this 
construction and reconstruction of borders is not openly acknowledged in the discourse of 
the Commission. This emergence of new borders is a result of articulations that construct 
new regimes for entering, moving and residing within the territory of the EU; new 
categories of people that have different rights under these regimes; that refer to particular 
groups of people/ social arrangements as being different, inferior, threatening to the Union, 
thus enunciating them as the “Other”.  
For example, a construction and reconstruction of borders recurring in Commission 
discourse throughout the Chapters on Border Controls and Free movement of People, is the 
emergence of the category “EU citizens” who have the right to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Union. These people are in effect juxtaposed in the Commission 
                                               
1 In that respect the ENP is a special case. Due to it being directed towards the external relations of the EU, it 
does not reconstruct internal borders in the Union. Nevertheless, as the analysis in Chapter Six has shown, it 
is implicated in the reconfiguration of European borders parallel with the reconstruction of the EU‟s external 
borders.  
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documents to non-EU citizens (TCNs), who are still very likely to face restrictions when 
entering the Union or trying to relocate within it. Nevertheless, as the analysis in these 
chapters shows, the Commission has consistently been promoting the rights for TCNs. It 
has advanced a position in favour of establishing a regime for the movement of people 
(irrespective of whether they are EU citizens or TCNs) within the EU along the lines of a 
movement within a national territory. As my analysis in Chapters Three and Four shows 
these attempts have been at best partially successful and have resulted in the reconstruction 
of the internal borders in the Union.  This is the case because often the Commission has 
faced strong opposition by the Council and the member states to its positions, which led to 
the ambiguous border configurations of the Commission discourse in these fields. 
Despite this common cause for the construction and reconstruction of borders 
through the Commission discourse, there are some important differences in the particular 
contribution of the Commission across the policy areas. As Chapters Three and Four 
illustrate, when internal EU borders are concerned, the Commission has been more 
successful in overcoming opposition towards greater inclusiveness to TCNs in the first 
pillar. As I showed in Chapter Four, the Commission has persistently tried to find a way to 
transform the acquis so that TCNs, just as EU citizens, face fewer obstacles when moving 
within the EU for work purposes. Therefore, in this policy area, as exemplified by the Blue 
Card initiative, the Commission has employed cultivated spillover and has acted as a policy 
entrepreneur by being pro-active and trying to set the trend. In distinction to this, the 
reconstruction of internal borders in the Commission discourse in the field of border 
controls (which prior to 2001 was in the third pillar) is a result of the inability of the 
Commission to overcome the limitations set to it by other EU actors. Thus, in this field, the 
Commission is playing by the rules established by other actors in the integration process. In 
a similar way the construction of internal borders in the social policy area is a result mainly 
of the limitations for the Commission to secure adherence of all the member states to its 
interpretation of the European Model of Society/ European Social Model.        
In distinction to the Commission efforts to further decrease the internal borders in 
the EU, when its external borders are concerned, it has contributed to their emergence. As 
directly related to the issues of the Union‟s external borders, the ENP and border controls 
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are the primary examples of this. As I argued in Chapters Three and Six, in these policy 
areas the Commission has overall accepted the assumptions on which each of the policies 
are based instead of adopting a more critical stance, which could have allowed it to 
articulate policies that decrease the salience of the EU‟s external borders. As I argued in 
Chapter Six, the ENP is especially well placed in this regard because the whole idea of the 
policy is to prevent the emergence of new dividing lines. This provides the Commission 
with a good starting position for advancing an alternative reading of various beliefs and 
practices, which if altered, can contribute substantially to decreasing the perception of a 
rigid distinction between the Enlarged EU and its neighbours. 
Thus, the case of free movement of people is a good illustration of the limits to 
border transcendence in the discourse of the Commission as a result of the interactions 
taking place during the process of renegotiating the bordering practices in the EU. The 
cases of border controls and the ENP, on the other hand, are examples of the inherent 
inability to transcend borders without the simultaneous necessity to construct borders 
elsewhere. Taken together, these two provide empirical examples of how in practise the 
Commission discourse constructs and reconstructs the internal and external EU borders.  
 Another finding of the study is that in different areas, varying types of borders are 
configured and reconfigured. The analysis of the case studies of this research shows that 
often the articulations configure predominantly one particular type of border. For example, 
the discourse on border controls is concerned predominantly with territorial borders, that on 
social policy deals primarily with identity borders, while the free movement of people one 
puts the accent on functional borders. In the ENP, the analysis shows that it is mainly 
territorial and identity borders that are being configured in the discourse of the European 
Commission. 
These findings contribute to the current academic debates both theoretically and 
empirically. Empirically, firstly I have demonstrated in detail how the processes of border 
transcendence and border construction/reconstruction appear simultaneously. Therefore, 
contrary to the approach taken by the overwhelming majority of current studies on EU 
borders that focus on only one aspect of border transformations (transcendence/ 
construction), I argue that these should always be approached as the two sides of the same 
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coin. Such an understanding provides a much more comprehensive picture of the on-going 
developments on the ground.   
Therefore, secondly, my study highlights the major factors and the current 
limitations leading to border construction/ re-construction through Commission discourses. 
These were demonstrated in the empirical chapters for all the main types of borders that I 
have focused on. In tune with the arguments of discourse theorists and post-strucutralists, it 
is not possible to articulate a perception of the “Self” without juxtaposing it to a particular 
“Other/s”. This was well illustrated especially in the Chapters on the ENP and Social 
Policy, where the analysis of the Commission documents revealed a number of “Others” 
against which the identity of the EU is articulated. As the discussion in Chapter Five 
showed, the major “Other” articulated in the Commission discourse is the US. In the ENP 
the main “Other” articulated are the partner countries because they emerge from 
Commission articulations as inferior, peoples that need to be taught the EU way of doing 
things. Related to this articulation of the “Other” is also the perception of the “Self”. As the 
analysis in the case studies has shown, the Commission documents articulate the EU as a 
world leader, especially in the economy, as an ordered place or as a society based on the 
values of social justice. These articulations contribute to the construction/ reconstruction of 
identity borders. For their part territorial and functional borders are configured mainly as a 
result of the construction of two categories of people, EU citizens and TCNs that are 
covered by different regimes for entering, moving and residing within the territory of the 
Union. The Chapters on Border Controls and Free Movement of People provide good 
illustration of these kinds of border configurations. As I discussed at length in Chapters 
Three and Four, EU citizens are entitled to move freely on the territory of the Union, while 
the regimes for entering into the EU and residing there legally severely restrict this 
possibility for TCNs.  
These examples ultimately show that in the territorial world we inhabit today, the 
Commission discourse does not advance an understanding that can overcome the prevailing 
territorial logic of organising different kinds of interactions. As a result of the two 
limitations in abolishing borders, Commission discourse contributes to the configuration of 
territorial, functional and identity borders. As the analysis in Chapters Three to Six shows, 
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this is demonstrated by the emergence of new divisions at the external edges of the Union 
and by the reconstruction of internal borders within it. Importantly, as far as the 
reconstruction of internal borders is concerned, as Chapters Four and Five show, the 
Commission in fact supports their transcendence, which is evident primarily from the Blue 
Card initiative and the efforts towards including the UK in the Agreement on Social Policy 
in the first half of the 1990s. Therefore, in these cases it is the constraints the Commission 
faces within the EU decision-making system that limit the actual achievement of the 
decreased significance of borders. This is not the case, however, with external EU borders, 
where Chapters Three and Six show the concurrence of Commission articulations with the 
prevailing logic in these policy areas. This is evidence that unless it is placed on a global 
scale any integration efforts are likely to lead to the emergence of some borders at some 
level.  
Thirdly, the project through its detailed examination of a wide range of Commission 
documents provides new angle of analysis under which particular details become more 
obvious. For example, the origins of the ENP in the European Security Strategy give an 
insight into why the policy is inherently contradictory in regards to its articulations about 
the partner countries and the detailed examination of the social policy discourse shows the 
underlying similarities between the two Models in regards to their configuration of borders. 
Thus, these realities at the borders of/ in the EU point to two important practical 
conclusions. Firstly, there is a necessity to examine critically the formulations and policy 
goals of EU institutions. As the example of the ENP demonstrates especially well, 
sometimes there is a discrepancy between the stated objectives in the official documents 
and the assumptions guiding the measures undertaken. Sometimes such a mismatch can 
have negative results on the achievement of these same aims. Therefore, what is required is 
evaluating critically whether despite the language and the overall presumed direction of a 
policy the underlying assumptions that inform decision-making and actions allow the 
effective attainment of the stated goals. Because if they do not until action is undertaken to 
address this issue, the declared policy aims will not be achieved, thus, prolonging the 
negative effects that prompted the development of the policy in the first place. Secondly, it 
is necessary to be more sensitive to the fact that very often decreasing the significance of 
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borders is a process that can take a lot of time and resources. Therefore, very often the legal 
inclusion or entry into the EU in a way may represent only the first step towards border 
transcendence. Such an argument is highlighted by the findings of the Chapter on Social 
Policy that there is a danger that despite the stated support and necessity to ensure the 
inclusion of the “new” EU member states into the European Social Model, in practice this 
is still highly problematic. However, the successful achievement of this goal is paramount 
because otherwise the perception that the “new” member states are not properly European 
will strive, thus pointing to the continuing existence of dividing lines.     
These empirical contributions relate back to some core theoretical debates in 
Political Science and Integration Studies. I have engaged with questions such as what are 
borders, how should they be studied, what is integration, or what is the Commission role in 
it, in order to develop my analytical framework. In that respect, the present study makes 
several contributions on a theoretical level.  
Firstly, I have argued that Neo-functionalism as it currently stands provides only a 
detailed account of Commission contribution towards  the configuration of the internal EU 
borders. This is an argument that is supported by the examples in the empirical chapters. As 
far as the external EU borders are concerned, Neo-functionalism anticipates that the 
Commission will favour the emergence of EU‟s external borders. Nevertheless, this theory 
does not explicitly engage with an in-depth analysis of how the Commission will express 
its preferences in practice. The present study allows addressing this shortcoming. As the 
analysis in the empirical chapters shows, there are several main ways in which the 
Commission has endorsed and facilitated the emergence of salient EU external borders. 
Firstly, this comes about due to the Commission accepting the underlying assumptions on 
which EU policies are based. I demonstrated this trend in Chapters Three and Six. 
Secondly, the external EU borders emerge as a result of the utilisation of spillover in the 
Commission discourse. Chapters Three and Four of this study provided illustration of this. 
Thirdly, EU‟s external identity borders are articulated in the Commission discourse by 
enunciating particular understandings of the “Self” and the “Other”. Chapters Four, Five 
and Six illustrate this.  
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Furthermore, importantly, these different patterns of the construction of the EU‟s 
external border by the Commission discourse provide examples of different contribution of 
the Commission to the process. The acceptance of the underlying policy assumptions can 
be attributed to the inability of the Commission to overcome the preferences of other 
powerful institutions, such as the Council of Ministers, on how the process of integration 
should be conducted. As such, it is plausible that the Commission was not the driving factor 
behind the establishment of the EU external borders. However, the last two examples are 
more clearly related to the Commission performing some of its core functions. Therefore, 
arguably the external borders these articulations configure come about as a direct 
consequence of the actions of the Commission. In these cases, the Commission support is 
most likely due to the possibilities of increasing its own powers and prerogatives.  
Secondly, I have provided a conceptualisation of the ways in which various types of 
borders in the EU are created. In Chapter Two I developed a general matrix of the main 
ways in which different types of borders can be configured and I demonstrated how it 
applies to the various policy areas interrogated in this study. Furthermore, building on the 
differentiation between two main types of internal EU borders, I have classified the internal 
borders reconstructed through the discourses of the European Commission in the fields of 
border controls, free movement of people and social policy. This contributes to pinpointing 
the on-going struggle between intergovernmental and supranational solutions in the process 
of redrawing EU‟s borders. When the former is paramount, national borders between the 
member states persist, thus prolonging the reign of Westphalian thinking. When the latter is 
dominant, important borders beyond the national ones of the member states emerge, which 
creates a new spatial organisation of various relations.     
Thirdly, I have addressed the role of the Commission in the transcendence, 
construction and reconstruction of EU borders, thus relating to the debates about its 
contribution to the process of integration. I argued that the Commission occupies a strategic 
position within the institutional structure of the EU, which is crucial because this allows it 
to be able to sway the decision-making process in its preferred direction. At the same time, 
I looked into the limitations it faces in promoting its preferred outcomes. 
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A major consequence of the findings of this thesis is that academic studies need to 
be much more attentive and critical to the ways in which borders are actually configured in 
policy documents. As the strategy of double reading, which I employed in this research has 
revealed, actors involved in decision-making may tend to articulate things in a specific way 
and to advance particular representations. These in turn encourage particular perceptions. 
When scholars, as well as other people, do not engage critically with thus constructed 
perceptions, there is a real danger of accepting them at face value. I refer to this process as 
a danger because it is through unquestioned acceptance of the messages conveyed that 
important dynamics that are taking place are not interrogated. In turn, this implicitly 
supports the assumptions the documents in question make, which contributes to the 
“normalisation” of the practices involved. When that happens, processes that are in fact 
constructed by people through their social interactions start to be taken as a given, creating 
the impression that there is nothing that can be done about it.  
For example, in the case of current inclusion/ exclusion dynamics in the EU that 
inform the particular ways in which borders are constructed, a central assumption, 
supported by the discourse of the Commission has been that the abolition of border controls 
between the member states necessitates stronger borders at the outer edges of the Union. As 
the Chapter on Border Controls has demonstrated, this assumption has been widely utilised 
(including by the Commission) in various discourses related to Shengen to create the 
current system that regulates the flow of people at the external borders of the EU. However, 
some scholars have argued that borders between the current Union member states have 
always been permeable and therefore, the abolition of internal border controls in the EU 
makes less difference than it is widely held to.
2
 Such a claim puts back in the limelight the 
issues of why, then, current policies on border controls in the EU take the shape they do, 
allowing to interrogate who they benefit, who loses from them, what alternative 
arrangements can be made. Therefore, critical engagements with the ways in which borders 
are currently configured are indispensable because they allow developing more 
                                               
2 Jef Huysmans, „The European Union and Securitization of Migration‟, Journal of Common Market Studies, 
38: 6 (2000), pp. 751-777 
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sophisticated grounds for policy-making and implementation and making it more difficult 
for policy-makers to ignore some important outcomes of their undertakings.  
In a similar vein, the critical engagement with the ways in which Commission 
documents configure borders, has allowed me to successfully address the issue that is of 
central concern here, namely to examine the configuration of EU and European borders by 
Commission discourse.  As this study shows, contrary to the perception suggested by the 
Commission documents, the Commission has much more ambiguous ways of configuring 
borders, which lead to border constructions and reconstructions parallel with the above 
process of border transcendence. Despite successfully addressing this central question, the 
research has come across issues that it has not been able to tackle in detail but which are in 
one way or another related to the question of configuring borders under the process of 
integration. Namely, future studies can engage in pursuing the question of when certain 
bordering articulations were advanced, where they were advanced, which were the actors 
behind them, and how these bordering articulations developed time-wise. Another direction 
in which the interrogation of this study can be continued is to investigate how the 
Commission‟s preferred positions on an issue are negotiated and supported in the wider 
decision-making machine of the EU and how they eventually develop into concrete 
policies. Also, a more empirically rich account can be provided to the claim that the 
Commission tends to promote the construction of the EU‟s external borders because this 
leads to an increase in its powers and prerogatives. In terms of policy-specific future 
research, it is of paramount importance to follow up on the ways in which the “new” 
member states of the EU are included into the ESM. This is the case because if the 
Commission assertion that there is a unique European way for organising societal relations 
is to hold true, becoming part of this European identity may prove to be a focal point for 
establishing a genuine enlarged common European area. From the field of social policy this 
common space may expand to other fields, thus having a significant impact on the 
transcendence of current internal borders in the EU.  
However, in tune with the central argument of this study even such a development 
will result in configuring borders at the external edges of the Union, which is an 
inevitability that even supranational institutions cannot escape. Therefore, especially in the 
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light of the findings of the Chapter on the ENP, it is going to be beneficial to start talking 
more openly of the emerging external borders of the Union.  This will at least have the 
advantage of allowing addressing some of the serious issues that come with it in terms of 
the final borders of the Union or the regimes for TCNs and maybe as a result creating a 
more transparent playing-field. 
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